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ABSTRACT
THE TAXPAYER AS REFORMER:
'POCKETBOOK POLITICS' AND THE LAW, 1860 -1940
by
Linda Upham-Bornstein
University of New Hampshire, May 2009
Dissertation Director, Associate Professor Lucy Salyer
Taxes and the citizens' tax burden have always been at the hub of American politics.
This dissertation opens up consideration of taxpayers as political and legal actors, who saw
paying taxes as a source of political legitimacy and empowerment. It examines the powerful
connection between organized taxpayer activity, political reform, and the law.
Organized taxpayers have relied heavily on the law in general, and on taxpayers'
lawsuits in particular, to promote their interests and political reform. During the last half of
the nineteenth century courts, and legislatures throughout the nation came to recognize the
right of taxpayers to bring suit to restrain unlawful acts by local government officials and
to force them to perform their duties. Between 1908 and 1930, the Citizens Union, a
political reform organization in New York City, employed this taxpayers' tactic in a
concerted and successful taxpayers' litigation program to combat corruption and promote
reform in municipal government.
Organized taxpayer activity became institutionalized with the formation oftaxpayers'
associations in the 1850s, but for the next seventy-five years the creation and activities of
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such organizations were sporadic. The Great Depression was a watershed in the history of
taxpayers' associations in the United States.

That economic crisis precipitated the

widespread proliferation of taxpayers' associations, and by 1935 the taxpayers' association
had developed into a permanent and influential institution in the United States through which
Americans engaged in political and legal activism. Since 1930, taxpayers' organizations
have played a critical role in refashioning the institutions and the operations of state and
local government.
Although taxpayers associations are often associated with conservative politics in
contemporary America, the history of organized taxpayer activity demonstrates that the
taxpayer could be mobilized for a broad range of political endeavors, even joining forces with
groups that some deemed radical. Organized taxpayer activity is significant because it sheds
light on key features of American society and because for 250 years it has frequently been a
sphere of activity in which the dynamics of citizenship, political reform, pocketbook politics
and law intersect.

XI

INTRODUCTION

PROTECTING THE TAXPAYERS' "HARD EARNED MONEY:"
ORGANIZED TAXPAYER ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

For nearly two and a half centuries, taxes and the citizens' tax burden have been at
the center of political tension in the United States. The nation was born in the context of a
tax revolt, and early in its history it experienced civil insurrection during the Whiskey
Rebellion. Taxes remain at the forefront of political debate in 2009, as anyone who watches
the 24-hour news coverage can attest Meg Jacobs has argued that "the fact that every
person... [is] a shopper made a consumer interest potentially powerful" in the early twentieth
century.1 Likewise, the fact that almost every adult American is a taxpayer has made the
interests of taxpayers prominent and powerful in American history. Organized taxpayer
activity is significant because it sheds light on certain key features of American society and
because for 250 years it has been a sphere of activity where the dynamics of citizenship,
political reform, pocketbook politics and law intersect and interact
A taxpayer's July 1931 letter to the editor, published in the Middlesboro Daily News
in Middlesboro, Kentucky, touched upon many of the salient aspects of organized taxpayer
activity in the United States. The writer praised the recently formed Taxpayers' League of
Bell County, declaring that "[w]e have a few unselfish citizens in our towns and county who
have organized a Taxpayers' League for the purpose ofprotecting the hard earned money the
taxpayers pay into the cities' and county's treasuries." The writer argued that such a
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taxpayers' organization was essential for several reasons. First, history had shown numerous
"irregularities and misapplication" of public funds by officials, as a result of which there
were then pending thirty-seven suits against public officials to recover those funds.
Moreover, because local officials "do not have full and complete audits made of their records
so that the taxpayers may know how their tax money is being spent,... we need a Taxpayers'
League to compel such audits to be made." Finally, the writer maintained, the "Taxpayers'
League is the only unselfish friend the taxpayer has—the only friend that will go out into the
open and into the courts and fight for the rights of the taxpayer." The letter concluded with
a ringing indictment of opponents of the League, declaring that any "man that hates and
abuses the Taxpayers' League... is not a first-class citizen of the country in which he lives."2
The anonymous letter is hardly an objective assessment of taxpayers' associations
but, rather, a partisan paean to them. It did, however, depict how taxpayers applied
conceptions of citizenship, engaged in pocketbook politics, endeavored to facilitate political
reform, and called upon the law and the courts to promote their interests. The writer
grounded the very origins of the taxpayers' league in notions of citizenship, equated good
citizenship with participation in such organized taxpayer activity, and questioned the
citizenship status of its opponents. The overarching purpose of the league was to engage in
pocketbook politics at one of its most basic levels by protecting taxpayers' dollars. One
means to this end was to promote political reform through combating corruption and
requiring transparency in government. Another was to resort to the courts and there invoke
the coercive power of the law to enforce the rights of citizen taxpayers and to hold public
officials accountable. The letter thus reflects organized taxpayer activity as a realm of action
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in which of citizenship, pocketbook politics, political reform, and the law all figured
prominently.
Taxes and taxpayers' organizations may not, at first glance, appear to be the most
engaging or alluring subjects of historical inquiry. On closer examination, however, one
finds that organized taxpayer activity is indeed important. It merits scholarly investigation
because it has so often been the context for the engagement of taxpayers and tax spenders
(referring to governments units and officials who expend public funds and to those
individuals who supported greater government spending) in American history.3 In general,
taxpayers have focused on containing the cost of government, whereas tax spenders have
been preoccupied with maintaining what they consider a reasonably necessary level of
government activity. The critical issues over which the interests of taxpayers and tax
spenders collide have consistently been at the hub of American politics. What is the
reasonably necessary level of government services, how big should government become, and
how and by whom (meaning which taxpayers) should it be funded? Disagreement about to
what extent, and on what matters, tax dollars should be spent has been a recurrent element
of taxpayer - tax spender engagement The economic downturn of 2008 - 2009 has once
again brought this dynamic to the front and center of American politics.
Moreover, collective action by taxpayers illustrates how Americans have developed,
adapted and applied conceptions ofcitizenship over time. It also offers insights into how and
why they have engaged in pocketbook politics and political reform to promote their interests.
Finally, organized taxpayer activity tells us much about the role of law in American society
and how taxpayers have used law and legal institutions in an effort to shape their destinies

3

and control their environments.
Organized taxpayer activity in the United States became formalized in its current state
with the creation of taxpayers' associations (sometimes called taxpayers' organizations or
taxpayers' leagues) in the 1850s. For a century and a half, taxpayers' associations have been
an institution, and since 1930 a principal institution, through which Americans have realized
their status as citizens, advanced political reform, participated in pocketbook politics, and
used the law to achieve their objectives.
The connections between taxpayers' associations and citizenship are fundamental and
vital. Citizenship, as historian Linda Kerber has suggested, "is basic to all other claims
which individuals make on the state, or the state makes upon them."4 Citizenship is, to say
the least, a complex and multifaceted concept. In general, it refers to the status or standing
of members of a state with respect to the state. It denotes a mixture of obligations, privileges
and rights that stand in various relations to one another. Such "[rjights and obligations are
reciprocal elements of citizenship" and, in that sense, two sides of the same coin.5 One of
the obligations of citizenship is to pay taxes, but in the mid-nineteenth century taxpayers
began to argue that this obligation gave rise to a corresponding right of citizens to hold
public officials accountable for how they spend taxes. Since that time, organized taxpayer
activity in the United States has been galvanized by that obligation and rooted in that right.
I contend that the development and expansion of the taxpaying citizen's right to hold
public officials accountable is a primary component of organized taxpayer activity in the
United States. Such a right was not contemplated when the nation was created. When the
colonists declared "no taxation without representation," they were merely asserting a general
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right to have their own elected representatives vote on taxes, not a specific right to oversee
how those taxes were spent or to check or restrain particular expenditures by public officials.
In the mid-nineteenth century, the latter right was still relatively inchoate and incipient.
Around 1850, however, taxpaying citizens started to articulate and advance such a right
through taxpayers' associations. For the next eighty years they pressed and expanded that
right, mainly through traditional political activity and through taxpayers' lawsuits against
local government officials.
By the late 1920s this aspect of citizenship in America was firmly established, but by
no means prominent or dominant Organized taxpayer activity in general, and citizens'
assertions of their right to accountability in particular, were still occasional and sporadic.
The economic crisis of the Great Depression was transformative in this regard. That crisis
precipitated an explosive growth of taxpayers' associations in almost every state. As a
consequence, Americans nation-wide intensively pursued, enforced and expanded their right
to hold public officials accountable for how they operated government and expended public
funds through a broad array of organized taxpayer activities, most notably through research,
legislative, legal and political efforts. The taxpayers' association movement of the 1930s
played an indispensable part in the evolution of Americans' conception of citizenship from
one based on obligations to one based on rights. It gave rise to a more distinctively
"modern" notion of the taxpayer as citizen with the rights to insist that government officials
be made to account for how they spent tax dollars and to check particular public
expenditures, rights which from that time on were widely recognized and invoked.
Taxpayers organizations also exemplify another critical aspect of citizenship in the
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United States - the "daily use which [Americans] make of the right of association" that
Alexis deTocqueville had observed a century earlier. Such organizations were symptomatic
of the propensity and the tradition of "[t]he citizen of the United States... to rely upon his
own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life." Tocqueville argued that
liberty of association in America was a principal means by which its citizens engaged in self
help to promote their interests, to resist "the tyranny of the majority," to "prevent the
despotism of faction or the arbitrary power" of the state, and otherwise to advance their
political objectives.6

This tradition of self help explains in part the indigenous and

spontaneous character of taxpayers' leagues.7 The scope and extent of organized taxpayer
activity in the United States confirmed Tocqueville's observations that Americans are "freely
and constantly forming associations for the purpose of promoting some political principle"
and that they also make use of public associations "in civil life, without reference to political
objects."8
Freedom of association, however, was not only a right but also an obligation of
citizenship. Historian Christopher Capozzola has contended that, throughout much of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "[b]eing a good citizen meant fulfilling your
political obligations and doing so through voluntary associations," and that Americans
"preferred voluntary associations as forums for public discussion and the execution of
political agendas" to the expansion of central government9 The freedom of association that
Americans exercised by participating in taxpayers' associations implicated reciprocal
components of citizenship in the United States, right and duty.
As the evolution of the taxpaying citizen's right to accountability suggests, the
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relationship and balance between rights and obligations in Americans' notions of citizenship
have not been static. Capozolla has noted that "throughout American history, a citizenship
of obligation has always coexisted with one of rights," but that "a rights-based vision of
citizenship...play[ed] a [more] prominent role in twentieth-century America."10 Some
historians, such as Kerber and Capozolla, have focused on the obligations of citizenship.
Others, like Meg Jacobs, have concentrated on the rights side of the citizenship coin. Jacobs
has identified an economic aspect of citizenship that emerged during the twentieth century
and was "based on participation in the mass consumer economy" and the right to consume.
She argued that "[i]n the twentieth century, as the economy and society became increasingly
organized around a new national mass consumer market, the means to consume became
important...as a marker of economic citizenship and full membership in the American
polity."11 Taxpayers, in their status as taxpayers, do not consume goods, but they do pay for
and consume government services. Consequently, the extent of their tax burden directly
affects the extent to which they are able to "become full economic citizens" and enjoy the
"promise ofa better, richer life."12 Collective action by American taxpayers has, for the most
part, been the product of a culture of citizenship emphasizing rights rather than obligations.
The outgrowth of this economic citizenship was what Jacobs calls "pocketbook
politics." She contends that, as a result of the development of a mass consumer economy in
the last century, the question of purchasing power - the ability of people to afford goodscame to the forefront of political debate, and "for most of the twentieth century... was never
far from the center ofAmerican politics." To optimize purchasing power, Americans pushed
for higher wages and lower prices.13 Pocketbook politics for taxpayers, as consumers of
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government services, focused on the cost side of the equation. Simply put, taxpayers wanted
to buy more government for the same amount of money or the same amount of government
for less money. Consequently, a perennial objective of taxpayers' associations has been to
promote economy and efficiency in government.
Organized taxpayers sought to achieve this goal through a wide array of political and
legal activities directed at the reformation of state and local government. One approach was
to change the people who ran government, with a view to improving the quality and integrity
of public officials, by engaging in traditional party politics. Another was to implement
measures, either administratively or by changing the relevant law, designed to improve the
means and methods of public administration and finance. These efforts, broadly referred to
as good government reform, gained momentum in the first decade of the twentieth century.
A third was to bring lawsuits, generally known as taxpayers' actions,torestrain the unlawful
expenditure of public funds or other illegal acts by local government officials or to compel
them to comply with the law. Taxpayers' suits were useful tools in fighting corruption in
local government and in making public officials accountable for how they spent public funds
and carried out their duties.
There were two aspects to the political reform activities of organized taxpayers:
reform has been both an objective of taxpayers' organizations and a strategy employed by
them. In some cases the main focus and objective of the taxpayers' association was reform
of the political system itself, and the taxpayers' association was a strategy or instrument with
which to change the political system. In these circumstances, taxpayers' organizations
generally served as a means by which political outsiders (those not then in political power)
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sought to exercise some degree of control and influence over those office holders who were
in power. The efforts of the Citizens Union and other New York City reform organizations
directed against the Tammany machine in thefirstthree decades of the twentieth century, and
those of taxpayers' associations in the South during Reconstruction, aimed at local
governments run by Republicans and "carpetbaggers," are representative ofthis aspect of the
political reform programs of organized taxpayers. Sometimes these political reform
activities had a progressive tenor to them, pursued for the purpose of combating corruption,
waste and inefficiency in local government At other times they appeared reactionary, the
efforts of conservative naysayers who wanted to circumvent the will of the majority or
unreasonably tie the hands of government
In the other aspect of organized taxpayer political reform, economic relief and
pocketbook politics were the objectives, and political reform was the strategy that taxpayers'
associations used to these economic ends. The most obvious example of this second facet
is the taxpayers' association movement of the Great Depression.
In both contexts, whether political reform was the ends or the means, law played an
indispensable part Law was both a strategy or tool of reform and an arena in which much
ofthe engagement between taxpayers and tax spenders played out Law and legal institutions
also figured prominently in the other tax reduction efforts of organized taxpayers.14
Kermit Hall has argued that the "contemporary definitions of law fully stress its
connection to society.... [L]aw is a system of social choice, one in which government
provides for the allocation of resources, the legitimate use of force, and the restructuring of
social relationships."15 Much of my analysis of organized taxpayer activity in the United
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States draws on law and society historiography. A recurring theme in that literature, as the
name implies, is the nature ofthe relationship between law and society. Do law and the legal
institutions of a society inform and shape that society and effectuate social and cultural
change over time?16 Or, on the other hand, do the impacts flow primarily in the opposite
direction, such that a society's law and legal institutions are essentially products of that
society?17
The problem with both formulations is that they characterize the influence as flowing
principally only in one direction, much like the phenomenon of direct current in the context
of electricity. Such a unidirectional conception does not do justice to the complex, organic
relationship between society and law and, in the long run, is as ineffective in generating
meaningful light on the subject as direct current is in generating electric light over great
distances. It is more useful to regard the relationship as a bidirectional one, more akin to
alternating current, in which the current flows in both directions, albeit sometimes more in
one direction and sometimes more in the other. Perhaps the most salient feature of the
relationship between law and society is its mutuality, a quality that is reflected in the
activities of organized taxpayers.
The intimate and reciprocal relationship between social reform and the law is
illustrative. At the turn ofthe twentieth century, for example, progressive reformers secured
important changes in statute law that advanced their agendas, such as the passage of child
labor laws and worker's compensation acts in most states. In these efforts Americans
expressed "no hesitancy in making affirmative use of the law" and in shaping it "to their
wants and vision."18 These statutory innovations, in turn, by redefining and restructuring
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social and economic relationships between employers and employees, had a profound impact
on American society and demonstrated the power of the law "to shape social life."19
Progressive-era social and economic legislation not only shaped and informed society in the
United States, but also was a product of that society.
The significant degree to which organized taxpayers have called upon the law and the
courts for assistance since 1860 corroborates the conclusions of historians such as James
Willard Hurst that the nineteenth century legal order was shaped by a "common instrumental
belief that people "could materially control their environment through the legally mobilized
power of the community," that in the first half of the twentieth century most Americans
"continued... to hold and indeed to strengthen the confidence that we could by law
measurably shape environment to our ends," and that, as Kermit Hall has summarized the
consensus school of thought, the law "has functioned as an honest broker through which
conflicting interests have sought to achieve their own ends" in American society.20 The
taxpayers' suit was a good example of the manner in which, Hurst noted, "Americans made
considerable use of legal compulsion to meet the challenge of [their] environment."21
At the same time, the amplitude and magnitude of taxpayers' associations' lawrelated activities, especially the surge in taxpayers' actions, reveal the profound influence of
law in American society. Because, as Tocqueville had observed, "[sjcarcely any question
arises in the United States which does not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial
debate," Americans "are obligated to borrow the ideas, and even the language usual in
judicial proceedings, in their daily controversies.... The language of the law thus becomes,
in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law... gradually penetrates... into the
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bosom of society."22 Americans' conceptions of legality in general, and the mature body
of law regarding taxpayers' suits that evolved between 1860 and 1930 in particular, both
framed the disputes between taxpaying citizens and government units and determined their
outcomes. In this regard, the law was, as Christopher Tomlins has hypothesized, "a mode
of operation, a structure, a discourse in itself that "informed and helped constitute" the
discourse of power.23 Moreover, the issues that taxpayers' suits presented and resolved - the
specifics of how tax dollars were to be spent and how local government was to be operated
-were acutely political ones. Consequently, taxpayers' associations and taxpayers' litigation
manifest the dynamic relationship between law and politics, the alliance of legal and political
activism, and the taxpayer as political and legal actor. In doing so, they reflect the "complex
interrelationship between law and politics" articulated by critical legal studies scholars.24
Taxpayers' associations thus demonstrate the centrality of law in America and the
complex, reciprocal relationship between law and society in the United States. Through
these instruments ordinary Americans made affirmative use of the law and of conceptions
of legality for their own purposes in order to advance their interests, arbitrate their
controversies with local government officials, and influence the conduct of government.
Those same instruments simultaneously served as conduits for a substantial centrifugal flow
of influencefromthe legal order, especially the common law courts and legislative bodies,
to society.
Notwithstanding its significance, organized taxpayer activity has received little
attentionfromhistorians. Occasionally, one finds a passing reference to or a short discussion
of taxpayers' associations in works on other subjects.25 The only treatment of taxpayers'
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organizations throughout the United States is that contained in the first chapter of historian
David Beito's work on the 1930- 1933 Chicago tax strike. Beito limits his examination to
a brief survey of taxpayers' associations that proliferated across the nation in the early
1930s.26 I undertake a more comprehensive and thorough investigation oforganized taxpayer
activity, examining the evolution of taxpayers' associations between the mid-nineteenth
century and 1940, the tools and tactics that taxpayers developed to promote their interests,
and the conceptual basis for their claims. I look at organized taxpayer activity both from a
national perspective and in particular local contexts. Doing so provides insights into the
salient characteristics of such activity in the United States and how those dynamics played
out in specific instances.
One of the challenges presented by the history of organized taxpayer activity in the
United States is its diversity, which makes it somewhat amorphous. Depending on the time
and the context, organized taxpayer activity assumed a variety of forms, shapes, and even
hues. In the majority of cases, organized taxpayer activity represented the bottom-up,
grassroots, local efforts of the broad swath of middle-class citizens aimed primarily at
lightening their tax burden. In other instances, the taxpayers' main objective was the
political reform of local government, and lowering taxes was an ancillary goal. In the
Reconstruction South, organized taxpayer activity was infused with a considerable degree
of racial and political animus, and was directed both at alleviating oppressive taxes and at
combating Republican regimes in local government The Citizens Union in New York City
was not organized taxpayer activity per se but, rather, an organization of upper-crust
Progressive reformers who adopted a tactic developed by taxpayers in the nineteenth century,
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the taxpayers' lawsuit, to accomplish their political reform goals. Organized taxpayers
employed an extremely broad range of means to accomplish their various ends, ranging from
moderate research, investigation and legislative efforts to more aggressive, but still
mainstream, tactics, most notably traditional political activity and taxpayers' litigation.
Sometimes, particularly during the crisis of the Great Depression, taxpayers' organizations
invoked even more aggressive modes, including pressing for tax limitations and occasionally
utilizing their most militant weapon, the tax strike. The most extreme methods were
employed by southern white taxpayers during Reconstruction, where the threat and the act
of violence were not uncommon. In short, the form, the ends, and the means of organized
taxpayers in the United States have been extremely variegated, giving organized taxpayer
activity something of a chameleon-like quality.

In the remainder ofthis introduction, I trace the origins oftaxpayers' associations and
their development from the mid-nineteenth century to the late 1920s. With this foundation
laid, the subsequent chapters look at specific aspects and episodes of organized taxpayer
activity by Americans.
While taxpayers' associations came into their own and assumed a prominent role in
American life in the 1930s, they did not then suddenly appear from nowhere, fully developed
and ready for battle, like Athena was said to have sprung from the head of Zeus. Rather their
origins and antecedents may be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. Citizens' frustration
with perceived political inequities, graft and corruption was evidenced by the episodic
formation oftaxpayers' associations across the United States, starting in the 1850s. Although

14

the organizations varied in purpose and makeup, they were all established by taxpaying
stakeholders as a tool to influence the direction of local and state economies.
As early as 1858, the New York Herald repotted that taxpayers in assembly districts
across New York City were forming "Citizens and Taxpayer Associationfs]" and nominating
candidates for alderman. One taxpayers' association proclaimed that its candidates had
received support "from the best and most influential citizens... [and] they therefore... invite
every voter who desires to elect honest and reliable men... to support the ticket."27 In 1861,
the Herald identified another taxpayers' association in New York City, which urged the
citizens to "restore capacity and honesty in the administration ofthe municipal government,
and show themselves worthy of republican institutions," in response to reports that the
Democratic Mayor, Fernando Wood, a Confederate sympathizer, had mishandled city funds
and allowed "traitors" from the "rebellious States" to seize arms from the New York
armory.28 In CaUfornia, rapid expansion and development fueled conflict between local
officials and taxpayers associations in mat state in the early 1860s.29
During Reconstruction, former Confederate states witnessed a surge in the number
of taxpayers' associations in response to the political policies of the Republican Party. In
much of the South, the property taxes levied by Republicans were burdensome, and many
people, especially farmers, were unable to pay them.30 As a consequence, white southerners
organized taxpayers' leagues to combat oppressive taxation caused by corruption in
government and by wasteful public spending.31 In this regard, they were motivated by the
same economic concerns as other organized taxpayers throughout the nation. What
distinguished taxpayers' associations in the South, though, was their willingness to use
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violence to achieve their goals. When they did not get what they wanted through political,
bureaucratic, and legislative efforts, it was not uncommon for southern white taxpayers to
threaten and engage in violence and even to murder black officeholders.
Taxpayers' leagues proliferated throughout the South in the decade following the
Civil War. In 1868, taxpayers in Nashville, Tennessee organized to protest against "unwise
and wicked legislation" in municipal affairs and to prevent "burdensome and unjust
taxation." The Association proclaimed it would takes steps to correct the injustices in
municipal administration or "bring the guilty parties to justice." An article in a Memphis
daily newspaper called on local taxpayers to look to Nashville's example and form their own
organization to fight the rise of "schemes...to make private fortunes out of public
misfortunes."32
Contemporary news accounts throughout the South identified several influential
taxpayers groups emerging in South Carolina and Alabama.

They attributed mis

phenomenon to the current political and military circumstances that allowed "thieves and
miscreants" to control municipal governments. The Macon Weekly Telegraph complained
about the "[njumber of blacks who occupy seats in the Legislature," as a result of which that
body was "made up almost exclusively of degraded and venal paupers... Not one
representative in ten stands for a tax-paying or property-holding constituency." It further
argued mat the conditions that existed in South Carolina would never be tolerated in "any
Northern State without a tax-payers' league being organized to resist the payment of taxes
imposed for fraudulent purposes."33 Two years later, in 1874, the same newspaper
commended the taxpayers in two counties in Alabama that had "united to resist in every
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lawful and legitimate manner, the thieving of their Radical and carpet-bag officials."34 The
Alabama taxpayers vowed that if they could not effectuate change in municipal
administration through "the strictest scrutiny," then "as a last resort, [they would] appeal to
the courts for justice against their knavery."35 True to their word, in May 1874, the
Montgomery County League successfully pushed for the prosecution and conviction of the
tax collector and the filing of indictments against several other county officials. The Macon
paper showered the Alabama taxpayers' group with praises and called for such action by
taxpayers in all southern communities in "hopes that the law may yet have its course, but at
present the carpet-bagger's star is in the ascendant, and he bids defiance to all legal
process."36
Frustration with northern interference with southern property owners' individual
rights and local control spawned taxpayers' groups in other states. In 1873, in Smith County,
Tennessee a taxpayers' group, sought to enjoin the subscription of $300,000 of stock to the
Tennessee and Pacific Railroad Company because, it alleged, the election held in December
1869 did not include the taxpayers in the eighth district of Smith County and that, therefore,
the election and the expenditure of public funds pursuant to that vote were illegal. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled in favor of the taxpayers and enjoined the subscription.
Why the decision was made by the county to by-pass the taxpayers in the eighth district is
unclear. What was significant was their decision to organize in response to the immediate
need and bring a taxpayers' action in order to assert their claims and protect their rights as
taxpaying citizens.37
The central role that violence played in taxpayers' organizations was all too evident
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in Vicksburg, Mississippi, where in 1873 taxpayers formed a taxpayers' league numbering
600 in response to a dramatic property tax increase, the result of "reckless extravagance."
The League launched an investigation of city officials and found evidence to suggest that the
city clerk had forged script and practiced "other rascalities." Verbal attacks by League
members exposed the deep rift between the white southerners and the Reconstruction
government officials, whom Leaguers believed were robbing white property owners. A
violent backlash resulted against the local black population that, according to white
southerners, was in cahoots with the Reconstruction government.38 Northern news accounts
of the events in Vicksburg suggest that the taxpayers' league and a so-called White League
were one and the same and were rooted in the Ku Klux Klan.39 In a subsequent hearing
members of the taxpayers' league defended their actions, claiming mat "there was nothing
political in [their organization]; colored men, if taxpayers, could join it." The League's goal
had been "to examine the books of the Chancery Clerk," but the Clerk had refused to
cooperate, stating that "I don't represent you or any of your crowd." To this the League
responded that since its members paid 90% of the taxes they had a right to ensure that the
clerk was "competent and honest."40
Much organized taxpayer activity in the states ofthe former Confederacy was fueled
by the deep political, racial and social divisions in the South during Reconstruction. Indeed,
the members of the Vicksburg Taxpayers' League likely went out of their way to disavow
political and racial motivations for their actions in order to obscure the class, racial and
political issues at stake. Taxpayers' associations provided white southerners a facade of
legitimacy, a forum for civic protest that was neutral on its face, but behind which boiled
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profound societal tensions. In many southern states during Reconstruction, the tensions
between white taxpaying southerners and Republican political leaders, black or white, in
some cases were exhibited in the moderate form of legal action by taxpayers, and in others
the violent form of murderous rampages, as seen in Vicksburg. Though much organized
taxpayer activity in the South in this period was spurred by the taxpayers' genuine desire to
reduce their taxes, in some cases taxpayers' associations served as fronts for groups of whites
determined to oust Republican regimes by any means necessary, including violence. The
degree to which these white taxpayers' organizations resorted to violence distinguishes them
from other taxpayers' associations, which pursued their objectives through lawful channels.
Southern communities were not alone in their efforts to confront the "reckless
expenditure of the people's money."41 In the 1870s, Camden, New Jersey and its neighbor,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania both had active taxpayers' leagues. The Camden Taxpayers'
League, in 1875, obtained an injunction to restrain the city treasurer from paying "certain
bills allowed by Councils to the former and present supervisors of highways." The League
adopted measures to "prevent future excessive rates of taxation" and to stop the "illegal
expenditure of public money." The next year it sought an injunction restraining the "city
treasurer from paying the additional $3.00 per week to the clerk's messenger," arguing that
the messenger's salary had been improperly increased from $12 to $15 per week by the
Council.42 In 1878, on the other side of the river in Philadelphia, citizens formed a
taxpayers' league in the twenty-seventh ward in response to the increased tax burden and
their belief that the present political parties were incapable of reforming government.
Unlike many of the taxpayers' organizations mentioned previously, which were politically
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independent, the Philadelphia group entertained an alliance with the Labor Party. The
Philadelphia Inquirer saw this action as the emergence of a "[rjeform [m]ovement" In
Philadelphia's eighth ward a taxpayers' league called on voters to "elect none but good
men... who have .. .at heart the interests of the people."43
Taxpayers continued to organize in New York in the last three decades of the
nineteenth century. Taxpayers' associations in Hunters Point, Brooklyn, Long Island,
Gravesend, and New-Utrecht (a suburb of Brooklyn) utilized political pressure, injunctions
and lawsuits to address municipal mismanagement. In Hunters Point a Citizens' and
Taxpayers' Association opposed special legislation and the "collection ofunequal and unjust
taxes," and demanded equal property valuation and the economical administration of town
affairs. In 1872, the Taxpayers Association of Newtown, Long Island was formed to
investigate "charges against the trustees and constables" and to reform municipal affairs
because the "taxes were recklessly and dishonestly squandered." The attorney for the Long
Island association asserted that a "public officer can make more money by robbing the
people violating his oath of office, man by honestly discharging his duty...." The Brooklyn
Citizens' and Taxpayers' Association appointed a committee to "collect... evidence of
fraud... in connection with certain public works and submit it to the Attorney General."
New Utrecht's and Gravesend's taxpayers' associations joined with other local political
reform groups to create what the New York Times variously called a "Citizens' Movement"
or a "Citizens' League" in an effort to defeat Democratic "ring" politicians. **
The same themes ofgraft, mismanagement and "ring" politics echoed from the pages
of The Baltimore Sun in the 1870s. Both Washington, DC and Baltimore taxpayers
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organized to fight municipal cronyism and excessive property taxes and to search for honest
politicians. District taxpayers contemplated withholding property tax payments because
property assessments made the previous year were from "twenty-five to one hundred percent
in excess of the actual cost value." In August 1874, The Sun published a "Letter From
Washington" which outlined the work and policies of the District of Columbia Taxpayers'
Association. In an 1876 editorial the Baltimore Sun commended the County Taxpayers'
Association for its efforts to "protect taxpayers against waste and extravagance on the part
of the county officials." The Baltimore County Taxpayers' Association added its voice to
the call for non-partisan municipal government to benefit "all the people" who are "citizens
and Taxpayers of Baltimore." In 1880, it sent a petition to the state legislature protesting the
ability of the wealthy in the state to avoid taxation. The petition declared "that exemption
from taxation by contract is inadmissible" and demanded "that all such laws which may be
inconsistent with the principles of equal taxation shall be repealed." The Association also
recommended that the citizens of Baltimore send representatives from each ward to a
"citizens' convention." Its avowed objective was only to oversee the spending of municipal
government independent of any political party.45 It is interesting to note that many of the
pleas to keep municipal government free from partisan politics continued to reverberate well
into the twentieth century. The Citizens Union in New York City likewise put municipal
independence at the top of its agenda.46
Taxpayers continued to organize and agitate during the first three decades of the
twentieth century. Prior to 1930, however, taxpayers' associations were neither numerous
nor a significant presence in American public life. In 1930, taxpayers' organizations
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probably numbered no more than fifty nation-wide.47 Furthermore, their creation and
activities were episodic and almost always in response to specific local problems.48 When
the stock market collapsed in 1929, the taxpayers' association was an inchoate institution
with only modest influence on a national scale.
The history of taxpayers' associations in the United States spans more than one
hundred and fifty years. One of the most remarkable attributes of such organizations prior
to the Great Depression, however, was their caducity. Like the lilies of the field, they
sprouted up, flourished for a season and then faded away. The Great Depression was
transformative in this way, as in so many other ways. In the five years following the 1929
stock market crash, the taxpayers' association rapidly evolved into a permanent and enduring
institution in American society, a part of the fabric of civic life and political life in the United
States. By the mid-1930s it had become, to paraphrase historian Fernand Braudel, one ofthe
"structures of everyday life" in this country.49 The chapters that follow assess the processes
through which this development occurred, its impacts on American society, and its
significance for historians.

In Chapter 11 examine taxpayers' lawsuits and the development of the law regarding
such suits in the United States. In the decades following the Civil War, courts in nearly every
state came to recognize the right of taxpayers to bring actions to restrain illegal or corrupt
acts by local government officials and to force them to perform their duties. In those states
where the courts did not afford taxpayers this right, the legislatures authorized such
taxpayers' suits and thereby created by statute ajudicial remedy that taxpaying citizens could
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invoke. I argue that, although some taxpayers' actions have been filed for petty reasons or
in an effort to thwart the will of the majority, their effects on the American political order in
general, and on local government in particular, have been largely salutary.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the use of taxpayers' actions by the Citizens Union, a
political reform organization in New York City, as an instrument for eliminating corruption
in the public sector and for promoting efficiency and reform in government between 1909
and 1930. The chapter also places the Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation program in the
overall context of political reform in New York City in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The Citizens Union did not style itself as a taxpayers' association and
was not organized as one; it was a reform organization. Its relevance to the history of
organized taxpayer activity lies in the fact that it used a tool developed by taxpayers, the
taxpayers' suit, as a principal tactic by which it pursued its reform agenda. Political reform
was also an objective of much organized taxpayer activity. The Citizens Union's sustained,
extensive taxpayers' litigation program represented apohcy formulated by the organization's
leadership. In mis respect it was analogous to the roughly contemporaneous litigation
program of the American Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), a voluntary organization of
small manufacturers organized with very different objectives - "to litigate and lobby against
organized labor" — but which also relied on a focused litigation strategy in advancing its
agenda.50 The Citizens Union's litigation program represented a powerful and dynamic
fusion of legal and political activism.
Chapter 3 looks at the taxpaying citizen as a political and legal actor in the
Depression era. It investigates the remarkable proliferation of taxpayers' associations in the
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early 1930s and identifies them as one ofthe primary institutions through which middle-class
Americans engaged in political activism and legal activism during the Great Depression,
producing what may fairly be termed a taxpayers' association movement. Such organizations
exercised an influence on state and local governments and on American civic life that was
both deep and wide. Americans' conceptions of citizenship, the imperatives of pocketbook
politics, political reform impulses, and the law interacted in the crucible of taxpayers'
associations in complex and vital ways, giving the taxpayers' association movement of the
Great Depression its character, and bringing meaningful change in American social, civic and
political life.
Chapter 4 is an in-depth study of this process of interaction in Depression-era
America in Berlin, New Hampshire, a small city in the White Mountains. It examines how
a group of concerned citizens, confronted both by the desperate economic circumstances
created by the Great Depression and by corruption in city government, formed a taxpayers'
association, which then instituted a taxpayers' action against city officials and prevailed in
the trial court The chapter also assesses how these efforts in turn created the requisite
critical political mass to sustain a viable third-party political movement and resulted in the
formation of the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party. The tale of the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party,
although rooted in the particular circumstances existing in that city in the 1930s, is
representative in many ways of the political protest movements of that decade and illustrates
the crucial role that law and notions of citizenship played in organized taxpayer activity and
in such political reform efforts.
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CHAPTER I

"WHERE JUSTICE REQUIRES A REMEDY:"
THE EVOLUTION OF TAXPAYERS' ACTIONS IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES

In July 1895, Land, Log & Lumber Company and other taxpayers of Vilas County,
Wisconsin appeared before the county board of supervisors with what they likely considered
a relatively straightforward request. They asked the board to institute suit against F. W.
Mclntyre, the former chairman ofthe board, to recover moneys that the taxpayers alleged had
been "corruptly drawn by him" from the county treasury. The taxpayers informed the board
that between April 1894, and April 1895, while he was chairman of the board of supervisors,
Mclntyre had submitted, and had the county treasurer pay, fraudulent bills for excessive and
"pretended services'' and for "constructing a so-called county road that had no existence in
fact." To the surprise and chagrin of the taxpayers, the county board refused to pursue the
matter. The taxpayers, on behalfof themselves and all other county taxpayers, then filed suit
against Mclntyre to compel him to account for and repay the money that he had illegally
obtained. Mclntyre argued that only the county could bring such an action and that,
therefore, the taxpayers had no right to relief. The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphatically
rejected this contention, stating that if
a county or other corporation has a plain cause of action for an injury done
to it, that should be enforced for the protection of its members, and its
governing body refuses to perform its plain duty..., our system of
jurisprudence is by no means so weak that justice can thereby be defeated...
It certainly would be a strange situation if unfaithful officials could plunder
28

a county.. .and be free from danger of being compelled to return their illgotten gains, or make good the injury caused by their corrupt conduct,
because they had retired from office and the corporation, through its proper
officers, unjustly refused to prosecute them.
The court emphasized that the "powers of courts of equity are broad and absolute enough to
fit all situations where justice requires a remedy" and ruled that the taxpayers were entitled
to maintain their taxpayers' action.1
The Vilas County taxpayers' litigation represented, at its core, a collision of interests
between those who pay taxes and those who spend them. This tension between taxpayers
and tax spenders is a recurring theme in American history, harking back to (and beyond) the
American Revolution. Taxpayer activism in the United States has most frequently been
thought of and studied in terms of taxpayer "revolts," whether they be literal revolts, such
as Shays' Rebellion in 1786 or the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, collective strikes, such as the
taxpayers' strike in Chicago during the Great Depression, or traditional political activity that
resulted in the legal overhaul of systems of taxation, such as the passage of Proposition 13
in California in 1978.2 Some scholars have examined lawsuits instituted by taxpayers to
advance their direct, private interests.3 Except for legal commentators, however, few
scholars have assessed the impact on American political life in general, and on local
government in particular, of "taxpayers' suits," defined by one legal scholar as "proceedings
in which one or more taxpayers, representing an entire class of taxpayers, seek a remedy for
illegal acts injurious to their interests as taxpayers through misuse, disuse or spoliation of
public funds or property."4
Though largely ignored by historians, such taxpayers' actions, by providing an
effective legal mechanism by which taxpaying citizens of all backgrounds could hold public
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officials accountable

and could eliminate corruption and promote reform in local

government, have profoundly influenced politics and the public sector in the United States.
In the twentieth century there are literally hundreds of reported cases in which taxpayers
prevailed in such actions, preventing or righting a host of wrongs.5 Specific, tangible
benefits accrued to local communities as a result of these court rulings. The cumulative
impact of these benefits and decisions, which have acted as a leaven in the American
political system to foster the honest and healthy functioning of local government, has been
significant. Moreover, taxpayers' suits have provided a means by which citizens could
lawfully and constructively express political discontent. Admittedly, not all taxpayers'
actions have been prompted by lofty motivations or had salutary effects. Some cases have
involved disgruntled cheapskates and gadflies who sued to delay or derail the political
processes or to frustrate or circumvent the will of the majority.6 Nevertheless, the overall
impact of taxpayers' suits on the American political order has been generally positive.
Taxpayers' litigation is not, however, only a twentieth century phenomenon. The
foundation for this legal edifice was established during the sixty years before World War I.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts of equity in most states came
to recognize the standing of taxpayers to bring actions to enjoin illegal or corrupt acts by
public officials. In those states in which the courts did not do so, such as New York,
legislatures authorized such taxpayers' actions in order to create a judicial remedy for
malfeasance in government By the eve of the First World War, American courts had
developed a mature body of law regarding taxpayers' lawsuits and had applied that law to
an immense variety of taxpayers' claims.
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The Development of Taxpayers' Litigation Jurisprudence by Courts
Nineteenth century taxpayers instituted actions against local government officials for
reasons as numerous as the universe of official misdeeds. In most cases taxpayers filed
actions in courts of equity to obtain injunctive relief, that is, a court order requiring a public
official either to do or to refrain from doing something. The most common actions were
those to obtain injunctions restraining the expenditure or misappropriation of public funds
through the unauthorized acts of local officials.7 Taxpayers also sought to enjoin other
allegedly unlawful municipal actions, ranging from the illegal issuance of municipal bonds
to the unauthorized extension of a waterworks franchise.8 If municipal officials had already
improperly paid out public funds, as in an Illinois case in which officials had donated monies
to pay the debts of a private company, taxpayers brought actions to compel the return of the
donations.9 Finally, taxpayers initiated proceedings to enforce municipal causes of action
where the public officers wrongfully declined to do so.10 In short, taxpayers turned to courts
of equity for relief in a wide range of circumstances, in which they maintained that they had
or would suffer damage as taxpayers as a result of the unlawful acts of local government.
The recognition and expansion of taxpayers' rights to bring such actions in the
nineteenth century was not, however, a tale of uninterrupted progress. Courts of equity in
a number of states refused to entertain taxpayers' suits. In Massachusetts, the Supreme
Judicial Court consistently ruled that, unless conferred by statute, courts of equity in that
state did not have jurisdiction to hear actions by taxpayers to enjoin illegal or wrongful acts
of municipalities.'! Courts of equity in New York also denied taxpayers a remedy. In an
1822 decision, the judge of the Chancery Court of New York rejected a taxpayer's request
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to restrain the town of Mooers from collecting monies to pay bounties for the destruction of
wolves, stating that "I cannot find, by any statute, or precedent, or practice, that it belongs
to the jurisdiction of chancery, as a Court of equity, to [grant the requested injunction]... and
in the whole history of the English Court of Chancery, there is no instance of the assertion
of such jurisdiction as is now contended for."12 Although some early lower court decisions
in New York did allow taxpayers' actions and some did not, in 1858 New York's highest
court settled the matter in Doolittle v. Broome County, ruling that a taxpayer had no right to
bring an action against municipal officials to restrain the waste of public funds or illegal acts
unless the taxpayer would sustain some particular injury not common to all taxpayers.13
Unlike courts in some other states, the New York Court of Appeals declared that "[n]o
private person or number of persons can assume to be the champions of the community, and
in its behalf challenge the public officers to meet them in the courts of justice to defend their
official acts."14 Courts in Kansas and Michigan adopted the New York common law rule.15
In most states, though, courts of equity were prepared to afford taxpayers the right
to bring taxpayers' suits for the public benefit and to craft appropriate relief to address
citizens' complaints. The willingness of nineteenth-century judges to jump into the breach
and devise equitable relief for taxpayers is reflected in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's bold
assertion of the equity powers of the courts in its 1898 decision in Land, Log & Lumber
Company v. Mclntyre. After enunciating "the boasted power of courts of equity to lay hold
of situations where legal remedies stop, and prevent a failure of justice flowing from
defective legal remedies," the court, paraphrasing an earlier decision, declared:
If for conduct such as detailed in the complaint, there is no remedy... the
taxpayers are at the mercy of dishonest officials and must stand by and see
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the public treasury plundered... The idea is simply preposterous, and that is
all that need be said about it. While guided by precedents, equity is not
bound by them, but may meet new situations as they arise, so that in the race
between it and the ingenuity of unfaithful officials, the former will generally
prevail...16
In an 1882 taxpayers' suit to require a judge and two county commissioners to repay to the
county funds that they, through fraud and collusion, had obtained, the Oregon Supreme Court
likewise held that a "taxpayer has an equity which entitles him to claim, through a court of
equity, that he shall not be subjected to the payment of additional sums of taxes on account
of the fraudulent and illegal disposal ofthe public funds and property by public officers...""
In so ruling, the court expressly rejected the New York rule denying taxpayers such a
remedy, observing that the "effect of these decisions in New York was to leave the
inhabitants of a municipal corporation without remedy where its officers made a fraudulent
disposition of its revenues."18 These sentiments reflected the views of judges in the vast
majority of states on the subject of taxpayers' actions. Consequently, most nineteenthcentury courts were prepared to expand the rights of taxpayers in order to provide more
effective protection against the unlawful acts of municipal officials.
By 1900, courts in almost all states recognized the standing of taxpayers to bring
taxpayers' suits against local officials. The conceptual basis for such actions articulated by
most of these courts was that public property was held in trust by public officials for the
benefit of the body of taxpayers, analogously to the situation of corporate officers and
stockholders. In 1897, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer was entitled to an
injunction restraining the city of Waycross from operating a plumbing business that
competed with the taxpayer's plumbing business on the grounds that the city's actions were
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unauthorized and hence illegal. The court offered this explanation for taxpayers' suits:
Following out the theory which regards the municipal corporation as a trustee
for the inhabitants, it is almost, if not quite universally, conceded by the
courts in the United States that... any... municipal taxpayer may resort to
equity to prevent municipal corporations or officials from exceeding their
lawful powers or neglecting or violating their legal duties, under any
circumstances where the taxpayer's interest will be injuriously affected.. .In
private corporations, it is well settled that if the directors will not protect the
rights ofthe creditors and stockholders, then the latter may and should attend
to their own interests. There is no reason whatever why a different rule
should be applied to municipal corporations, in which the taxpayers are the
beneficiaries upon whose shoulders will ultimately fall the loss and expense
which is caused by illegal, fraudulent or tortious acts... 19
In a similar vein the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that the
philosophy of the taxpayer's action... is that the taxpayer is a member of a
municipal corporation who, by virtue of his contributions to the funds of the
municipality, has an interest in its funds and property of the same general
quality as the interest of a stockholder in the funds of a business corporation,
and hence when corporate officers are about to illegally use or squander its
funds or property he may appeal to a court of equity on behalf of himself and
his fellow stockholders (i.e., taxpayers) to conserve and protect the corporate
interests and property from spoliation by its own officers.20
Courts explicitly acknowledged that public officials held a position of trust with respect to
public property and funds and that taxpaying citizens had a substantial and legally
enforceable interest in ensuring that local officers did not violate that trust.
These published rationales highlight several important features of the American
judiciary in the late nineteenth century. It is not surprising that common lawjudges, at a time
when business and corporation law were evolving into their modern forms and when
business and economic issues occupied such a prominent place in American jurisprudence,
would utilize business analogies in evaluating taxpayers' claims. Moreover, judges in this
period were notably protective of private property rights and vigorous in shielding private
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interests from government intrusion.21 Taxpayers' suits represented a clash between public
and private rights in which most courts were prepared to intervene to protect taxpayers from
the transgressions of public officials.
Taxpayers' actions shared at least two common characteristics. First, in every case
one or more taxpayers filed suit because they were in some way unhappy with how
government officials were spending their tax dollars. In this sense the taxpayers' suit was
a legal manifestation of what historian Meg Jacobs has called "pocketbook politics."22
Second, in each case taxpaying citizens resorted to the courts in order to bypass and, they
hoped, overrule political processes that were not working to their advantage.23 Some ofthese
lawsuits did not involve issues of great public import but were filed by obstructionists who
simply disagreed with the wisdom of a particular government action or policy and sought to
frustrate the will of the majority through protracted litigation.24 Most taxpayers' actions,
however, were brought to promote reform and combat corruption in government by those in
the political minority who lacked access to or influence in the local political machinery.25
Taxpayers' actions gave political outsiders an effective and much-needed weapon.
Nineteenth-century judges developed two principal limitations on a taxpayer's right
to obtain relief. First, the taxpayer must have a pecuniary interest in the matter; that is, he
must be able to demonstrate mat the municipal action he was challenging would increase his
tax burden. For example, in Patten v. Chattanooga taxpayers in Chattanooga, Tennessee
who asked the court to declare void a franchise that the city had granted to a utility company
were denied relief because the ordinance in question "cannot affect their tax burden."26
Second, courts generally would not grant relief with respect to acts within the authorized,
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lawful discretion of public officials because such actions, even mistaken ones, were "beyond
legal redress."27 Taxpayers, that is, could not second-guess or micromanage the lawful
decisions of public officials or obtain relief for their mistakes or poor judgment. In those
circumstances, taxpayers were left to their political remedies, including voting such unwise
officials out of office. As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in 1885,
[fjhere has been an idea in some places...that courts of equity can always
stand between citizens and municipal authorities, to shield them from abuses
and extravagant action. This is not one of the functions of courts. It is one of
the incidents of popular government that the people must bear the
consequences of the mistakes of their representatives. No court can save
them from this experience. It is one of the means of teaching the necessity
of choosing proper servants.. .28
In applying the first restriction, judges were essentially adapting a "no harm, no foul" rule.
In applying the second, they were giving appropriate deference to the political (non-judicial)
branches of government and were demonstrating a pragmatic approach to the limits of
judicial authority in political matters.
Several factors account for the increasing frequency with which taxpayers' suits were
instituted in the decades following the Civil War. Perhaps most important, the rapid
industrialization and urbanization of the United States in this era dramatically expanded the
public sector and public spending and, as a consequence, multiplied the potential scope,
magnitude and incidence of official misconduct.

Conversely, the extension of local

government institutions into the unsettled frontier regions also threatened the interests of
taxpayers. In his study of the Wisconsin lumber industry in the nineteenth century, James
Willard Hurst identified two reasons why the lumber industry and the principal taxpayers
generally opposed the creation of new local government units. They were concerned that the
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"temptations inherent in the spending that would go with setting up a whole new county
machinery" would "tend to increase the burden oftaxation." Furthermore, the establishment
of new town and county governments conduced toward public corruption because "in the
newer, thinly settled counties... it was peculiarly hard for local officials to withstand private
importunities and peculiarly difficult to staff the public offices with men of probity and
detachment from personal fortune."29 Indeed, one ofthese newly-created counties was Vilas
county, the source of the Land, Log, & Lumber Company case, in which the former chairman
of the board of supervisors was alleged to have, among other things, billed the county for
constructing a "pretended county highway" that did not exist.30 Finally, the absence of
central supervision of local government by state legislatures in many states contributed to the
rise in taxpayers' litigation. As Hurst noted, "[l]egislative initiative for policing or
invigorating local government was rare, episodic, and marked by that relative indifference
to adequate implementation that stamped most nineteenth-century statute law."31

Progressive-era Taxpayers* Suits in New Hampshire
A survey of taxpayers' actions in New Hampshire during the Progressive Era
illustrates the salient features of the law, the objectives of taxpayers, and the concerns of
courts. In Blood v. Manchester Electric Light Co. a group of taxpayers in the city of
Manchester asked the courts to invalidate an 1893 contract between the city and Manchester
Electric Light Company to provide electric lighting for the city streets for ten years. The
taxpayers, objections to the agreement are not apparent from the court's decision. Perhaps
they were Luddites who opposed the conversion of municipal lighting systems from gas to
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electricity, a sentiment that played at least some part in an 1890 taxpayers' suit against the
city of Buffalo to restrain mat city from substituting electric lights for gas.32 More likely, the
Manchester taxpayers believed the terms of the contract and the expenditure of public funds
to be imprudent and wasteful. Whatever the citizens' motivation, the taxpayers argued that
the contract was invalid because city officials could not bind the city to a contract that
extended beyond their term of office. At the outset, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
acknowledged the right ofNew Hampshire taxpayers to request a court of equity to "restrain
a municipal corporation and its officers from appropriating money raised by taxation to
illegal or unauthorized uses" and noted that the basis for "such a suit is to enforce a trust with
a municipal corporation on behalf of its taxpayers." The court ruled, however, that in this
case the term of the contract was for a reasonable duration and that the contract was legal
because the city councilors had, "in good faith, exercised that discretion lodged with them."
Thus, the court denied the taxpayers' petition.33
Seven years later taxpayers in Concord, New Hampshire instituted a proceeding in
equity seeking to enjoin the city from constructing a new municipal building and from
issuing municipal bonds to pay for it. Between November 1901 and March 1902, the city
council had adopted various resolutions authorizing the expenditure ofup to $ 130,000 to pay
for the project, and on March 25,1902, the city purchased land for the proposed site. The
taxpayers filed their action on April 3,1902, contending that the city's real intention was to
build, not a municipal building, but an opera house for purposes of entertainment and that,
regardless of the city's purpose, the proposed cost was unreasonable. The state Supreme
Court rejected both contentions, finding no evidence that the city council planned to build
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anything other than a building for purely municipal purposes and that the "right to determine
the cost of the building is vested in the city council as a matter of legislative discretion. So
long as they proceeded in good faith the court cannot interfere."34 Equity judges were
prepared to afford a remedy for illegal acts of public officials, but not for lawful, albeit illconceived or unwise, acts falling within the bounds of their discretion. Moreover, courts
were willing to enjoin future unlawful acts of municipal officers but loath to attempt to
"unring the bell" with respect to past conduct.
In 1904, a proposed baseball park became a bone of contention between the city of
Portsmouth, New Hampshire and a number of its taxpayers. In 1716 an eleven-acre public
common had been given to the city, it had been used for militia musters and as a public
playground since that time. In 1903 the city council proposed to fence the common "for the
purpose of amusement and for the better protection ofcity property." A group of Portsmouth
taxpayers instituted suit in which they alleged that the city, pursuant to this resolution,
actually intended to privatize the city common by building a baseball park that would be
operated by private individuals who would charge a fee for admission. They asked the court
to restrain the city from constructing the baseball park andfromvoting to fence the common.
The court sided with the taxpayers on the first request and against them on the second. It
began with a bold declaration of "the power of the court to restrain city councils at the suit
of a taxpayer for acting illegally," affirming that it is
the policy of the law to subject all persons acting in a trust capacity to the
control of the court... So city councils act in a trust capacity in administering
the ordinary business affairs of the city... Since they act in that capacity, they
are subject to the control of the court... [TJhere is the same need of a remedy
to prevent city councils from abusing their trusts that there is to prevent other
trustees from abusing theirs.
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The court then ruled that the relevant New Hampshire statutes did not authorize cities to use
money raised by taxation to build baseball parks and that, consequently, the construction of
such a park by the city of Portsmouth would be illegal. The court also stated that any uses
to which the city put the common "must be public." Accordingly, the court held that the city
could not be enjoined from passing the resolution to fence the common because construction
of a fence to protect the property was legal. The city could, however, be restrained from
building a baseball park or otherwise using the common in a manner that excluded the public
for an unreasonable time.35 The Court thus endeavored to strike a balance between the lawful
acts of public officials and the legitimate interests of the taxpaying public.
Another New Hampshire taxpayer case from this period is Cox v. Jones, decided in
1906. In that case taxpayers of the Meredith Village Fire District sought to restrain the
execution ofa contract between the district and the Meredith Electric Light Company to light
streets. In August 1904 the district had entered into an agreement with a company to light
the streets for one year, beginning September 1. On September 7, notwithstanding the
August contract, the district negotiated a second contract for the same services with Meredith
Electric Light Company, this time for a five-year period. The taxpayers maintained that the
second contract was illegal because it exposed the district to a breach of contract action from
the utility company awarded the first contract, and because it was not in the district's best
interests to enter into the second contract. The court rejected both arguments. First, it ruled
that the second contract was lawful, and the fact that the district did not intend to honor the
first contract did not make the second one illegal. Furthermore, it concluded that, even if the
district's action in making the second contract was "hasty and ill-advised" and "not in the
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best interest of the district" and its taxpayers, that "would not authorize the court to enjoin
the defendants." Even though a court may restrain a municipal corporation from using tax
monies for illegal purposes, it explained, it "has no authority to enjoin such corporation[s]
from doing what the law authorized them to do."36 While affirming the rights of taxpayers
to obtain injunctive relief for unauthorized or illegal acts, the court declined to afford relief
for lawful acts, however unwise.
The New Hampshire taxpayers' suits in the Progressive Era are representative of the
manner in which courts of equity in most states had developed the law governing taxpayers'
actions during the preceding half century and of the competing interests oftaxpayers and tax
spenders. The right of taxpayers to restrain illegal acts of local officials was firmly
established, as were the limitations on that right. Judges mostly adopted a flexible and
common-sense approach, providing injunctive relief in cases of illegal, fraudulent or corrupt
actions but generally (ifnot always) declining to grant it in the absence of such bad behavior.
Taxpayers challenged a broad variety of municipal actions, almost always on the grounds that
the proposed actions would increase the citizen's tax burden. Municipal officials defended
the scope of their authority, the bounds of their discretion, and their ability to govern
efficiently.

Authorization of Taxpayers' Suits by Statute
In those few states in which the judiciary did not afford taxpayers the right to
maintain taxpayers' suits in courts of equity, the other two branches of government,
responding to political pressure, came to the rescue. In Massachusetts, where the courts had
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refused to provide taxpayers with a judicial remedy for alleged abuse of authority by
municipal officials, the legislature in 1847 gave the Supreme Judicial Court jurisdiction,
upon the petition of ten or more taxable residents of a town, to restrain the unlawful
expenditure of public funds.37 In 1905 the legislature in Kansas, in which the courts had
followed the New York rule denying taxpayers the right to enjoin the illegal acts of public
officials, enacted a statute affording taxpayers that remedy.38 In some states in which the
courts had already established the right of taxpayers to challenge local government actions,
the legislatures expanded those rights. An 1881 statute in Indiana, for example, authorized
county taxpayers to appeal certain actions of county commissioners.39 Perhaps the state in
which taxpayers were most in need of a judicial remedy for illegal acts of government
officials, though, was New York.
In the decade prior to 1872, several developments converged to create immense
public pressure for legislative recognition oftaxpayers' suits in New York. First, New York
was then the nation's most populous state and among the most urbanized, and New York
City was the largest city in the United States. Consequently, the nature and magnitude of
potential official misconduct in New York was proportionally greater than in other states.
Moreover, the harsh reality of government corruption of seemingly unparalleled scope was
brought home vividly to New Yorkers with the exposure of the Tweed ring in 1871 and the
arrest of William "Boss" Tweed in late 1871. The New York Times began providing
sensational coverage of Tweed's crimes in July 1871, and Thomas Nast's political cartoons
in Harper's Weekly depicted the political rot that had infected Tammany Hall.40 Tweed
understood only too well the political potency of Nast's cartoons. According to Nast
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biographer Albert Bigelow Paine, after Nast's publication of a two-part cartoon entitled
"Two Great Questions," Tweed declared:
Let's stop them d

d pictures.. .1 don't care so much what the papers write

about me - my constituents can't read; but, d

n it, they can see pictures.41

Finally, only a decade earlier the state's highest appellate court, in its 1861 decision in
Roosevelt v. Draper, had reaffirmed its refusal to allow taxpayers' suits in equity courts.42
The confluence of these circumstances prompted the New York legislature and the governor
to take action to provide taxpayers with a judicial remedy for official misconduct, a remedy
that would encourage transparency and integrity in government.
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Even though he had been Tweed's handpicked candidate for governor, Governor John
Hoffman had to respond to the public outcry for cleaning up Tammany Hall.43 In his January
1872 annual message, Hoffman, characterizing himself, "like everyone else, [as] a
Reformer," called for "a remedy in Courts for taxpayers against abuses of trust."44 The state
legislature promptly passed a bill authorizing taxpayers' actions to redress wrongful acts of
public officers, but Hoffman vetoed it on February 12 because "its provisions were open to
serious objections."45 The Court of Appeals, in an advisory opinion requested by Governor
Hoffman, had indicated that Hoffman's objections were well-founded. Hoffman, noting that
in "times of unusual excitement about abuses in the Administration, and when the demand
for correction and reform is urgent and loud, it is especially important that those charged with
the responsibility of legislation should move with great caution," returned the billtothe state
senate to make "such amendments... as will carry out effectually the important purposes
which the legislature had in mind."46
The New York Legislature made the necessary revisions and, later in 1872, passed
"an act for the protection of taxpayers against fraud, embezzlement and wrongful acts of
public officers and agents," which the governor signed. The 1872 statute authorized a
taxpayers' action "to prevent waste or injury to any property, funds or estate" of any county,
town, or municipal corporation.47

The New York Court of Appeals upheld the

constitutionality of the statute in its 1875 decision in People v. Tweed?*
Tweed was eventually brought to justice, although not under the 1872 statute. In
1873 he was prosecuted criminally, convicted and sentenced to a twelve-year prison term.49
Tweed was also the principal target in a civil suit by the state of New York under an 1875
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statute authorizing the state to institute suits to recover money fraudulently obtained from a
municipality.50 The state was represented in this suit by a trio of distinguished lawyers,
including James Coolidge Carter, a prominent Mugwump reformer.51 Carter was a leader
in a number ofnonpartisan organizations whose primary purpose was to eliminate corruption
and promote reform in municipal government, including the City Club Of New York, the
National Municipal League, and the New York City Citizens Union.52 The state sought to
recover misappropriated public funds in excess of $6 million. There was so much public
interest in the trial that the New York Times covered the March 7,1876 closing arguments
of Carter and Tweed's attorney, David Field, in great detail.53 On March 8 the jury returned
a verdict against Tweed for more than $4.7 million, which verdict with interest exceeded
$6.5 million.54
Although Tweed may not have been the object of the 1872 statute authorizing
taxpayers' suits, he was clearly the impetus for it. Not only did contemporary politicians and
newspaper coverage make the connection, but so did New York courts on more than one
occasion. In a 1916 decision the New York Court of Appeals, after reviewing the common
law rule in New York that did not allow a taxpayer to bring an action unless he had suffered
some damage not suffered by taxpayers in general, observed that the
legislature recognized that this condition ofthe law was inadequate to protect
the public rights where public officials who were charged with the
enforcement of the law were themselves guilty of waste or injury to public
funds or property or illegal official acts. The need for legislation upon this
subject was made very apparent in the litigation growing out of the frauds of
Tweed and his associates.. .55
Two years later the Appellate Division traced the roots of the legislation to the same source,
noting that the legislature had enacted the various statutes authorizing taxpayers' suits "[a]s
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a result of the many illegal and wasteful acts committed by Tweed and his associates."
Judges in other states also appreciated that public outrage and political pressure had forced
the political branches of government to create a remedy for aggrieved New York taxpayers.
In 1898 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, emphasizing the necessity of such remedies and
declaring that their earlier absence in New York "amounted to an absolute denial of justice,"
observed that it
was the early doctrine in New York that a taxpayer could not prosecute such
an action as this. The result was that when the people of the city and county
of New York discovered that they had been systematically plundered by
trusted officials, and the members of the governing body of the corporations
were so interested in the fraudulent schemes by which the people had been
defrauded that they would not prosecute to recover the public funds,
squandered and lost, such taxpayers were powerless to meet the situation in
any effective manner, and the legislature was compelled to provide a
remedy.57
The Legislature amended the 1872 taxpayers' statute on several occasions and eventually
incorporated it in section 1925 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure.58
In 1881 the New York Legislature passed a second, broader "act for the protection
of taxpayers," chapter 531 of the Laws of 1881, to provide more effective protection against
official misconduct. Not only did this statute authorize a taxpayer to bring suit to prevent
"waste or injury" to public property, as had the 1872 law, but it also authorized taxpayers'
actions to "compel the restitution of such property" and to "prevent any illegal official act."
This statute was amended in 1887 and again in 1892, and it was eventually codified in
section 51 of the General Municipal Law.59
In the generation following the enactment of the two acts for the protection of New
York taxpayers, citizens instituted scores of taxpayers' actions and the courts had numerous
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opportunities to interpret and apply those statutes and to develop a coherent body of law
governing such actions.

The fact that New York City and other major New York

municipalities in this era were often controlled by political machines, to which complaining
taxpayers had little access through ordinary political channels, largely accounts for this
burgeoning of taxpayers' litigation. The most frequent complaint of taxpayers was that
public officials had illegally paid out public funds, often to themselves. In an 1887 case the
Court of Appeals ruled that a taxpayer could maintain an action under the 1881 statute to
restrain a county treasurer from paying to himself his fees and expenses in connection with
the sale of land for the county before his claims had been audited and allowed by the town
auditors. Such action by the treasurer, the court ruled, would be an "illegal official act"
covered by the statute.60 The Court reached a similar conclusion in favor of a taxpayer who
sued the three members of the Nassau County Board of Supervisors to recover from them
monies that, the taxpayers alleged, they had illegally and collusively paid to themselves for
services rendered to the county.61 Courts also restrained other types of illegal actions, as in
the case of a taxpayer who obtained an injunction barring the superintendent of buildings for
Manhattan from approving plans for the alteration of a theater that would violate the city fire
code and therefore constitute a public nuisance.62 Like courts of equity in other states, New
York courts refused to provide a remedy for discretionary acts of public officers within the
scope of their authority, regardless of how imprudent the proposed action may have been.
In Talcott v. City of Buffalo, for instance, a taxpayer filed suit to restrain the city of Buffalo
from substituting electric lights for gas lights on one of its streets. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the action, ruling that city officials had the authority to make the proposed change

47

in lighting systems and that courts would not restrain officials "acting within the limits and
scope of their powers and discretion" even though a taxpayer alleges that the intended action
was "due to mistakes, errors of judgment or the lack of intelligent appreciation of official
duty," in other words, stupid.63 New York courts were diligent, however, in crafting
appropriate remedies in cases involving waste, injury to public property, or illegal acts that
threatened the public interest.

The Legacy and Importance of Taxpayers' Lawsuits
By the turn of the twentieth century the United States had undergone something of
a taxpayer's legal revolution. The taxpayers' suit, almost unheard of a century earlier, had
become firmly ensconced in the jurisprudence of every state, either through the efforts of
courts of equity or state legislatures. In the twentieth century, middle-class political activists
built upon this foundation and utilized taxpayers' actions to pursue their goals in a number
of contexts. Reformers and progressives seeking to liberate New York City from Tammany
Hall between 1900 and 1935, for example, used a variety of tactics, one of the most
important being the taxpayers' suit. The Citizens Union, the political arm of the New York
City Club, implemented a concerted litigation program to combat Tammany Hall's influence.
Taxpayers' litigation provided a means by which political outsiders could facilitate political
change and hold government accountable.64
The taxpayers' suits of the nineteenth century are also significant because of what
they tell us about nineteenth-century Americans' notions of citizenship. Taxpayers viewed
themselves as political actors; they saw paying taxes as a source of political legitimacy and
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empowerment and as a badge of citizenship. The connection between paying taxes and
citizenship was most often made by Americans when considering the right to vote. In the
colonial era and the early Republic, the right to vote was extended only to those who owned
property and paid taxes.

As historian Linda Kerber has noted, suffragists likewise

understood tax paying and voting as two sides of the same citizenship coin, anchoring one
indication of citizenship, the right to vote, on another, the obligation to pay taxes.65
Nineteenth-century judges explicitly acknowledged the connection between paying taxes and
citizenship, variously identifying the persons bringing actions as "taxpayers and citizens,"
"citizens and taxpayers," and "citizens who pay taxes."66 The obligation to pay taxes was an
incident of citizenship and gave rise to a corresponding right as a citizen to take legal action
to ensure mat public officials did not violate the trust that citizens had reposed in them.
The development of the law regarding taxpayers' lawsuits also served an important
political function. By empowering the judiciary to entertain taxpayers' actions and to afford
relief in appropriate cases, courts and legislatures provided a means by which citizens could
lawfully, and within the bounds of civil society, achieve legitimate goals, require public
officials to answer for their actions, and encourage good government. As a consequence, the
law and the legal order gave citizens an outlet through which they could release political
steam, a constructive way in which to vent and to obtain a public benefit for themselves and
their fellow citizens. This aspect of taxpayers' actions served the United States well in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as accelerating industrialization, urbanization
and immigration dramatically expanded the size and scope of municipal government and,
consequently, the tax burden of property owners.

49

Finally, the taxpayers' actions reflected certain prominent features of the nineteenthcentury American legal order. They represented one of the many ways in which Americans
made affirmative use of the law to further their interests and employed the legal order, in
Hurst's words, "wherever it looked as if it would be useful."67 They also reflected the
expansion ofjudicial review and judicial intervention in American life.68 For the most part,
judges were unwilling to see justice want for lack of a remedy when confronted with waste,
injury to public property, or illegal acts by government officials. They adapted the law,
addressed citizens' complaints, and devised such equitable remedies as the situation
demanded in order to effectuate the policies of integrity and accountability in government.
In doing so, as Morton Horowitz has argued, "common law judges came to play a central role
in directing the course of social change."69 Nineteenth-century judges understood that they
were breaking new ground in recognizing taxpayers' actions, noting that "the precedents for
suits of this nature are of modern origin."70 Where direct resort to the legal system did not
avail, taxpayers pursued the goal of obtaining ajudicial remedy for government malfeasance
through political channels. Consequently, in those states in which the courts did not jump
into the breach, state legislatures, responding to political pressure from their constituents,
created judicial remedies by statute for aggrieved taxpayers. Throughout the nineteenth
century, both courts and legislatures refashioned the law to accommodate the needs of a
growing and urbanizing society, in which the public sector and public spending played
increasingly important roles.
In taxpayers' litigation we see, among other things, a fusion of legal activism and
political activism. Time and again, citizens resorted to the courts in the pursuit of political
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objectives that they had been unable to attain through traditional politics. When Vilas
County, Wisconsin taxpayers were unable to convince the county board of supervisors to file
suit against a former county official to recover funds that he had plundered from the county
treasury they turned to legal action, as did New Yorkers when they, through the usual
administrative and political channels, failed to prevent city officials from turning a public
theater into a fire trap. Drawing on this nineteenth-century heritage, twentieth century
middle-class Americans would utilize taxpayers' suits with increasing frequency to promote
good government, political reform and political change.
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CHAPTER II

THE HAMMER OF JUSTICE:
TAXPAYERS' LITIGATION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY

As the year 1920 drew to a close, Leonard M. Wallstein, legal counsel for the
Citizens Union ofthe City ofNew York, contemplated with immense satisfaction the newest
trophy on the wall of his office.1 The prize was a personal check in the amount of $250.00
from New York City Comptroller Charles L. Craig, which Wallstein recently had framed.
The previous year Wallstein had brought a taxpayers' action on behalf of Citizens Union
chairman William Jay Schieffelin against Craig and other city officials to enjoin them from
issuing $4.5 million of corporate stock of the city of New York and from using $lmillion of
the sale proceeds to construct a subway system, with the balance to be used to reduce the
1919 tax levy. The Citizens Union's objection was not to the subway project itself but to
paying for it by issuing long term corporate stock (which would not be paid off and retired
for fifty years) rather than by issuing, in accordance with the city's former "pay -as-you-go"
policy for such projects, special revenue bonds that would be paid the following year. The
Citizens Union also opposed using long-term debt to reduce current taxes. The trial court
had granted the injunction on February 13, 1919, a ruling that was later upheld by the
appellate courts.2 Although Craig was served with the injunctive order on the afternoon of
February 13, he failed to inform his subordinates and other city officials of the restraining
order, and on February 15 and 17 they proceeded to issue and sell $ 1 million of the stock and
to apply the proceeds in violation of the injunction. Wallstein was furious with Craig, whom
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he characterized three decades later as "an ornery cuss, brilliant, resourceful and
unscrupulous," and he promptly initiated contempt proceedings to punish Craig for violating
the court order. According to Wallstein, the trial judge "gave Craig every opportunity to
'purge' himself of the contempt by undoing what he had done in violation of the order" but
"Craig refused to repent."3 The judge determined that Craig had been "lamentably remiss in
the discharge of his sworn duty," called Craig's excuses "puerile," found him guilty of civil
contempt, and ordered him to pay a $250.00 fine and costs in the amount of $824.38. The
remaining $3.5 million in stock was never issued.4 Upon receiving the fine payment,
Wallstein mounted it with the other trophies in his office.5
These lawsuits involving Comptroller Craig were but two of more than a score of
taxpayers' actions instituted by the Citizens Union, with chairman Schieffelin as the named
plaintiff, between 1909 and 1930. The nature, magnitude and duration of this litigation
program are unique among political reform groups in New York City during this period.
This is not to say that other good government organizations in New York City never resorted
to the courts. Following the election of 1889, for example, the City Reform Club
successfully maintained an action to enforce election laws and was also instrumental in
bringing about the indictment and prosecution ofmalfeasant election commissioners.6 Such
litigation by other reformers, however, tended to be occasional and episodic. In contrast, the
Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation program was intensive and sustained, the product of
a policy formulated and adopted by the Citizens Union's leadership under Schieffelin.
Historians have devoted scant attentiontothe taxpayers' action as an important arrow
in the quiver of New York City reform groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and have instead emphasized other aspects of their programs. Many scholars have
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examined what was admittedly the most substantial and pervasive component of the
reformers' agenda prior to the election of Fusion Mayor Seth Low in 1903 - traditional
political activity.7 Obviously, this included efforts to elect reform candidates and to defeat
Tammany candidates or, in the words of historian Augustus Cerillo, Jr., a strategy of
"replacing bad men with good men." 8 Indeed, the Citizens Union was established in early
1897 for the explicit purpose of participating in the municipal elections that year.9 The
reform groups' political programs also included public education (for example, publishing
voting records of legislators and information on proposed legislation), monitoring polling
places to guard against election law violations, promoting specific items of legislation,
mobilizing public opinion for or against legislation, and investigating city departments and
publishing the findings. Some of these efforts were successful and others less so.
Other historians have focused on the shift in reform strategies after 1900 from
political to business and administrative strategies that aspired to change not the men who
governed, but the means and methods of public administration by which they governed.10
This shift in emphasis was spurred by the social science movement then being embraced by
much of the city's elite. Representative of these reform efforts was the Bureau of City
Betterment, established in 1905 as an arm of the Citizens Union by William H. Allen, a
political scientist, with the encouragement and financial backing of Robert Fulton Cutting,
a prominent New York banker and then chairman ofthe Citizens Union. In 1907, the Bureau
became independent of the Citizens Union and was renamed the New York Bureau of
Municipal Research.

The Bureau employed experts in fields relevant to municipal

government and, in Allen's words, would "apply the processes of research, and the
disinterestedness of research, and the techniques of business management, to public affairs
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and civic problems."11 The Bureau's aims included the implementation of efficient,
transparent and scientific systems of accounting and budgeting, reform of the city's
administrative structure to make it more effective and competent, and the staffing of the
city's bureaucracy with, where appropriate, professionals in finance, education, business,
engineering and other fields crucial to municipal government.

The Bureau made

considerable progress toward these goals during the Democratic adrninistration of George
B. McClellan, Jr. (1904 - 1909) and enjoyed even greater success during the adrninistration
of Fusion Party Mayor John Purroy Mitchel (1914 -1917). n
Despite the reformers' achievements in facilitating political change and in promoting
a business model of government in New York City, however, corruption, mismanagement
and unlawful official acts in municipal affairs were endemic and remained a chronic problem
throughout most of the first three decades of the twentieth century. Accordingly, following
the election of William Jay Schieffelin as chairman of the Citizens Union in December 1908,
the Union's leadership concluded mat it needed to add to its arsenal of reform tactics one that
would be efficacious in promoting reform in government, in compelling municipal officials
to toe the line, and in holding mem responsible when they failed to do so-the taxpayers'
action. During the next two decades, and with increasing frequency and success after the
Tammany machine regained control of city government in 1918 with the election of John
Hylan as mayor (1918-1925), the Citizens Union utilized the taxpayers' lawsuit with great
effect This less known and less studied tactic complemented and furthered the reform
movement's political and scientific government strategies. By exposing and rooting out
corruption, the taxpayers' action facilitated reform in municipal government, and by forcing
officials to adhere strictly to the law and to the new business methods of public
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administration, it made city government more efficient, more honest, more open and more
responsive.
For the Citizens Union, organized taxpayer activity was essentially politics pursued
by other means. Political reform was the Citizens Union's objective, not its strategy, and the
Tammany Machine was its specific target. Schieffelin and his reform allies aimed to force
Tammany officials to adhere to the law and to the business methods of government that had
been put in place by previous reform administrations, and to hold them responsible when
they failed to do so. They also hoped to take down Hylan and other officials in his
administration whose political philosophy and conduct they regarded as antithetical to good
and honest government. The tactics that the Citizens Union employed to these ends were its
vibrant taxpayers' litigation and legislative programs and, to a lesser extent, traditional
political activity. In making political reform its objective, as opposed to its strategy, the
Citizens Union was being true to its political roots. The Citizens Union was fundamentally
a political organization and consistently acted like one. Law and legal institutions were the
principal instruments through which it pursued its reform agenda.
The powerful relationship between litigation and political reform movements is an
important but neglected aspect of American political culture. Innumerable studies have
examined legislation as a tool of reform and litigation as a means of testing or challenging
such legislative reform measures, perhaps most notably with respect to Roosevelt's New
Deal initiatives.13 Few works, however, have investigated litigation as a tactic or tool to
promote reform. The Citizens Union used the taxpayers' suit for precisely this purpose.
These taxpayer's actions are also worthy of scholarly inquiry because of what they
convey about New Yorkers' conceptions of citizenship and of the law in the early decades
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of the last century. Residents of the city understood that their right to bring such actions was
grounded in their status as taxpaying citizens. As taxpayers they had a vested interest in how
well government worked and, consequently, the right and the motivation to protect and
further those interests through litigation. Moreover, the fact that Schieffelin and the other
leaders of the Citizens Union were prepared to entrust to the courts important issues that
would have a direct impact on public policy and municipal administration suggests that, for
the most part, they regarded the legal system as an honest broker of significant disputes, and
the law and the courts as responsive to the public's interest in good government. Its litigation
program represented an alliance of legal and political activism of unparalled vigor.

Political Reform at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
The emergence of numerous reform organizations during the last two decades of the
nineteenth century provides the context and background for the Citizens Union's activities
in the next century. The reform efforts precipitated by the Tweed administration scandals
and the reform organization largely responsible for Tweed's ouster, a nonpartisan committee
of seventy, had been short-lived. With the resurgence of Tammany Hall by 1880, renewed
reform efforts began in earnest. Many reform organizations were established in the ensuing
years, including the City Reform Club, The City Club of New York (which claimed
thousands of members by 1895), and the Citizens Union.14 In addition, businessmen and
professionals pursued reform through other existing civic and professional organizations
such as the Chamber of Commerce and the New York County Bar Association.15
The various associations of reformers shared two important characteristics. First,
although hardly a unitary lot, the reformers tended to be what would later become known as
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progressives. They generally favored expanding the regulatory functions of government in
order to promote the public welfare and progressive change in American society.16 Most also
embraced another key element of progressivism - "an ideological commitment to
professionalization, scientific rationalization, and administrative governance."17 In the
context of municipal reform, this meant that these reformers espoused a business model of
government and the application of the "municipal research idea" to government, which
would become formalized with the creation of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research
in 1905. "The Progressives, viewing reform primarily as an administrative process,"
endeavored "to replace men and measures with methods of administration" and to
professionalize municipal government.18
Second, the three most important political reform organizations in New York City
all had occasion to invoke the coercive power of the law to advance their reform objectives.
In 1890, the City Reform Club filed a lawsuit to enforce laws aimed at preventing election
fraud.19 Ten years later the City Club brought charges against a district attorney, whom they
considered a corrupt and pliable tool of Tammany, in an effort to have him removed from
office.20 In 1907, the Citizens Union pressed charges against a borough president for
maladministration in office and supported a lawsuit instituted by the state attorney general
to invalidate the official's re-election.21 By the time the Citizens Union launched its
sustained taxpayers' litigation program in 1909, New York City's political reformers had
established a tradition of resorting to the law and to the courts to achieve their goals.
The City Reform Club was the first of this generation of reform organizations to be
constituted. According to one historian, New York City Assemblyman Theodore Roosevelt
was the impetus for the formation of the Reform Club on October 10,1882, as a response
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to the resurgence of Tammany. Roosevelt held an organizational meeting at his home and
invited prominent young Republican men for the purpose of devising some means to purify
local government of corruption and graft. The stated goal of the club was to promote the
election of "honest and capable representatives" to municipal offices. In a letter to the New
York Times on October 14, however, Roosevelt resigned bis membership, having concluded
that the club's membership should not include present or future public officeholders, in order
to preserve the integrity of the organization and demonstrate a nonpartisan interest in
municipal politics.22
Over the next few years this group of business and professional men formed a
committee on political information to inquire into the workings of city departments. To
educate the citizenry about problems in local government, the City Reform Club conducted
a series of lectures on municipal reform. In 1886, Roosevelt's Mend and former classmate,
Richard Welling, was elected to the executive committee and served as the club's treasurer.
Welling's presence reinvigorated the club's leadership and caused a shift in its focus. Over
the next ten years the club compiled and published the voting records of New York City's
representatives in the State legislature, a process that was later assumed by New York City
Club, and thereafter by the Citizens Union.23 Perhaps the most significant project of the
Reform Club for Welling, John Jay Chapman and his cousin William Jay Schieffelin (who
joined the club in 1889) was the club's efforts to police New York City saloons during the
municipal elections of 1887, 1888 and 1889, in order to detect and prevent election law
violations.24
The context for the reformers' efforts was the political function and culture of the
city's saloons. Historian Michael Lerner has highlighted "the legendary connections between
63

saloons and Tammany Hall that characterized New York City politics in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries." In New York City the close "links between corrupt political
machines and the alcohol trade" were notorious. Many Tammany elected and appointed
officials were themselves saloon owners. In 1890, for instance, nearly half of the city's
aldermen owned saloons. Saloons served not only as headquarters for Tammany politicians
but also places where they purchased votes in exchange for free food and drink and enlisted
vagrants to cast more than one ballot in the same election. The New York City saloon had
been the site of immense graft and voter fraud for decades.25
The reformers sought to target these practices by invoking the excise laws, which
regulated the sale of liquor.26 The specific excise law on which they relied, the enforcement
of which historically had been lax to say the least, required all saloons within one quarter of
a mile of a polling place to be closed on election day. The purpose of this proscription was
to deter the purchase of votes with liquor or other inducements.27
In the weeks preceding municipal elections the club appointed neighborhood saloon
"watchers" who took careful notes on excise law violations and incidents of voter bribery.
During the 1887 election the Reform Club compiled evidence of "false registration, false
voting, bribery of voters, and [voter] intimidation." The evidence was submitted to New
York City District Attorney Martine immediately following the election. A month later,
according to a New York Times editorial, the authorities' failure to launch an investigation
into the fraudulent activities documented by the club was "puzzling the wits of all honest
citizens." The editorial questioned why the district attorney appeared disinterested in the fact
that "election frauds [were] committed and every law for the protection of the ballot box
[was] violated in this city."28
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The Reform Club's "abundant evidence" against Tammany leaders included the
rounding up of "thieves and tramps" and lodging them in boarding houses where they were
registered under bogus names and paid to vote for a particular candidate. Among the
"fraudulent devices" utilized during the election "were the organizations formed for the
purpose of selling the votes of its members to the highest bidders."29 Martine, citing an
immense work load comprising what he considered to be more serious crimes, took no action
and, in this same election, won a six-year term as Judge of the General Sessions.30 In the
spring of 1887, the new district attorney, John R. Fellows, finally presented the Reforms
Club's evidence to a grand jury. After months of political posturing and several grand juries,
in October 1888, it was finally concluded that although election fraud clearly had been
committed, no one could be prosecuted.31 In January 1889, Richard Welling of the Reform
Club noted that the repeated delays by the district attorney had allowed one of the accused
saloon owners enough time to flee to Canada.32
Despite such legal setbacks, the Reform Club was determined to continue monitoring
municipal elections. During the fall elections in November 1888, the club again recorded
a number of excise law violations against more than 150 saloons. As before, district attorney
Fellows delayed action until forced by public opinion, in June 1889, to make some attempt
at resolving the matter. The district attorney, however, merely gave lip service to the media
and to the Reform Club, for as late as September 1889, all efforts to bring charges against
election law violators had been unavailing.33
Exasperated by their unsuccessful attempts to bring to justice those who had violated
the excise law on election day, Welling and the Reform Club renewed their efforts.
Schieffelin later recalled that the club sent out notices to licensed saloon owners who
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operated within the proscribed limit of a polling place. On election day, club members
serving as election watchers brought surveyors' steel measuring tapes and measured the
distance between the saloon entrance and the polling place. If the saloon was within the
quarter-mile-limit, the club members would enter the saloon and buy a drink to confirm the
violation. The club's crusade against excise violations amassed evidence against between
eighty and one hundred saloon keepers. Following the election they submitted their evidence
to the excise commissioners who, according to Schieffelin, "laughed at [the] charges."34
Welling and the Reform Club exhorted the district attorney to bring charges against
the commissioners who, according to the New York Times, were acting as "friends and
protectors of saloon keepers" who had violated the election laws. In April 1890, Assistant
District Attorney Henry Stapler, assisted by City Reform Club counsel Lewis L. Delafield,
obtained indictments against the excise commissioners, charging them with malfeasance in
office. During the trial a minor flaw in the indictment forced the court to direct the jury to
acquit the defendants on mis particular indictment, but the Court allowed the district attorney
to reindict the commissioners.35
Concomitantly, Welling, as a "resident and taxpayer of the city of New York,"
brought an action to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel the excise board to render a
decision upon a complaint he had filed against a saloon owner named Scheuplein for serving
liquor on election day in 1889.36 The commissioners had repeatedly delayed hearing and
acting on his complaint, although he and the witnesses were prepared to proceed. Judge
Barrett found that the commissioners clearly had neglected their duty in not deciding these
cases in a reasonable time. According to Barrett, this was "plain negligence, and it was
subversive ofthe law... and the writ should therefore issue with costs."37 The commissioners
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appealed Barrett's decision, arguing that Welling had no right '"either individually or as a
citizen' to a judicial determination of any question by the commissioners." The appellate
judge concluded that the commissioners' appeal "overlooks the fact that under the statute the
board is required to act 'upon the complaint of any resident' of the city." Based on this and
other arguments, it affirmed the earlier order.38 Refusing to relent, the commissioners
appealed further, but the court affirmed the decision and awarded Welling costs.39 Following
this victory, Welling and the Reform Club's counsel, Charles W. Barnes, again asked the
excise commissioners to render decisions in nine 1889 election fraud cases. Schieffelin, a
member of the Reform Club and an election watcher in 1889, was the principal witness in
one case.40 Despite the presentation of what the New York Times described as "convincing"
evidence, the commissioners ruled that there had been no violation of the election laws, a
decidedly unsatisfactory result from the Reform Club's perspective.4,
In 1892, the Court of Appeals upheld the second set of indictments that Stapler had
brought against the excise commissioners in 1891. The decision required the commissioners
to stand trial for malfeasance with the possibility of being sentenced to a year in jail if
convicted. 42 In the meantime, the state legislature, under pressure from Tammany state
senator George Plunkitt, had

amended the statute that held excise commissioners

accountable for their actions and had made their failure to act punishable by incarceration.
Under the new bill excise commissioners found guilty of failing to perform their official
duties would only be fined $250.00 and removed from office rather than face a prison term.43
The Reform Club's persistent legal actions may not have had the results for which
it had hoped, but the club did force Tammany to change its tactics on election day to some
extent in 1890. According to a New York Times article, during the November elections that
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year "hardly a saloon within one-quarter of a mile of a polling place was open.'
Although the City Reform Club had mixed resultsfromits attemptstopurge elections
of corruption, it was successful in blocking the construction of a "speedway" (more
commonly known as a race track) along the west side of Central Park.45 In 1892, Senator
Plunkitt was again at work trying to slip bills through the New York state legislature without
attracting too much attention. This time Plunkitt's stealth bill provided for the conversion
of the west side of Central Park from 59th to 110* Streets into a public race course with
taxpayers' dollars. Schieffelin later observed that "in those days" it was fashionable for "rich
men" to "enjoy driving fast horses and trying to pass each other on the road." Members of
New York's upper crust, including Cornelius Vanderbilt, Schieffelin's father, and prosperous
Tammany leaders drove their fast trotters "all the way up to Jerome Avenue, beyond Harlem
River in order to have a stretch of broad highway with no cross streets."46 The bill was
passed very quickly and quietly. According to the media, the governor signed the bill into
law a mere ten minutes after its passage in the assembly.47
When the race track statute became public, the New York Times observed that it
"would have been difficult for the powers mat be in this city and in Albany to have offended
the people of New York more grossly than by passing [this] law to turn the entire west
section over to a few owners of race horses and taint the rest of the Park with the evil
presence of the crowd that a race track would surely attract" In response to the public outcry
the City Reform Club called for a mass meeting to demand the repeal of the act, declaring
that "the Park was created for the whole public, and should never be despoiled or diminished
for the benefit of any class." By the time the meeting was held public demands for repeal of
the law had increased considerably, due in part, according to Schieffelin, to Park
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Commissioner Gallop ordering "white cotton strips tied around the trunks of all the trees that
were to be cut down to make room for the speedway." A few days later various groups
submitted more than 7,000 signatures protesting the speedway. Another club member, John
Jay Chapman, placed a coupon in the newspaper asking for $ 1.00 donations to cover protest
movement expenses. According to Schieffelin, within a few days they had "received $8,000
in one dollar bills." The sheer volume of individuals protesting the proposed race track
prompted the New York Times, claiming to quote Lord Brougham, to write that "the thunders
of heaven are sometimes heard to roll in the voice of a united people." Many called for the
resignation of the park commissioners. With the money raised by Chapman a group of one
hundred citizens hired a train to travel to Albany and demand the repeal ofthe speedway law.
The magnitude of the citizen protest weighed heavily on the elected representatives in
Albany. On the last day of the legislative session, April 14,1892, the law was repealed. The
effect of this coalescing of various classes and political groups to effectuate change also had
a marked influence on Schieffelin, who noted that one lesson he learned from this episode
was that "public opinion was all-powerful when aroused in a just cause."48
The public unity inspired by the speedway victory, however, did not produce
sufficient energy to spur City Reform Club members to pursue more pressing municipal
reform. The Reform Club's fundamental problem was that it lacked a formal organizational
structure and enough members committed to continue the fight After five years of legal
wrangling over the election law violations, club treasurer Richard Welling had lost much of
his earlier enthusiasm. According to one historian, internal dissensions over the club's
inability to bring about municipal change ultimately led to its demise. Several key leaders,
including Edmond Kelly, resigned because they disagreed with the "uncompromising
69

idealism" of the older and perhaps more traditional members.49 Kelly, an "able exponent of
collectivism, in fact a socialist," felt that the city needed a new reform organization, one that
would reach out to the recent immigrants and working-class citizens of New York and offer
them an alternative vision for the city's future.50 The City Reform Club continued to lose
members, and by 1894 it was no more.51
The mid- 1890s witnessed a "rising sentiment for non-partisanship in city affairs" and
calls for "good, honest city government" in New York City amidst the progressive movement
that was then gathering steam across the nation. The astute Kelly took advantage of this
energy by persuading concerned leaders in a number of reform organizations to come
together under the City Club of New York moniker. The purpose of the more formalized
City Club was "to aid in securing permanent good government for the City of New York
through the election and the appointment of honest and able municipal officers and the
establishment of a clear and stable system of laws relating to the city." Welling and others
also demanded the deletion of the word "reform" from any name the organization might
adopt, arguing that there was "a fatal implication of personal superiority in the word."
According to the organizers, "nobody likes to be 'reformed.' Nobody with sense assumes the
role of 'reformer.'"

The emergence of this new organization allowed Welling to turn his

efforts to a municipal reform movement led by upper-class, urban professionals.52
The City Club concentrated on two important aspects of the progressive agenda promoting good government and reforming legal institutions, particularly courts. In
furtherance of the first objective, the City Club sought to organize Good Government Clubs
in every assembly district throughout New York City.53 Many of the younger members,
shaped by the emerging social science initiatives at Columbia University, saw the
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professionalization of government as one means of eliminating, or at least reducing, rampant
corruption, graft and favoritism. These clubs were dedicated to "securing honesty and
efficiency in the administration of city affairs,.. .severing municipal from national politics,
and.. .procuring the election of fit persons to city offices." The City Club maintained that the
efforts of Good Government Clubs "made possible the election of a reform Mayor, William
L. Strong, in 1894." The City Club also became the "focal point" of Fusion Party activity.54
The City Club's good government efforts were hampered, however, by the growing
chasm between what historian Sven Beckert has termed the " self-conscious upper class in
New York City" and the immigrant, working class. Illustrative is an 1897 incident in which
three well-dressed club members forayed into the "regions near Second Avenue" to proclaim
the virtues of honest government. The crowd they addressed was not particularly receptive
to the message or the messengers and pelted "the three musketeers" with "rotten eggs, rotten
vegetables, rotten mud and everything else that was rotten and could be picked up and
thrown." The event exemplifies the difficulty that upper-class reformers had communicating
with and constructively engaging the average man on the street, many of whom were
immigrants, and their limited ability to understand and embrace the needs of the workers and
those less fortunate than themselves. To the extent that one goal of reform organizations
such as the City Club was "to weaken the institutional underpinnings of political
mobilization independent ofelite support," a capacity that the Tammany machine embodied,
some degree of conflict between the reformers and the lower classes was inevitable.55
The other component of the City Club's progressive agenda, the reform of legal
institutions, had two main targets. The first was Asa Bird Gardiner, the district attorney for
New York County, whom the City Club deemed incompetent at best and a corrupt Tammany
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political hack at worst. Gardiner had long been contemptuous of municipal reform
organizations and was known for proclaiming "To hell with reform!" in an 1897 speech at
a Democratic Party meeting in Harlem. The club launched a "series of far-reaching
investigations, one of which led to the presentment of charges against" Gardiner in 1899,
which asserted that he had used his power "as prosecuting officer to set the criminal law in
motion against any citizen who venture[dj to criticise [sic] Tammany officials in language
that hurts their feelings." Governor Roosevelt ultimately dismissed Gardiner, although for
reasons unrelated to the City Club's charges. The episode is significant, though, because it
demonstrated the reformers' willingness to invoke legal processes to advance their goals.56
The second object of the City Club's legal energies was the magistrate, or police,
courts. Court reform was consistently at the forefront of reformers' agendas throughout the
nation during the Progressive-Era. Progressives targeted local courts because, as historian
Michael Willrich has contended, they "were the true laboratories of progressive democracy,
flexible instruments of public welfare and social governance on a scale not matched again
until the New Deal."57 Progressive-Era court reform often took two main forms - making
judges more accountable to the people and, therefore, more likely to embrace and uphold the
progressive platform, and improving the quality, integrity and efficiency of the judicial
branch and its administration.58
It was through the magistrate courts that New York's immigrant and working-class
populations generally first came in contact with the judicial system. Legal scholars have
argued that the officials in such courts act as "gate keepers" or "watch dogs" and control
people's access to the law and the justice system.59 The magistrate courts' interaction with
local citizens would certainly have shaped New Yorkers' perceptions of the legal system.
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In June 1905, City Club secretary Lawrence Veiller submitted a report to the club's
trustees calling for a "thorough and searching investigation" of the magistrate courts. He
recommended that the inquiry study
not only the methods and forms of procedure in vogue in these courts but
also.. .the treatment of citizens by the Court employees and attendants, the
propriety of the decisions and the attitude of the judges toward persons
brought before them; the sanitary conditions of the buildings in which the
courts are held; the conduct of attendants and police officers; the relations of
the clerks to the judges; the adequacy of the number of courts in relation to
the volume of business transacted and the need of new courts; the amount of
revenue received from fines, etc.; the method of keeping court records, and
other questions which may be concerned in such inquiry.60
Veiller argued that this was the most significant project the club could undertake in light of
what he believed to be the "failure of the judges... to sustain arrests made by policemen,"
the "lack of sympathy and support on the part of these courts" for the police department and
other city departments, and the fact that the magistrate courts "stand to our large foreign
population as examples of American government."61
The City Club's leadership accepted Veiller's recommendations and, in July 1905,
solicited club members to participate in such an investigation of the magistrate courts. The
solicitation asserted that there "is no branch of our municipal government which so vitally
affects the welfare of the great masses of the City's population as the conduct of these lower
courts of criminal jurisdiction...That there are many abuses in connection with their
administration there can be no question."62 Upon receiving the investigative committee's
report, the club trustees anticipated preparing and introducing appropriate legislation "to
meet any evils which may be found to exist" and taking such other action "as may be
necessary to secure appropriate reforms in administration."63 In 1907, the club formalized
its efforts to "look after the administration ofjustice in the minor courts" when it created a
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"permanent committee on 'Courts'" with attorney Albert Bard serving as its first chairman.
The City Club was important in the history of New York City reform activities
because it became something of a focal point for those efforts.

Previously, the

interconnectedness and overlapping of New York City's myriad reform organizations and
their memberships had obscured and diluted the potency of any particular group. As
historians have observed, progressives tended to view social and economic problems as
challenges to be met or ills that required treatment What made the period unique was the
multifarious programs that progressives created to respond to the societal ills that some
perceived as threats to "polite culture and society" and others regarded as the difficulties
presented by modernity.65 The City Club became the sinew that knit all these elements
together and lent some degree of cohesiveness to reform efforts in New York City. Its
members organized and reorganized committees to attack, in a focused and concerted way,
problems of class, social and economic injustice, and political corruption.

The Citizens Union's First Decade
A third major New York City reform organization was the Citizens Union. Initially,
it was a non-partisan political party created by the City Club in 1897 to participate in the
municipal election that year.66 The City Club hoped that the Citizens Union would
consolidate Greater New York City's numerous and diverse anti-Tammany groups into a
political force that would liberate the city from mismanagement and corruption. The
organizers ofthe Citizens Union sought to capitalize on several concomitant changes in New
York's municipal organization.67 First, the 1894 state constitution called for the separation
74

of municipal elections from state and national election cycles. This change allowed local
groups to unite and focus their energies on municipal concerns without the influence and
demands of state and national campaigns.68 Second, the Greater New York charter was
scheduled to take effect on New Years Day, 1898. The charter enlarged the city from one
borough, Manhattan, to five boroughs, the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island
(Richmond) and Manhattan. This change gave city officials control of an immense
municipal bureaucracy, comprising 35,000 employees serving a population of almost
3,250,000.

The "good government" men were convinced that the time was ripe for

"concerted action" to unite New York's citizens into a cohesive political body. 69

Lastly,

City Club members believed that, as a consequence of the past education efforts of good
government clubs in the five boroughs, many citizens were now ready to put their
knowledge into action.
The nascent Citizens Union proposed to "rid the city of... organized piracy" carried
out by the Tammany machine.70 To this end, they established nine guiding principles and
objects. These included holding municipal elections separately from state and national
elections so that the city's "affairs may be managed upon their own merits uncontrolled by
national or state politics," selecting public officials "solely with reference to their
qualifications" and in accordance with impartial enforcement of civil service law
requirements, better schools and rapid transit facilities, enforcement of the eight-hour labor
law, and the application of "business methods to municipal affairs."71
These objectives reflected the business model of government and the social and
economic legislation for which progressives advocated. As evidenced by its support of the
eight-hour day statute, the Citizens Union aimed to reach across class and party lines to
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create a broad basis for municipal reform. It nominated Republican and Columbia University
President Seth Low as its reform candidate for mayor. The Citizens Union's leadership
recognized that if they were to have any chance of achieving victory they would need to
create an efficient political operation of their own to contend with the Tammany machine.72
During the 1897 election campaign the Citizens Union president, R. Fulton Cutting,
focused on working-class New Yorkers. Cutting recognized that the City Club drew its
principal support from the educated and wealthy members of society but believed that
electoral victory would be attained only through listening and responding to the needs and
aspirations of the working masses. To this end the parry spent a considerable amount of time
wooing labor leaders from the United Garment Workers, the Knights of Labor, and the
Granite Cutters' Union.73
The Citizens Union's 1897 electoral strategy caused it some loss of support among
the more affluent classes in general and from Republicans in particular. Several factors
accounted for this development. Citizens Union members held firm to their belief that local
elections must be independent of state and national politics and, therefore, eschewed calls
for a fusion with the local Republican party, despite pleas for such cooperation from
Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, Republican businessmen regarded the Citizens Union's call
for public franchise reform an untenable, marked by faulty economics and contrary to their
individual financial interests. One Republican leader declared that franchise reform was a
"socialistic demand" that would compel the business community to support Tammany.74
While Cutting sought to reach across class lines in 1897, the Citizens Union
candidate failed to garner enough support among its base of middle- and upper-class
voters.75 The divisions between the Citizens Union and other anti-Tammany forces resulted
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in the very outcome they most feared - a Tammany Democratic victory. John Jay Chapman
later opined that "the worst enemy of good government is not our ignorant foreign voter, but
our educated domestic railroad president, our prominent business man, our leading lawyer."76
There was plenty of blame to go around for the election loss, but many in the Citizens Union
saw Low's strong second place as an encouraging sign.77
The Citizens Union Executive Committee, pleased with the political inroads made
thus far, voted in 1898 to continue it as a permanent organization. Nevertheless, changes
were needed if the Citizens Union was to achieve political success. The Union reorganized,
acknowledging the "importance of having one ticket" by finding common ground with those
who, regardless ofpolitical party affiliation, "demand the separation of Municipal from state
and national politics and a Civic Administration without spoils, favoritism or political
tyranny."78 Over the next two years the Citizens Union concentrated on building a political
organization based on the local assembly district unit. It also decided to participate in statewide elections in 1898, an action that marked a brief aberration from one of its founding
principles and "a rather extraordinary excursion of the Citizens Union into the field of State
politics." The Citizens Union's leadership justified this departure from its first "guiding
principle" by explaining to voters that "the restriction of the Union's influence to the
selection of local city officials seriously hampers its efforts to improve the management of
city affairs." This was because the "control exercised by the State Legislature.. .over purely
municipal matters has demonstrated the insufficiency of any effort for home rule that does
not secure the selection...State officials completely independent of faction or party
dictation."79 This proposal caused a rift among the membership, and many prominent
members abandoned the Citizens Union, particularly those who supported the nomination
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ofRepublican Theodore Roosevelt for governor. The excursion into politics was short lived
and the effort costly. After 1900, the Union chose to limit its political activity to local
candidates.80
As the campaign of 1901 approached, the Citizens Union sought to collaborate with
the Republican Party and other anti-Tammany political groups in New York City, partly in
recognition of the fact that "it could not unaided expect to terminate Tammany control."
This less rigid and more practical approach allowed the Citizens Union to ally with the
Republicans and the Jeffersonian Democrats (Democrats not affiliated with the Tammany
machine), and they nominated Seth Low again for mayor on a fusion ticket81 The Van
Wyck administration was riddled with controversy and corruption. Governor Roosevelt had
removed Van Wyck's District Attorney, Asa Gardiner, from office the previous year.
Controversies during Van Wyck's tenure erupted regularly, including the indictment of
administration officials, the "discovery of evidence of police connivance with... gamblers,"
and persistent charges of bribery.82 The Tammany mayoral candidate, Edward Shepard, an
honest reformer himself, was badly tarnished by the Van Wyck administration, and Low
defeated him by more than 30,000 votes.83
Low was sworn in as mayor of New York City in January 1902. Faced with the
daunting task of reform, Low initially turned to the Citizens Union for guidance.84 During
his two years in office, however, the Low administration was often at odds with the Union.
For example, in a 1902 committee meeting one member, Stebbins, suggested that the Low
administration's employment of "inefficient and unqualified persons" in city office was an
"intolerable condition...involving our entire city, bringing odium, emphatic criticism and
severe condemnation upon the political movement know as the fusion movement of 1901 ."85
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The "strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the Low administration" continued to grow,
although the Union supported his re-election in 1903. Tammany, sensing tension within the
fusion ticket, "executed a clever coup" by placing several fusion candidates on the
Democratic ticket alongside its mayoral candidate, Congressman George B. McClellan.86
McClellan's victory forced the Citizens Union to reexamine its reason to exist. As
historian Augustus Cerillo has suggested, Low's defeat signaled the end of the reign of the
older generation of wealthy, elite reformers and ushered in an era of new younger
"progressives" more interested in the professionalization of municipal government than the
character of the elected officials.87 While the Citizens Union had made some inroads in
reforming city administration during Low's tenure, such as the enforcement ofthe Tenement
Laws, the creation of new city parks and schools, and opening municipal board meetings to
the press, it was frustrated with the bickering and infighting between the anti-Tammany
groups.88 As a result, the Citizens Union decided to withdraw from fusion politics and shift
its focus. First, it established a permanent Committee on Legislation as a watchdog to study
pending legislation and existing laws and to propose amendments to state laws that affected
the city.89 Next, the Union spearheaded efforts, for which a generation ofprogressives would
advocate, to nominate and elect non-partisan judges "based on the concept that the
administration of justice required.. .judges uninfluenced by political considerations."90 This
change in direction, from traditional party politics to municipal reform, opened doors
previously closed. Mayor McClellan, reelected to a second term in 1905, indicated a desire
to work with the Citizens Union to improve the quality of city government and the
judiciary.91
In 1906, as part ofthis shift in focus, the Citizens Union organized the Bureau of City
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Betterment (renamed the Bureau of Municipal Research the following year), headed by
Henry Bruere, to promote a business model of municipal government and to investigate
various city departments. The Bureau, with the assistance of city comptroller Herman A.
Metz, issued a report on the workings of city agencies in the Borough of Manhattan entitled
"How Manhattan Is Governed." The probe uncovered compelling evidence that the
administration of the Borough President, John E. Ahearn, was "inefficient and wasteful."92
McClellan launched the inquiry by appointing a political outsider, John Purroy Mitchel, as
a commissioner of accounts to work with the city's corporation counsel, William B. Ellison,
charging them "with the duty of considering the condition of the Borough President's office
in detail."93
Over the next few months the battle between Ahearn and the investigating body
escalated. In the fall of 1907 the commissioners' findings were sent to Governor Hughes.
On December 9, 1907, following a six-week hearing, Hughes determined that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the request for Ahearn's removal for "breach of duty" and
removed him from office.94
The drama continued, however, when on December 19 the borough aldermen reelected Ahearn as Manhattan Borough President. The City Club president, the Bureau of
Municipal Research, and the Citizens Union resolved to take further legal action. Leading
members of all three groups contemplated bringing a taxpayers' action to seek Ahearn's
removal. Ultimately they decided that the proper course of action was to support the state
attorney general's decision to file a quo warranto action to test Ahearn's right to hold
office.95 Finally, on October 29,1909, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ahearn, having been
lawfully removed from office by Governor Hughes, was disqualified for the entire term of
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that office and that, consequently, his subsequent appointment by the board of alderman to
fill his own unexpired term was null and void.96
The fact that the Citizens Union was thinking of filing a taxpayers' suit in the Ahearn
situation demonstrates that this option was on the table and being considered by the Union's
leadership as early as January 1908. Since quo warranto had proven effective in a similar
case concerning the mayor ofKansas City, Kansas who, like Ahearn, had been removed from
office and thereafter re-elected, the Citizens Union opted to let the attorney general pursue
this path to justice.97 Clearly, however, the Union was thinking about the taxpayers' action
as a means to challenge and remedy unlawful actions of municipal officials, and it filed its
first such action (Schieffelin v. McClellari) the following year.98
By 1908, then, the three principal political reform organizations in New York City
had all sought legal intervention, in one form or another, in their battles for good government
during the previous two decades. Certain common threads connect the election fraud cases
initiated by Welling and the City Reform Club in 1890, the City Club's actions to remove
District Attorney Asa Gardiner at the turn of the century, and the Citizens Union's
involvement in Ahearn's removal. In all three cases the objects of the reformers' legal
attacks were Tammany officials who were dragging their heels in order to obstruct and
stymie efforts by good government organizations to clean up city government. In each
instance the goo-goos, as the opponents ofgood government referred to the reformers, having
found other approaches unavailing, resorted to various types of legal action - a proceeding
for a writ of mandamus to compel the excise commissioners to do their duty and decide the
election fraud complaints; bringing charges against Gardiner to have him removed by the
governor, and obtaining Ahearn's removal from office by the governor and, when the
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aldermen thumbed their noses at this action by re-electing Ahearn, supporting the attorney
general's action for a writ quo warranto to void the re-election. A generation of New York
City reformers, including much of the Citizens Union's leadership as of 1908, had been a
part of these diverse experiments in invoking the law to further political reform and,
consequently, had come to see the alliance of political activism and legal activism as both
natural and efficacious. It was with these antecedents in mind that the Citizens Union
launched its taxpayers' litigation program.

The Citizens Union's Taxpayers' Litigation Program
Three key developments in the years 1907 and 1908 were largely responsible for the
Citizens Union's new emphasis and reliance on litigation as a tool of reform. First, the
success of the Bureau of City Betterment in exposing wasteful and corrupt practices in city
departments had convinced Citizens Union President Robert F. Cutting that the Bureau
should be an independent organization with a more prestigious name. In 1907, the Bureau
separated from the Citizens Union and Cutting resigned in December 1908, in order to head
the renamed Bureau of Municipal Research." Second, the frequency with which reformers
had resorted to the courts to advance their agendas made the Union's leadership realize that
an honest, qualified and independent (especially from the Tammany machine) judiciary
would aid their reform efforts. Accordingly, in 1907 the Citizens Union intensified efforts
in this regard and "investigate[d] the records ofjudicial candidates and conducted an active
independent campaign for the election of those found to be worthy." Lastly, with the
departure of Cutting, the Citizens Union elected executive committee member William Jay
Schieffelin as the new chairman.100
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Schieffelin was born in New York City in 1866. A descendent of United States
Supreme Court Justice John Jay, he was deeply rooted in New York's elite and its business
communities. In 1889, Schieffelin received a Ph.D. in chemistry from a university in
Munich, Germany. Upon his return to the United States he married Cornelius Vanderbilt's
granddaughter and began working at the Schieffelin family's pharmaceutical business, and
in 1906 he became its president.101 Citizens Union member Julius Henry Cohen later
observed that although Schieffelin came from a long line of aristocrats he "remained simple."
Moreover, Schieffelin had "great admiration" for the work done by organized labor in the
garment industries, and he was known to invite labor leaders and socialist members of the
Citizens Union to dinner meetings at his home on Fifth Avenue.102
Rooted in Huguenot traditions on the "duty and privilege" of Christians "to take part
in public affairs" and to serve their community and nation, Schieffelin was committed to
confronting the social, economic and political problems of New York City.103 He embraced
many of the progressive ideals espoused by New York social reformers of that era. m Upon
Schieffelin's return from graduate school in Germany his cousin, John Jay Chapman,
strongly encouraged him to join the City Reform Club. He did so, thus embarking on a
journey into reform politics that lasted more than sixty years. Schieffelin opposed his father
and his wife's grandfather by playing a "conspicuous" role in the movement to prevent the
construction of the Central Park race track, was a founder of the City Club in 1892, worked
for the election of fusion mayor William Strong in 1894, and had long been a part of the
Citizens Union's leadership. He was also a leader in other beneficent organizations,
including the American Mission to Lepers, the Tuskegee Institute, and the American Bible
Society. Schieffelin served as president of the Citizens Union from 1908 to 1941 and on its
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executive committee for more than fifty years.105
Upon becoming chairman, Schieffelin implemented a number of changes in
organization and in policy. First, he strengthened the executive committee "at the expense
of the representative character of the body" because, he had concluded, the Union needed to
be more efficient and effective. Schieffelin also wanted the Citizens Union to focus more
on shaping state legislation, which directly impacted the structure and operation of city
government and thereby concretely advanced or stymied the Citizen's Union's reform
activities, and less on participating in fusion politics, which had not proven especially
effective in furthering its reform agenda. Consequently, he expanded the Committee on
Legislation and made its work a priority.106 The Committee on Legislation not only studied
proposed legislation but also lobbied for or against it 107 Finally, he initiated the taxpayers'
litigation program that was to play such a prominent role in the Citizens Union's reform
efforts for more than two decades.
Schieffelin's first foray into the world oftaxpayers' litigation occurred in 1909, in the
case of Schieffelin v. McClellan. Earlier that year the New York City Board of Estimate and
Apportionment had granted a fifty-year franchise to the South Shore Traction Company to
construct and operate a trolley line through the borough of Queens and over the new
Queensborough Bridge into Manhattan. On June 8, the Public Service Commission refused
to approve the franchise because it conferred on the trolley company what amounted to a
fifty-year monopoly ofthe principal thoroughfare from Queens to the new bridge. The Board
of Estimate challenged the Commission's action in court and obtained an order in the
Appellate Division, New York's intermediate appellate court, holding that the Commission
had no authority to second-guess the terms of the franchise.108
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Schieffelin likely agreed with the Public Service Commission's observation that "the
time has passed when cities of this state, either to obtain a premature advantage of low fares
or to encourage sales of vacant real estate, should contract away the welfare of future
generations," inasmuch as this sentiment echoed the Citizens Union's "pay-as-you-go policy"
- that government operations should be paid for through current taxes or short-term bonds
rather than long-term debt that would burden future generations - that prompted many of its
taxpayers' actions.109 Accordingly, Schieffelin brought a taxpayers' suit under section 51 of
the General Municipal Law, which provided that a taxpayer may maintain an action "to
prevent any illegal official act" on the part of municipal officers or to "prevent waste or
injury to or to restore and make good any property, funds or estate" of a municipal
corporation, in which he sought to restrain the Board of Estimate from granting the franchise
to the South Shore Traction Company. Julius Henry Cohen, then counsel to the Citizens
Union and later its vice chairman, and Albert S. Bard, a member the Citizens Union's
executive committee, represented Schieffelin in these proceedings. The trial court granted
Schieffelin's request for an injunction on December 11, and the defendants appealed.H0 In
a 3 - 2 decision, the Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the procedures by which city
authorities had granted the franchise were governed by section 74 of the city charter rather
than by section 92 of the Railroad Law, that the city had complied with the requirements of
the city charter and that, therefore, the injunction should be dissolved. New York's highest
appellate court, the Court of Appeals, dismissed Schieffelin's appeal on the procedural
ground that not all necessary parties were before the court.111
This initial clash between the Citizens Union and New York City officials reflects
several recurring themes in taxpayers' litigation. The Citizens Union undertook to restrain
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the city from engaging in what the Union (and two members of the Appellate Division)
deemed an illegal official act.

City officials, who had regarded the Public Service

Commission's refusal to approve the franchise as an "attempt to usurp the power conferred
by law upon the Board of Estimate and Apportionment in granting franchises for the use of
streets," continued to defend in Schieffelin's lawsuit the parameters of their authority and
their discretion.112 The courts, while recognizing the right of taxpayers to obtain injunctive
relief for unlawful acts of local officials, declined to intervene where the challenged action
may have been imprudent but was not found to be illegal.
The McClellan lawsuit also highlights another aspect of the Citizens Union's
taxpayers' litigation program - many of its taxpayers' suits focused on the issues that
preoccupied Americans in the first three decades ofthe twentieth century. In these years one
of the greatest challenges confronting America's rapidly growing cities was how to move
large numbers of people from one place to another. The dramatic (and perhaps traumatic)
technological change accompanying, and the massive public expenditures necessitated by,
the construction of municipal mass transit systems captured the attention of the Citizens
Union and other New York City reform organizations. Not surprisingly, five of the Citizens
Union's taxpayer's actions involved rapid transit construction.113 Over the course of two
decades the Citizens Union litigated with city officials about how rapid transit systems in
New York City would be operated and funded, beginning with the McClellan lawsuit in 1909
and ending with the Walker case in 1928.114
The dramatic urbanization of America in these years likewise insured that questions
relating to municipal personnel and human resources would assume a prominent place in
public discourse and in the legal efforts ofreformers. In antebellum America, cities had been
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relatively few and relatively small, and staffing municipal bureaucracies had been a far
simpler matter. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, American cities had become
increasingly complex political, economic and social organisms. Consequently, the manner
in which municipalities hired, compensated and provided pensions for their employees had
a tremendous impact on citizen taxpayers and became a focal point of American political life
and political reform. Personnel issues were the subject of at least nine Citizens Union
taxpayers' actions in the 1920s. InSchieffelinv. Enright and Schieffelin v. Warren, Wallstein
challenged the legality of the pension payments to Police Commissioner Enright, and in
Schieffelin v. Berry took aim at Mayor John Hylan's pension. In the Doolan case Schieffelin
enjoined the unlawful reinstatement of a police officer. The Citizens Union also filed
taxpayers' suits to litigate the validity ofthe payment ofpolice captains' salaries {Schieffelin
v. Lahey and Schieffelin v. Kelliher), raises for municipal court judges {Schieffelin v. Leary),
and the reimbursement of attorney's fees to a police inspector {Schieffelin v. Henry), as well
as the manner in which the office of police building superintendent was to be filled
{Schieffelin v. O 'Brieri).115 Cronyism and political patronage were to some extent endemic
to the Tammany machine, particularly under Hylan. The existence of such conditions,
combined with the emerging importance of city personnel matters, galvanized the Citizens
Union's litigation program. Municipal administration came to be front and center in both
American politics and in the Citizens Union's legal efforts.
Within days of filing the lawsuit against Mayor McClellan, Schieffelin instituted a
taxpayers' action against the city of New York and its commissioner of bridges, James
Stevenson, to enjoin them from awarding a contract for the construction of a new municipal
building.

In 1907, the state legislature had enacted a statute which authorized the
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construction of new offices, removed from the borough president of Manhattan the control
of the project otherwise conferred upon him under the city charter, and transferred it to the
commissioner of bridges. Schieffelin had several objections to the proposed contract. First,
he argued that certain contract specifications prevented fair competition among bidders,
especially one clause that, he alleged, gave preference to the use of hollow tile bricks instead
of concrete blocks. Schieffelin saw the hand of Tammany behind this contract provision
because the largest manufacturer of hollow tile bricks in the United States at that time was
National Fireproofing Company of Pittsburgh, whose general counsel was Daniel F. Cohalan
and whom the New York Times characterized as the "Grand Sachem of Tammany Hall." U6
On December 20, the trial judge issued a temporary injunction. One week later the
court heard arguments on Schieffelin's request for a permanent injunction. In his January
1910 decision, Justice Dowling noted that "before a plaintiff in a taxpayers' action can be
given relief by way of an injunction against the acts of an official it must first appear that the
acts complained of are without power or that collusion, fraud or bad faith amounting to fraud
exists." n ? He went on to deny the requested injunction, holding that the 1907 statute was
constitutional and a valid exercise of the legislature's power and that none of the contract
provisions were illegal. Although Dowling expressed some personal concerns about the
wisdom of "ousting the superintendent of buildings of his power" to oversee this particular
project and about the plans for the building's foundations, he declared that "the courts will
not interfere merely to substitute their judgment or discretion for that of the municipal
officers whose duty it is to perform an act whose propriety is questioned." He emphasized
that it "is neither the right nor the duty of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
persons charged with the responsibility for the conduct ofpublic affairs."118 Absent an illegal
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act, there was no basis for granting injunctive relief.
There is no record of the Citizens Union's reaction to the adverse rulings it received
in the McClellan and Stevenson cases, although its leadership was likely disappointed not to
have prevailed on the merits. They could not have been too disenchanted with the legal
system, though, since the Citizens Union resorted to the courts in a score of other taxpayers'
suits during the next two decades. The fact that its executive committee continued to entrust
important public policy issues to the New York courts indicates that the leadership felt that,
although they had lost both cases, it was worth trying again.
Between 1911 and 1917, the Citizens Union instituted only one taxpayers' action, and
that lawsuit was brought not against New York City officials but against state election
officials. This period of quiescence was likely attributable to the character of the municipal
administrations governing during those years, mat ofDemocratic Mayor William Jay Gaynor
(1910-1913)andofFusionMayorJohnPurroy Mitchel (1914-1917). Although Gaynor
was Tammany's nominee, he was a respected judge and a reformer who embraced good
government principles and proved to be relatively independent ofTammany.119 Mitchel was
the Citizens Union's own candidate, having been nominated by the Citizens Municipal
Committee and Fusion Nominations, Inc., two umbrella organizations that included the
Citizens Union, the City Club, and other reform-minded organizations and individuals and
whose stated purpose was "to promote the nonpartisan election of honest, efficient and
independent public officers within the City of New York and to that end to use any and all
lawful and proper political means therefor, including the nomination and election of
candidates."120

Mitchel, an advocate of the business model of government, made

considerable improvements in government administration during his tenure.121 The Citizens
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Union's overall satisfaction with the Mitchel administration was reflected in a resolution it
adopted on April 20,1914, shortly after a failed assassination attempt on Mitchel, in which
it declared that the "Citizens Union's support of the candidacy of the Honorable John Purroy
Mitchel for Mayor last fall has been amply justified by the splendid record of his
administration" and that "[tjhrough the failure of the attempt on his life... the continuance
of the City administration on its present high plane of ability and efficiency is assured."122
In these circumstances, the Citizens Union had little need to invoke the taxpayers' lawsuit.
The sole taxpayers' action that the Citizens Union did bring during this period was
Schieffelin v. Komfort, an important case in the development of taxpayers' litigation
jurisprudence in New York. In April 1914, there had been an election to decide whether to
hold a convention to amend the state constitution, and the proposal had passed by a slim
majority (1,253 votes out of a total vote of 310,444). The Citizens Union had collected
evidence of election fraud in the Twelfth Assembly District and believed that, if those
fraudulent election returns were excluded, then the proposition would have failed. The
Citizens Union was not opposed to the very idea of a "non-partisan citizens' committee to
obtain the election of desirable delegates to the proposed convention." Rather, it objected
to the fact that the vote apparently had been obtained fraudulently. As the New York Times
editorialized,"[t]he thought that the organic law of the State is to be revised as the result of
an election tainted by fraud is intolerable."123, Schieffelin therefore brought an action as a
citizen and a taxpayer for an injunction to restrain state election officials from nominating
and electing delegates to a constitutional convention.124
The trial judge who ruled upon Schieffelin's petition in the first instance was Samuel
Seabury, who later chaired the commission that investigated corruption in the New York City
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municipal courts in the 1930s. Seabuiy expressed considerable openness to taxpayers' suits
to enjoin fraud and corruption and rejected the defendants' contention that courts had no
authority to afford relief in such situations, declaring emphatically that "the idea that courts
of justice are powerless in such an emergency to grant redress enunciates a doctrine to which
I am unwilling to subscribe." Seabury saw "no reason why the door of the court should be
closed to a citizen and taxpayer who asks of the court only such relief as the Constitution and
justice require should be given to them."125 He went on to consider the merits of the case but
ruled that the statute Schieffelin challenged was constitutional and that, because a large
number of votes in Kings County in favor of the constitutional convention had been
erroneously omitted from the election returns, a majority had voted in favor of the proposal
even if the fraudulent returns were disregarded. Accordingly, he denied Schieffelin's
petition. The Appellate Division agreed with Seabury on both points: that courts of equity
did have authority to restrain election officials from electing delegates to a constitutional
convention absent a majority vote in favor of a convention, and that Schieffelin had not
proven that a majority had not voted in favor of a convention.126 Schieffelin appealed.
The New York Court of Appeals did not even reach the merits of the case but
affirmed on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested injunctive
relief. The court reiterated its mid-nineteenth-century rulings in Doolittle v. Broome County
and Roosevelt v. Draper, that New York courts of equity had no power to enjoin or to right
a wrong unless the plaintiffs personal rights (as distinguished from his rights in common
with his fellow citizens) were affected. It emphasized that a citizen of New York could
maintain a taxpayers' lawsuit only if, and to the extent, it was authorized by statute.127 It held
that the New York taxpayers' acts on which Schieffelin based his action permitted such
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taxpayers' actions only against municipal and county officials and not against state officers,
such as the defendants in this case, and that, consequently, Schieffelin "as an individual
cannot sustain this action." 128
While the Komfort decision was significant to legal scholars and others who followed
the jurisprudence of taxpayers' litigation, it had little practical impact on the use of such suits
by organized taxpayers to promote municipal reform. The Court of Appeals had only
declared that taxpayers could not bring taxpayers' actions on behalf of the public against
state government officials. It did not limit the taxpayer's established statutory right in New
York to sue local government officials. Since almost all taxpayers' lawsuits were focused
on the municipal and county levels of government, the taxpayers' action remained a viable
and effective tool for reform organizations such as the Citizens Union, and for other
organized taxpayers.
The return of Tammany machine politics precipitated a period of intensive taxpayers'
litigation by the Citizens Union during the administration of Mayor John Hylan (1918 1925). Between 1918 and 1926 the Citizens Union filed fifteen taxpayers' actions, with
Schieffelin as the named plaintiff, relating to actions taken during Hylan's tenure; it
ultimately prevailed in twelve of those lawsuits. In light of the unpredictability of litigation,
this was an impressive record by any means of scoring. The frequency of the Citizens
Union's taxpayers' suits and the overall success with which they met demonstrates the need
for and vitality of such a remedy.
The lawyer who conducted this legal onslaught of the Hylan administration was
Leonard M. Wallstein, whom the Citizens Union hired to serve as its counsel in 1918.
Wallstein was born in New York city in 1884 to parents of modest means. He attended New
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York public schools and went on to Columbia University, receiving his undergraduate degree
in 1903 and his law degree in 1906. Wallstein was a proponent of the business model of
government and was active in the City Progressive Party in New York County. Following
the victory of Fusion Party candidate John Purroy Mitchel in the 1913 mayoral election,
Mitchel appointed Wallstein Commissioner of Accounts, and Wallstein served in that
capacity from 1914 to 1917. During his tenure Wallstein labored diligently to improve and
reform the mechanics of city government. His investigation of the fee system under which
county sheriffs were paid disclosed that the sheriffs fee compensation was exorbitant, and
it resulted in the conversion of the compensation system for sheriffs to a straight salary
commensurate with the pay received by other municipal officials. Another investigation
disclosed rampant corruption and graft in the Department of Licenses and led to numerous
criminal prosecutions.129 Of particular importance, because it precipitated the complete
administrative reorganization of the affected city department, was Wallstein's inquest of the
city coroner's office, which Wallstein characterized as "at best.. .a hot-bed of incompetence
and, at worst, a prolific breeding ground of corruption." After a series ofpublic hearings that
received extensive news coverage, the coroner's office, which had been staffed by untrained
coroners, was abolished and its functions transferred to a city-wide Medical Examiner's
Office that employed trained physicians hired through the civil service examination
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process.
Wallstein's experiences as commissioner of accounts reinforced his conviction that
the key to good government and reform lay in improving the methods and processes of public
administration, that is, in making them more efficient, honest and transparent. Consequently,
when Citizens Union Secretary Rufus E. McGahan asked Wallstein if he would serve as the
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Citizens Union's legal counsel in 1918, he was "delighted to accept [the position] because
it would enable me to continue in the same kind of work that I had done in the
Commissioner's office."131 The Citizens Union Executive Committee sought out Wallstein
to be its attorney because he was, according to Schieffelin, "a young lawyer of unusual ability
and initiative," he shared the Citizens Union's business model approach to municipal
government reform, and his work as Commissioner of Accounts made him especially
qualified to be an effective watchdog of the new Tammany administration.132 Because the
compensation he received as counsel for the Citizens Union was fairly modest, Wallstein
supplemented his income through his private law practice while serving as the Citizens
Union's lawyer from 1918 to 1934 or 1935. Throughout those years Wallstein worked
closely with the members ofthe Citizens Union Executive Committee, particularly chairman
Schieffelin. Wallstein considered Schieffelin a man of lofty principles and motives, who
"exercised a very fine influence." Wallstein did feel that Schieffelin exhibited "a degree of
excessive liberalism," and he parted company with the Citizens Union in the mid-1930s
when its "endorsement of Communists [for public office] became very frequent."133 In the
interim, however, the two worked hand-in-hand in executing the Citizens Union's legal
strategies against Tammany Hall.
The objects of Wallstein's ire and the defendants in these taxpayers' actions were
various officials of the Hylan administration and Hylan himself. John F. Hylan was born in
1868 in Hunter, New York, a country village in the northern Catskills. He labored on his
father's farm until the age of nineteen, when he sojourned to New York City in search of
opportunity. For the next nine years he worked for a railroad company, eventually becoming
a licensed engineer, while studying law in the evenings. Hylan's railroad experience may 94

have contributed to bis political undoing years later because it gave him a confidence in his
knowledge ofurban rapid transit, a perennial hot potato political issue in New York City and
most other American metropolises in this era, that proved to be unwarranted. Hylan then
practiced law for ten years while becoming involved in Democratic politics in Brooklyn. At
this time Hylan developed a small group of what a biographer called "less scrupulous"
associates, including two lawyers who had been indicted and a vaudeville performer turned
politician. As a loyal Democratic machine man, he represented the antithesis of the
progressive reformers ofthe era. In 1905 he secured an appointment as a magistrate with the
support of Pat McCarren, the Democratic boss in Brooklyn. Several years later he was
elected a county judge and served in that office until 1917.134
In 1917, backed by Brooklyn Democratic boss "Big Jim" Sinnott, Hylan secured the
Democratic nomination for mayor. In the general election the incumbent Fusion mayor, John
Purroy Mitchel, had several liabilities. First, bis efforts to improve the efficiency of city
government by centralizing and consolidating many municipal functions had alienated many
residents in boroughs outside of Manhattan. Furthermore, Mitchel was a far better business
administrator than he was a politician. Finally, the Tammany machine did what it did best,
mud-throwing, in a particularly dirty campaign. Hylan won decisively in November, and he
assumed office on January 1,1918.'35
Wallstein began bis first assault on the Hylan administration only two months after
Hylan took office in the case of Schieffelin v. Craig. Thomas L. Craig, as the New York City
Comptroller, was in charge of municipal finances and expenditures and, consequently, was
a frequent target of Wallstein's taxpayers' actions in these years. It was Craig's $250 check
that Wallstein had mounted on his office wall in 1920. Schieffelin sought an injunction to
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restrain Craig and other city officials from raising more than $2 million by taxation to cover
the city's share of the costs of widening Queens Boulevard, a levy that would have resulted
in a $2.47 increase in the city's tax rate. The trial court denied the motion for an injunction,
and the Appellate Division affirmed, observing that both parties had overlooked the fact that
the legislature had amended section 217 of the city charter in 1917 to require that the funds
for the Queens Boulevard project be raised by taxation. Consequently, the proposed levy did
not involve waste of or injury to the city's property or in illegal official act such as would
"imperil of the public interests or... produce some public mischief."136
The Citizens Union's next taxpayers' action was the one in which the trial court
issued the injunction that Craig then violated by not advising his subordinates of it and
allowing them to sell $1 million of stock, a violation for which Craig was later found in
contempt137 The lawsuit reflected the Citizens Union's support for the "pay-as-you-go"
provision of the New York City charter, which prohibited the use of proceeds from the sale
ofthe city's corporate stock to pay current municipal operating expenses and which had been
added to the city charter in 1916 during the Fusion administration ofJohn Purroy Mitehel.138
In a letter to Walter H. Pollock, an attorney who also represented the Citizens Union in
litigation on occasion, Wallstein argued that the Hylan administration had initiated
proceedings to issue corporate stock "[fjor the purpose of fictitiously reducing the tax levy
with the result that current expenses of operating the city government would be paid out of
the proceeds of long term bonds." In the same letter Wallstein characterized the lawsuit as
one of many "instances of lawlessness" on the part of the Hylan administration that "the
Citizens Union had corrected" over the years.139
The dispute was infused with political overtones and generated considerable heat in
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the media. At the February 7,1919 meeting at which the Board of Estimate approved the
issuance of the stock, Wallstein and Hylan engaged in a heated exchange, with Hylan calling
the Citizens Union "the biggest bunch of fakers in town" and Wallstein, "looking hard at the
Mayor," replying "with the single exception of one individual." Craig also attacked the
Citizens Union, characterizing Schieffelin's lawsuit a "political move" to embarrass his
administration. The chairman of the Public Service Commission, the agency responsible for
constructing the subway system, the funding for which was the subject of the taxpayers'
action, declared that "in this city... the government is no longer one of laws but one of two
men - Mayor Hylan and Comptroller Craig - who have throttled the initiative of every city
department, have blocked every plan of development so far proposed, and have halted the
progress of rapid transit construction." Wallstein lost no opportunity to contrast the Mitchel
administration's adherence to the "pay-as-you-go" provision of the city charter to the Hylan
administration's disregard of it. Even Justice James C. Cropsey, the trial judge who issued
the injunction, observed in his order that "[n]ow a new administration seeks to upset and
undo all that has been done in the years past by prior administrations."140 For Wallstein and
the Citizens Union, litigation was proving to be, like war in Clausewitz's aphorism, a
continuation of politics by other means.
The political temperature continued to rise when, in November 1919, Wallstein filed
contempt proceedings against Craig for disregarding the injunction upheld by the Court of
Appeals on October 21,1919 in Schieffelin v. Hylan. The motion for contempt was based,
in part, on Wallstein's own affidavit reciting the particulars of Craig's contumacious
conduct Following a hearing the trial court ruled that Craig had a duty to take affirmative
steps to "check any further acts necessary to consummate the forbidden transaction" and that
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he was "guilty of a very serious act of omission" by failing to notify city officials and his
subordinates that the injunction had been issued. That the dispute was rife with political
tension was obvious to Judge Manning, who observed that Craig's perspective had been
clouded by the fact that he "saw the situation through glasses blurred with the mist of
political or personal antagonism on the part of those whom he may have surmised were
watching his every step." Manning went on to scold Craig, declaring that Craig was himself
an experienced attorney and held "the high and responsible office of comptroller" and that,
as such, "[s]urely, if anyone should be held to a strict accountability and be expected to
render due obedience to injunctions and orders of the courts the comptroller is that man, but
in the present instance I find that he was lamentably remiss in the discharge of his sworn
duty." In doing so, Manning articulated one the ofthe core principles underlying the Citizens
Union's taxpayers' litigation program, that public officials are, and must be held, accountable
to the citizens whom they serve. Manning concluded that Craig's action was not "entirely
willful, but savors rather of indifference or carelessness" and, therefore, found him guilty of
civil, rather than criminal, contempt and fined him $250 plus costs.141 Craig appealed, and
the Appellate Division upheld the monetary penalties, holding that a fine for contempt may
be imposed in a taxpayers' action even though the extent to which the taxpayers' "rights and
remedies are impaired... may not be stated in money." The Court of Appeals dismissed
Craig's appeal.142 Soon thereafter Wallstein received his pound of flesh in the form of
Craig's $250 personal check.
It was at about this time that Schieffelin and Wallstein increased the Citizens Union's
efforts to police graft and corruption in city government. Between 1908 and 1920 a principal
focus of the Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation program had been to restrain illegal
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official acts involving large-scale public improvements, such as the city'srapidtransit system
(as in the McClellan and Craig cases) and municipal buildings (as in the Stevenson case).
With the return of old-style Tammany politics under Mayor Hylan, however, the Citizens
Union leadership decided that it was time to make cronyism in city government a specific
target of its political and its litigation activities.
On March 24, 1921, for example, the Citizens Union sent a letter, signed by its
secretary, Walter Tallmadge Arndt, to the state legislature in Albany requesting a legislative
investigation of Hylan's administration. The letter contended that the Hylan administration
had "been characterized by stupidity, incompetence and the brazen exploitation of the
opportunities of public office holding," as a consequence of which it had "brought the City
government to its lowest level of twenty years." Although the Citizens Union laid a number
of charges at Hylan's door, the chief complaints were of cronyism and corruption. Arndt
wrote that
[pjolitical or personal favoritism has replaced effective public servants with
incompetent satellites. In many of the [city] departments graft has proceeded
without check...the Mayor himself has insisted upon the appointment to
office of men of questionable previous record. In some instances such
appointees have been indicted while actually holding office. The Mayor has
been exposed by the Lockwood Committee as a pliant tool in the hands of...
special interests.143
The New York legislature had previously appointed two separate committees, the Meyer
Committee and the Lockwood Committee, to investigate charges of corruption in the Hylan
administration, but neither committee garnered sufficient evidence implicating Hylan
personally to harm him.144
The charges of incompetence and cronyism, on the other hand, were beyond dispute.
In 1926 the National Municipal Review noted that almost all of Hylan's appointments to city
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offices were made at the behest of the Tammany organization, and Charlie Murphy, the
Tammany boss, said of Hylan that "[n]o Tammany Mayor has ever been more liberal to
Tammany in the matter of patronage."145 In the fall of 1921 the Citizens Union compiled a
list of Hylan's relatives, political backers and personal friends whom he had appointed to
important positions in city government within five months of taking office. Among the
thirty-eight named political appointees were the Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of Accounts, the Police Commissioner and the Deputy Police Commissioner,
the Tax Commissioner, the Tenement House Commissioner, four lawyers in the city
attorney's office, numerous officials in the Fire Prevention Bureau and in the Department of
Water Supply, the Inspector of Accounts and the Examiner of Accounts.146 The Citizens
Union maintained that the appointment of unqualified persons to such key posts because of
their political connections undermined public safety, the efficient operation of city
government, and the honest administration of city finances. It also objected to the use of city
tax dollars to pay the salaries and pensions of such appointees.
The first of many taxpayers' suits initiated by the Citizens Union to restrain attempts
by city officials to manipulate the retirement system for their own benefit was Schieffelin v.
Enright. Enright had been a member of the police force from 1896 to January 22, 1918,
when, while he held the rank of lieutenant, Mayor Hylan granted him an indefinite leave of
absence and appointed him police commissioner. Later that year the state legislature, at the
request of Hylan and Enright, amended the greater New York charter to allow a member of
the police force who had served on the force for twenty years, and for at least six months as
police commissioner, to be retired by the Mayor, placed on the pension roll, and granted the
pension allowed to a chief police inspector. On December 22,1920, Hylan issued an order
100

retiring Enright as a lieutenant and awarding him a chief inspector's pension of $3,750.00
annually pursuant to this new law (as opposed to a lieutenant's pension of $1,050.00
yearly).147
On January 24,1921, Wallstein filed a taxpayers' suit to restrain Enright, individually
and as a police commissioner, from remaining enrolled in the pension fund and from paying
or receiving the pension. In a press release the Citizens Union articulated the reasons for the
action as follows:
Though the amount of money is comparatively small, the Citizens Union
approved the proposed litigation on the Enright pension, not only because it
believes that an important principle is involved, but also because it regards
this as an attempted pension grab, which is but typical of the whole attitude
of the Hylan police administration, in misusing the prestige and power of
public office for the private advantage of favorites.148
The trial court granted Schieffelin's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Enright
appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Enright had ceased to be a lieutenant
and a member of the police force upon accepting the position of police commissioner and
that Hylan had no authority to retire him as a lieutenant. The court further held that the
police pensions statutes prohibited a police commissioner, who "has practically complete
control of the administration of the police pension fund," from receiving a police pension
while serving as commissioner. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's injunction
restraining Enright from keeping his name on the present role of the pension fund and from
collecting any such pension.149 In so ruling, the court affirmed the well-settled statutory right
of New York taxpayers to enjoin illegal official acts. Two years later Wallstein cited the
Enright pension scheme as one among the numerous "instances of lawlessness" of which the
Hylan administration was guilty and for which the Citizens Union took it to task in the
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courts.
The machinations of the New York City Police Department under Police
Commissioner Enright continued to provide the Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation
program with plenty of fodder. On March 8, 1922, Schieffelin filed a taxpayers' suit to
restrain city officials from keeping patrolman John Doolan on the police force. On August
23,1915, then Police Commissioner Woods had found Doolan guilty ofhaving taken a bribe
to fix a case and had dismissed him. The New York City Charter allowed a dismissed officer
to apply for one rehearing on the charges. Doolan did so, Mayor Mitchel granted the
rehearing, and on December 17,1917, during the last weeks of the Mitchel administration,
the Police Commissioner confirmed Doolan's dismissal after the rehearing. In October 1918,
Doolan submitted a second request for a rehearing, which Mayor Hylan purported to grant
under a city ordinance provision. A rehearing followed, and Commissioner Enright
reinstated Doolan.
Wallstein brought the taxpayers' action to enjoin Enright and other city officers from
continuing Doolan on the police force and from paying him a salary on the ground that
Doolan had been properly dismissed from the force in 1915 and illegally reinstated by the
Hylan administration. The trial court denied Schieffelin's motion for atemporary injunction,
and he appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Greater New York
Charter allowed a dismissed police officer only one rehearing and that any authority
purportedly conferred on the mayor in the city ordinance to consent to a second rehearing
was void. Accordingly, the court declared, Schieffelin as a taxpayer had a right to commence
the taxpayers' action under section 28 ofthe Civil Service Law to prevent waste because "the
reinstatement being unlawful, Doolan is not a member of the force, has no claim upon salary
102

as such, payment thereof is illegal and a waste of public funds." The court therefore granted
the injunction.151
Doolan's unlawful reinstatement was not an isolated violation but, rather, part of a
larger systemic problem under the Hylan administration. The Meyer Commission, which the
state legislature had appointed to investigate the administration of New York City
government under Hylan, had determined that Doolan was only one of at least twenty-nine
police officers who had been discharged during the administration of Mayor Mitchel and the
unlawfully restored to their positions by Police Commissioner Enright and that Hylan's
Corporation Counsel had declared those reinstatements to be unlawful. Because "the mayor
has done nothing to compel compliance with the law," the Citizens Union declared in a press
release, "this appeal to the courts has become necessary."152 The Doolan suit, then, was a
test case, and a successful one for the Citizens Union. After the Appellate Division's ruling
against Doolan, Acting Police Commissioner John A. Leach dismissed from the police force
twenty-one officers and two detectives who had been dismissed by Mayor Mitchel's police
commissioner and reinstated by Enright153 Not willing to accept defeat on this patronage
issue, Hylan sought to circumvent the court's decision by persuading the legislature to pass
the Klienfield bill, which gave the police commissioner the power to hear charges against
dismissed police officers more than once and to reinstate them.154 I have found no evidence
of how many, if any, of the officers dismissed by Mayor Mitchel's police commissioner
successfully availed themselves of this statute.
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the Greater City of New York
precipitated the Citizens Union's next taxpayers' action. An early 1923 Mayor Hylan
proposed to have the Board of Estimate issue $400,000 of special revenue bonds to finance
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a proposed Silver Jubilee. The Citizens Union saw the event as a shameless attempt at selfpromotion by Hylan. Wallstein characterized it as nothing more than a clumsy effort by the
Hylan administration to use Greater New York City's Silver anniversary "as the pretext for
the self-exploitation and political propaganda of the present officials at public expense...
[and the] dissipation of public money in trashy amusement and jollification for the
glorification of officials under the guise of a so-called educational exposition."155 In this
particular case Comptroller Craig agreed with the Citizens Union that the proposed
expenditure of city tax monies on the celebration and the use of city workers to prepare for
it was unlawful, although Hylan's allies accused Craig of having political, not principled,
motives. Commissioner of Accounts David Hirshfield, for example, suggested that Craig
had sided with Schieffelin and the Citizens Union on this issue and "has flirted with and has
established cordial intercourse" with the Citizens Union, the City Club and other reform
organizations in an effort to gain their support as the Fusion nominee for mayor in 1925.156
In March 1923, Schieffelin filed suit, seeking an injunction restraining city officials
from issuing the special revenue bonds to finance the jubilee. The trial court ruled that the
proposed expenditure would not be for a lawful purpose and issued the injunction. Noting
that the issuance of the bonds would subject New Yorkers to "unnecessary and oppressive
taxation," the court articulated what was by then the settled role of courts of equity in
policing illegal acts of municipal officials as follows:
Courts are, and should be, extremely loath to interfere with public officials
in the performance oftheir onerous and often ungrateful task; but courts must
not weakly be swayed from the performance of their duty, not always
pleasant, to curb lawlessness... Within the domain of their authorized
functioning, city officials are free from interference by courts. It is their
judgment, and theirs alone, that must control. But when they step beyond the
bounds of their allotted jurisdictions they divest themselves of legal power,
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and their acts beyond those bounds have not the sanction of the mandates of
the people.157
The Appellate Division upheld the trial judge's order.158 Hylan appealed.
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court on the municipal
purpose issue, holding that the legislature had conferred upon the city the power to expend
public funds on municipal celebrations and that such legislation was valid and constitutional.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction, however, on the ground that
the board of aldermen's adoption of the resolution for issuing the revenue bonds was illegal
because the proposed resolution had not been published five days before its adoption as
required by the city charter. The court strongly defended taxpayers' rights, declaring that a
"provision in the city charter designed to give to taxpayers notice of a proposed resolution
leading to the expenditure of public monies ought to be construed strictly in favor of the
taxpayer."159 Hylan's Silver Jubilee was eventually financed, but with funds from the private
sector. Hylan continued to insist that the use of city funds for the celebration would have
violated no law, denouncing Schieffelin, Wallstein and the Citizens Union as obstructionists
whose tactics had prevented city officials "from initiating measures helpful to the people"
and who "have been singularly successful in enlisting the aid ofthe courts."160 Hylan always
resented the interference of judges in the administration of city affairs and tended to view
them as Schieffelin's co-conspirators.
Hylan had always taken the Citizens Union's criticisms of his administration
personally, and he rarely lost an opportunity to fire back. At an October 24, 1922 budget
hearing, for example, Hylan sent for members of the press to make "disclosures of
importance." He then went on to charge that the Citizens Union had cost New York
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taxpayers $500,000 by initiating the Meyer Committee investigation of his administration,
accused Wallstein of personally profiting from the investigation, and suggested mat
Schieffelin's pharmaceutical company sold wine and liquor in violation of the prohibition
laws.161 In a letter to the Board of Estimate in 1924, Hylan made a stinging indictment of the
Citizens Union, the City Club and other affiliated political reform organizations which, in
Hylan's words, "have been particularly obstructive of the progressive and humanitarian
administration which we have been endeavoring to give to all the people, with special
privilege to no class." Hylan asserted that these groups were the "mouthpieces" of
monopolies, large corporations and plutocrats and were "usually under the control and
domination of cunning coteries whose machinations are unknown to the great bulk of the
membership" and want to "run the city government according to their own sweet will while
the public pays the bill." Apparently believing that the best defense is a good offense, Hylan
accused the Citizens Union of attempting to "hoodwink the people" with a "mass of
fabrication and misleading statements."162
Early in his administration, however, Hylan made accusations against Schieffelin that
went beyond the pale even in the no-holds-barred arena of New York City politics. These
statements precipitated another lawsuit by Schieffelin, though it was libel suit filed by
Schieffelin individually rather than a taxpayers' action on behalf of the Citizens Union. In
March 1919, Schieffelin had mailed a solicitation letter asking potential donors to
"contribute to the Citizens Union to promote sanity in the City Government and to command
respect for the law."

The following month Hylan sent a letter to the City Health

Commissioner accusing Schieffelin & Co. of being "one of the chief narcotic drug
manufacturers and dealers in cocaine, heroin, morphine and opium in New York." Hylan
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wondered at "a reformer like William Jay Schieffelin attaching his name to such a letter as
this asking the people to 'promote sanity' when the cocaine and other narcotics that his drug
company manufactures drive people to insanity and crime, and asking people to contribute
to 'command respect for the law' when the Schieffelin narcotic drug manufacturing
company... violates the law in the sale ofnarcotics which make criminals by the wholesale."
Schieffelin emphatically denied the allegations, characterizing Hylan's letter as a "scurrilous
personal attack upon me [which] appears to be the only attempt which he can make to answer
the Citizens Union's exposures of his disgraceful conduct of the city government." The
Mayor's letter had the unintended consequence of increasing contributions to the Citizens
Union. Nevertheless, Schieffelin retained fellow Citizens Union members Clarence M.
Lewis and Walter H. Pollock to represent him in the defamation action, and he brought suit
on May 2, 1919. The case never went to trial, although it went on for almost nine years,
during which time Schieffelin ultimately prevailed at nearly every stage of the pretrial
proceedings.163 Finally, on January 30,1928, three years after Hylan left office, he issued
a complete retraction of the charges against Schieffelin "in form satisfactory to Dr.
Schieffelin" in which he had acknowledged that "these accusations against Dr. Schieffelin
personally and against the drug corporation and the reform organization with which he was
and is connected I entirely withdraw. I sincerely regret the injustice that I did." In exchange
for the apology, Schieffelin agreed to terminate the libel action.164
Hylan's accusations and the defamation suit in no way distracted Wallstein and
Schieffelin from the Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation program, which continued to be
one of the reform organization's core activities. Meetings of the Executive Committee
included regular updates from Wallstein on pending taxpayers' suits and other law-related
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activities of the Citizens Union.165 It was in late 1924 that Wallstein sent to Walter Pollack
a four-page letter summarizing the taxpayers' actions and other lawsuits that the Citizens
Union had brought since 1918 to address and remedy lawless acts of the Hylan
administration.166 Wallstein later observed that, as legal counsel for the Citizens Union, "it
was my job primarily then to keep tabs on the Hylan administration and to keep them within
the law." He estimated that he "brought more taxpayers' actions against Hylan and other
members of the City Administration during the time of my incumbency as counsel to the
Citizens Union than had ever been brought altogether in the history of the State."167 From
1924 to 1930 Wallstein would bring at least nine more taxpayers' actions for the Citizens
Union against New York City officials.
Schieffelin v. Henry marked the approximate mid-point of the taxpayers' litigation
program under Wallstein, both in terms of chronology and the number of suits. The case
arose out of a tawdry tale of municipal vice, graft and perjury. In 1920 Police Inspector
Dominic Henry had testified before a grand jury that Assistant District Attorney James E.
Smith had approached him and offered to purchase police protection for houses of
prostitution and gambling places operated by Smith's friends. Smith had incurred the ire of
Hylan, Police Commissioner Enright and Henry by conducting a two-year crusade against
vice, during which he had "charged that the Police Department was 'more corrupt' than it
had ever been, and that Inspector Henry's district was the worst policed in the city."168 When
Henry's grand jury testimony was contradicted by every other witness, he was indicted for
perjury. Following a trial in which Enright testified on Henry's behalf, Henry was convicted
and sentenced to a term of two to five years at Sing Sing Penitentiary. The Appellate
Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, but the Attorney General concluded
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that he could not convict Henry on retrial and had the trial court dismiss the indictment.169
In 1923 Hylan persuaded the state legislature to enact a statute authorizing the city
to reimburse Henry for the attorneys fees and expenses that he had occurred in defending
himself in the criminal proceedings in 1920 and 1921. The Citizens Union promptly brought
a taxpayers' suit to restrain city officials from reimbursing Henry. The trial court ruled that
"there is no constitutional power to reimburse public officers for expenses incurred in
defending criminal prosecutions for official acts or omissions, unless a statute provides
therefor in advance." Accordingly, the court granted Schieffelin's motion for an injunction
on the ground that the retroactive statute violated the state constitution "as a mere gift of city
money for other than apublic purpose."170 The Appellate Division and the New York Court
of Appeals both affirmed, without opinion, the trial court's decision.171 In this one of many
battles involving the New York City Police Department, the Citizens Union had prevented
another illegal expenditure of public funds by the Hylan administration.
Commissioner Enright's police department prompted yet another taxpayers' suit by
the Citizens Union in 1924 in the matter of Schieffelin v. Lahey. William J. Lahey had been
a member of the New York City police force from 1888 to January 24,1918, at which time
he held the rank of police captain. On that day, less than one month into the Hylan
administration, Enright granted Lahey a leave of absence and appointed him second deputy
police commissioner. Lahey continued to serve in that capacity until September 1920, when
Enright restored Lahey to the rank of captain and assigned him as Chief Inspector.
The Citizens Union, relying on the Appellate Division's 1922 decision in Schieffelin
v. Enright, contended that Lahey had vacated his office as police captain and that his
reinstatement to the uninformed police force was unlawful. Schieffelin therefore filed a
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taxpayers' suit to enjoin Lahey from receiving, and city officials from paying him,
compensation as a police captain detailed as a chief inspector. The trial court ruled in
Schieffelin's favor, holding that upon accepting the position of deputy police commissioner
Lahey had resigned as a police captain, that the civil service commission rules pursuant to
which Enright had purported to restore Lahey to the office of police captain conflicted with
the provisions of the city charter and hence were void and that, as such, Lahey's present
tenure of office as chief inspector was illegal. Accordingly, the court granted Schieffelin's
motion for judgment on the pleadings and issued the injunction.172
The lawsuit dragged on for another two years. In 1925, the Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court's decision.173 The following year, however, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's orders in a four to three decision. The Court of Appeals
upheld the rulings that Lahey had vacated his office as police captain when he accepted the
appointment as deputy commissioner in 1918, but the four-member majority concluded that
Lahey's reinstatement as a police captain in 1920 was authorized by a municipal civil service
rule and that he had been properly restored to duty as a police captain under that rule. Lahey
was thus allowed to retain his position as Chief Inspector.174 Wallstein and Schieffelin could
at least console themselves with the knowledge that three members of the Court of Appeals
had agreed that Lahey's reinstatement was not authorized by statute and hence was unlawful
and that they would have affirmed the judgments in Schieffelin's favor.175
Public policy regarding rapid transit in New York City, which had precipitated the
taxpayers' actions in Schieffelin v. McClellan (1909) and Schieffelin v. Craig (1918),
returned to the fore during Hylan' s second term (1922 -1925). In the early 1920s New York
courts had repeatedly enjoined efforts by New York City to operate municipal bus lines on
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the ground that such activities were beyond the city's power. Hylan, therefore, sought to
have the state legislature enact special legislation authorizing New York City to operate
buses but was unsuccessful.176 The Citizens Union opposed municipal operation of bus lines
on both legal and fiscal grounds. Louis Marshall, a member of the Citizens Union and the
lawyer who had successfully represented a stockholder in a private transit company in a
taxpayers' action for an injunction, maintained that the city had lost millions of dollars
operating ferries and that if "Hylan is allowed to try out his theories on the buses the
taxpayers will suffer to the tune of anywhere from fifty to one hundred million dollars. The
thing will just not work."177 Years later Wallstein observed that, with respect to municipal
operation of bus lines, the "view of the Citizens Union was that there was no authority for
it and that it would be a wasteful enterprise which would cost the taxpayers great sums of
money - 1 may say that subsequent events have proved that municipal operation of transit
facilities is not very prudent or successful.''178 Because the city's pleas for special legislation
went unheard in Albany, Comptroller Craig convinced the New York City Municipal
Assembly to enact four local laws authorizing the city to establish and operate a bus line.
Hylan opposed this action because New York City Corporation Counsel George R.
Nicholson had opined that the local laws were illegal and Hylan anticipated (correctly) that
the matter would be tied up in the courts for several years.179
In early 1925 Schieffelin and Wallstein did indeed commence a taxpayers' suit to
enj oin city officials from dispersing public monies under the authority ofthe four local laws.
It was consolidated for trial with a taxpayers' action brought by Louis Marshall on behalf of
Stuart Browne, President of the United Real Estate Owners Association, with the same
objective.180 Hylan resorted to his now-familiar characterization of the Citizens Union as an
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obstructionist group, declaring that
[w]hile I don't think Comptroller Craig's theory is sound... nevertheless we
could proceed upon the Craig bills and put buses on the streets of the city for
the benefit and service of the people, had it not been for the intervention and
interferences of so-called reformers and uplifters like William J. Schieffelin,
who uses his Citizens Union to block everything beneficial to the people.181
The trial court judge, Justice Wagner, denied the motions for an injunction and dismissed
both Schieffelin's and Browne's complaints, a decision that Craig hailed as "an emancipation
proclamation for the people ofthe City ofNew York" and "the greatest step forward in home
rule since the Civil War."182 Schieffelin and Browne appealed, however, and the Appellate
Division, in a unanimous decision, reversed the trial court and reinstated the injunctions.183
The city appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in the taxpayers'
favor, ruling that neither the State Constitution nor the Home Rule Law authorized the city
to engage in the business of a common carrier and to operate municipal buses and that, as
such, the four local laws were invalid. The Court of Appeals noted that the state legislature
had consistently and intentionally denied to the city the power to engage in the business of
municipal transit. The court noted that "as a result of injunctions against the operation of
municipal bus lines which had been granted by the courts, repeated applications had been
made to the legislature in behalf of the city ofNew York to enlarge the city's powers and that
all bills directed to that end had been rejected."184 This observation reflected, at least in part,
the Citizens Union's view of the rapid transit dispute as a power struggle between city
officials and citizen-taxpayers. Historically, a fundamental purpose of the taxpayers' action
had been to prevent municipal corporations and municipal officers from exceeding their
lawful powers. This tension between city officials and taxpayers was exacerbated by the
Hylan administration. After Justice Wagner had ruled against Schieffelin in the Mills case,
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Wallstein "went to see him and told him that I thought he had made a political decision, mat
it was orthodox Tammany Democratic doctrine at that time - this was during the Hylan
administration - to extend the powers of the City as vastly and widely as possible. I said I
thought he was wrong."185 Power and politics consistently infused the conflict between the
Citizens Union and the Hylan administration. The intersection of law and politics in the
Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation program was especially dynamic during this period.
Between 1924 and 1928, the Citizens Union had a second go-around with the Hylan
Administration in the courts regarding the payment of police captains' salaries, the same
issue that had been litigated in Schieffelin v. Lahey.m

On June 23, 1923, Police

Commissioner Enright had promoted three lieutenants (William Kelliher, Patrick Brady and
Edward J. Quinn) to the rank of captain, even though there were then no known vacancies
and, therefore, they were not assigned until later. The three had been on the eligible list for
police captain, which expired on the date oftheir appointment. A Brooklyn taxpayer, Roscoe
Brown, instituted a taxpayers' action on behalf of the Civil Service Reform Association to
vacate the appointments. H. Elliot Kaplan, the Association's attorney, argued that the
Police Captains' case is more important than appears on the face of it. The
principle involved [is] the right of any department head to make gerundive
appointments; that is, may appointments of public employees be made long
after the eligible list on which their names appear has expired and ceased to
exist? If department heads can do so, it would be an easy means for them to
invade the merit system law by appointing favorite employees from an
eligible list on the eve of its expiration.187
The trial judge agreed, observing that to "permit the appointing power, on the eve of the
enforced death of such a list, to take men therefrom and assign them to a then non-existent
vacancy, the time of which was entirely speculative, would be to open the way to grave
evasions of the civil service law."188 Accordingly, the court granted Brown's motion for an
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injunction and restrained the payment of the three captains' salaries.189
Not to be deterred, Enright persuaded the state legislature to pass a statute to furnish
relief to the three captains, whom Enright then appointed under this special legislation.190
While this special legislation was pending, Enright had intentionally passed over three other
lieutenants who were at the top of the eligible list.191 It was this type of manipulation of the
civil service system for the benefit of political favorites that the Civil Service Reform
Association and the Citizens Union strove to eradicate. Schieffelin and Wallstein then filed
a taxpayers' suit to enjoin payment of the three captains' salaries. The trial court granted the
injunction, on March 20, 1925, ruling that the statute was unconstitutional because it
violated, by evading, the civil service requirements for promotion under the State
Constitution.192 The ruling was affirmed on appeal.193
This was not, however, the end of the matter. In 1926, the New York Court of
Appeals clarified the law regarding police force vacancies in the case of Schieffelin v. Lahey,
holding that when a police captain accepted a promotion to commissioner, he automatically
vacated his office as captain.194 Based on this ruling, the lawyer representing Kelliher, Brady
and Quinn moved to modify the March 20,1925 injunction on the ground that on June 26,
1923, the day on which they had originally been appointed, there were three captains who
were serving as Deputy Police Commissioners and, therefore, had vacated their offices as
captains, so vacancies did indeed exist 195 On June 2, 1928, the trial court modified the
injunction "to limit its operation to restraining the payment of salaries as captains to Kelliher,
Quinn and Brady under their reappointment pursuant to the unconstitutional act of 1924."1%
This meant that the three captains were entitled to be paid under their initial June 23,1923
appointments, the appointments that had been voided in the Brown v. Craig lawsuit.
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Accordingly, the three captains were awarded four years of back pay ($13,500 each), so the
Citizens Union ultimately lost this battle.197
By the time Kelliher and his colleagues prevailed, John Hylan had long since
departed the New York City political scene. In early 1925 the prevailing political winds
took a decided shift against Hylan following the release of Justice John V. McAvoy's report
to Governor Smith on transit conditions in New York City. Ironically, the independent
judicial inquiry had been initiated as a result of Hylan's charge that the Transit Commission
was to blame for the sorry state ofNew York's subways. Following a fifteen-day evidentiary
hearing conducted at the office of the New York City Bar Association, however, McAvoy
placed most of the blame for subway congestion and delays in constructing new lines on
Hylan.198 Opponents of Tammany Hall quickly made political hay with McAvoy's report.
Samuel Koenig, Chairman ofthe New York County Republican Committee, J. Irving Walsh,
President of the Real Estate Board of New York, and Louis Marshall, the Citizens Union
member who had represented the plaintiffs in the injunction action regarding city bus lines,
all cited the report as evidence ofHylan's culpability for the "existing deplorable" conditions
of the municipal subways. Wallstein characterized the report as a
finding that the Hylan administration had been deliberately and consciously
guilty of treason against the people of the city, has... purposely kept the
public in suffering... and has capitalized the people's agony for the power
and profit of place. Hylanism is now authoritatively exposed in all its ugly
nakedness. Just public indignation may be depended on to inflict the
appropriate penalty upon the leader and all those who have abetted him in his
terrible public betrayal.199
The charges of treason likely referred to the fact that Hylan had intentionally promoted bus
lines, in which his relatives and Tammany favorites had various ownership interests, at the
expense of subway construction.200
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The political impact of the McAvoy report was profound. At the time the report was
issued the New York Times predicted correctly that it would prompt Tammany Hall to
abandon Hylan and prevent his renomination. The Tammany-backed candidate for mayor,
State Senator James J. Walker, defeated Hylan in the Democratic primary and went on to win
the general election in November 1925. In a March 1926 biographical sketch of Hylan, the
National Municipal Review concluded that "in the end [the transit question] encompassed
his undoing." Joseph McGoldrick, a political science professor at Columbia University,
made the same assessment two years later.201
Although the Citizens Union had endorsed Walker for State Senator in 1924, it did
not do so in the 1925 mayoral race and instead backed the Republican ticket headed by Frank
Waterman. The Citizens Union regarded Walker as a "Tammany regular" and argued that
"the Tammany Democratic ticket, despite the improvement that has resulted from the
elimination of Hylan, holds no promise of giving the City an administration of its affairs on
a non-partisan basis of efficiency and economy." The Citizens Union did not expect that the
replacement of Hylan with Walker would change the essential nature of Tammany Hall's
"character, tradition and practices" but that "it merely means that Tammany has again broken
one of its own creatures, grown too powerful,... for factional reasons."202 The Citizens
Union's hopes for a reform administration headed by Waterman, however, were dashed at
the polls in November.
The Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation arising out of actions of the Hylan
administration continued long after Hylan left office. The first such post-Hylan taxpayers'
suit involved Hylan himself and recently-retired police Commissioner Richard Enright in
what became known as the Hylan and Enright "pension grabs." Enright had resigned on
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December 29, 1925, two days before Mayor-elect Walker was to be inaugurated, so that
Hylan could pass upon Enright' s pension application. When Hylan left office on December
31, he submitted his pension application pursuant to two local laws that he had signed in
1925. Before a month had passed, Wallstein had filed taxpayers' suits on behalf of
Schieffelin against both Hylan and Enright based on the Citizens Union's belief that the
special legislation authorizing the two pensions was invalid and that "the last-minute
attempts of Mayor Hylan and Police Commissioner Enright to attach themselves
substantially and permanently to the city payroll is generally resented by the public." Hylan
had indeed been subject to considerable criticism in 1925 as the local laws, which would
make him eligible for a pension to which he would not otherwise have been entitled, worked
their way through the New York Municipal Assembly. The day after Schieffelin filed the
lawsuits he received a letter from a fellow New Yorker characterizing Hylan's and Enright's
pensions as "a disgraceful robbery of the people's money" and requesting that the Citizens
Union initiate legal proceedings to stop payment of the pensions.203
The two local laws at issue in the Hylan pension case certainly smacked of special
legislation. One reduced the minimum age of retirement of the city employee group that
included Hylan from sixty to fifty-five and the other increased the basis of the pension
payment from the employee's last ten-year average salary to the lastfive-yearaverage salary.
The effect of the two amendments was to enable Hylan to receive a pension when he retired
on December 31,1925, for which he otherwise would not have qualified (he was then fiftyseven) and to increase the amount of his pension benefit Moreover, the local laws affected
not only Hylan but also approximately 100 other city employees and were expected to cost
the city and city taxpayers an additional $3 million annually.204 Supreme Court Justice
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Joseph Proskauer granted Schieffelin's motion to enjoin city officials from paying any
pension whatsoever to Hylan.205

The Appellate Division affirmed the decision in

Schieffelin's favor, ruling that the two local laws, which conflicted with and purported to
supercede the relevant pension statutes enacted by the state legislature, were therefore
invalid. 206 In doing so the court relied on the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Schieffelin v. Mills, another case in which the Citizens Union successfully challenged the
validity of local laws enacted by the Municipal Assembly (in that case authorizing the city
to operate municipal bus lines) because they conflicted with state statutes.207 Preventing
municipal officials from exceeding the bounds of their lawful authority was a consistent
policy objective of the Citizens Union and a frequent purpose of taxpayers' suits in general.
Of equal concern to the Citizens Union was the fact that the two local laws substantially
increased the cost of the retirement system and, hence, imposed a significant burden on city
taxpayers. Hylan felt that "he had been 'singled out' by the Citizens Union to have his
pension held up" and appealed.208 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision
on October 19,1926.209
The proceedings in the Enright pension case were far more protracted. In 1920
Enright had attempted to retire from the police force and draw a pension under section 355-a
of the Greater New York Charter while still serving as police commissioner, but the Citizens
Union had prevented him from collecting a pension at that time in the case of Schieffelin v.
Enright.210 In 1924 the state legislature passed a bill, section 14-b of the General City Law,
that authorized Enright to retire on a pension in the amount of $5,000 annually. Schieffelin
asked the court to restrain the new police commissioner and other city officials from paying
any pension to Enright on the ground that section 14-b was unconstitutional special
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legislation. The trial court agreed, ruling that the statute was a special and local law that
violated the Home Rule Amendment of the State Constitution and issued the injunction.211
In June 1928, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that
section 14-b "could not very well apply to any but Enright It was a deliberate attempt to
enact special legislation of the kind which has frequently been condemned by the courts."212
The following year, however, the Court of Appeals modified that judgment. It agreed that
section 14-b was unconstitutional special legislation but concluded that, because Enright had
now retired as police commissioner, section 355-a of the Greater New York Charter applied
to him and entitled him a pension under that statute, that of a chief inspector. Since a chief
inspector's pension was only $3,750 per year, though, the Court of Appeals did enjoin any
pension payment to Enright in excess of that amount213 The Citizens Union was thus only
partly successful in derailing the Enright "pension grab."
The last two Citizens Union taxpayers' suits arising out of legislation enacted during
the Hylan administration were Schieffelin v. O 'Brien and Schieffelin v. Leary. The first case
involved the manner in which a senior management position in the police department, a
seemingly never-ending source of grist for the Citizens Union taxpayers' litigation mill, was
to be filled. The second was directed at efforts by the New York Municipal Assembly to
increase the salaries of municipal court judges.
In the O 'Brien matter, Schieffelin and Wallstein filed a petition to enjoin the payment
of the salary of Thomas E. O'Brien, the police department building superintendent. In 1895
the police department had established a Bureau of Repairs and Supplies, supervision of
which was not an independent office but a duty assignment at the pleasure of, and revocable
by, the police commissioner. O'Brien had served as bureau chief since the office was
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created. In 1923, the state legislature, being not satisfied with this situation and desiring to
give the police building superintendent a more secure tenure in office, added section 276-e
to the New York City Charter which created the office of police department building
superintendent whose salary was $5,000 annually and who could not be removed except in
the manner prescribed for all police officers. At that time O'Brien held the rank of lieutenant
with a salary of $3,300 per year. Police Commissioner Enright did not require O'Brien to
take the civil service examination mandated for all civil service positions but merely
appointed O'Brien to the office.214
Schieffelin filed suit, contending that section 276-e created a new office that could
only be filled through the competitive examination process pursuant to the statutory and
constitutional provision for promotion in the civil service. The trial court dismissed
Schieffelin's complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed.2,5 The Court of Appeals,
however, agreed with Schieffelin that the position was one that had to be filled after
competitive examination, reversed the lower court decisions and awarded Schieffelin
judgment plus costs in all courts.216
The O'Brien decision marked another victory for the Citizens Union in its battle
against political patronage in municipal government One of the governing principles of
New York City political reformers in general and of the Citizens Union in particular was that
municipal government should be staffed and run by those persons who were the most
qualified and who were selected because of what they knew rather than whom they knew.
In one of its founding documents, the 1897 Declaration of Principles and Objects, the
Citizens Union had declared:
We demand that the Civil Service requirements of the Constitution and laws
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of this State be impartially enforced by such methods as will insure a
practical and reasonable test of fitness and the selection of subordinate
officers upon their merits, irrespective of political influence, so as to afford
a fair chance to every citizen, without regard to race, religious belief, or
political affiliations.217
In a 1931 publication the Citizens Union reiterated its continuing commitment to "cooperate
with other agencies in resisting efforts to undermine the merit principle in the Civil
Service."218 Indeed, the Citizens Union had cooperated with the Civil Service Reform
Association (CCRA) in at least three successful taxpayers' actions brought by the CCRA
against the Hylan administration.219 The Citizens Union litigated such civil service issues
so frequently precisely because such litigation directly promoted its fundamental purpose,
as stated in the first paragraph of its 1897 Constitution, of "securing the honest and efficient
government of the City of New York."220
The case ofSchieffelin v. Leary, the last of more than fifteen taxpayers' suits that the
Citizens Union initiated against Hylan administration officials, likewise implicated a core
Citizens Union objective, an independent and honest judiciary. In 1915 the New York
legislature had promulgated the New York City Municipal Code which, among other things,
fixed the salary of municipal court judges at $9,000 per year. In 1925, the New York City
Municipal Assembly enacted two local laws which conferred upon city officials the authority
to fix and increase the salary of every person whose compensation was paid by the city, a
class that included municipal court judges. This legislation represented yet another effort by
the Hylan regime to expand the power of municipal government under the Home Rule Act.
The following June the Municipal Assembly increased the annual salary of the forty-nine
municipal court judges from $9,000 to $10,000.
The Citizens Union immediately filed a taxpayers' action against one of the affected
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judges, Timothy A. Leary, to test the validity of the law. A panel of Appellate Division
judges unanimously ruled in Schieffelin's favor and issued an injunction restraining city
officials from paying the salary increase to Leary and the other municipal court judges. The
court construed the local laws as applying only to officers and employees of the city
government and not to judicial officers who, although paid by the city, were a part of the
State's judicial system. The court further ruled that to the extent that the local laws purported
to grant such authority to the city Board of Alderman it conflicted with the State municipal
court code and, therefore, was unconstitutional because it violated the City Home Rule Law
and the State Constitution.221 Wallstein hailed the decision, declaring that it was of "farreaching importance and paves the way for a complete reorganization of the Municipal Court
system of New York." He further observed that the
greatest effect of the decision is to emancipate the judicial system ofthe State
... from the meddling control of the local authorities... It will aid legislation
introduced to bring about comprehensive reorganization of the Municipal
Court which will enable that court to regain the respect of the bench and bar,
a reorganization already too long delayed because of differences of opinion
as to where the power to fix the salaries of the Judges was vested. All
obstacles in the way of reform are now removed with the elimination of the
municipal authorities from a voice in the salary question.222
Wallstein's sentiments on this issue reflected Citizens Union policy, which from its
inception had advanced keeping politics out ofthe courts. In 1910, for example, the Citizens
Union had opposed John Delany in the Democratic primary for a judicial position. In a
pamphlet entitled "Keep the Courts Out Of Politics," the Citizens Union declared that
"partisan political considerations should have no place in the selection of judges." It went
on to argue that Delany's record "has not been such as to ensure that independence,
impartiality and predominant concern for the public welfare which should distinguish our
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judiciary," and that "it was largely because ofbis usefulness to the [Tammany] machine" that
Delany had been given the nomination "as a reward."

In 1917, the Citizens Union had

opposed the Dowling Bill, which would have changed the manner in which judges were
elected and which Citizens Union Executive Committee member Albert S. Bard
characterized as "an act to facilitate partisan combinations and the jockeying of elections for
judges." Lead articles in The Searchlight, the Citizens Union's news publication, often
addressed the subject of an independent judiciary. For example, the October 22, 1922
edition's front page story, entitled "Politics and the Courts," exhorted New Yorkers to
"rebuke attempts to play politics with the courts" and condemned instances of nepotism in
judicial appointments and "the use of judicial office as a party spoils." In 1930, the Citizens
Union strongly advocated for the Hofstadter-Moffat Bill because it "would eliminate political
party machinery entirely from the process of nomination as well as of election of judges,"
and the Citizens Union "pressed actively its campaign to relieve the courts and the judiciary
ofpartisan domination." The Citizens Union's efforts in this regard and the Leary taxpayers'
suit helped provide the critical political mass that led to the Seabury Committee's
investigation of the Magistrates Courts in 1932.223
Between 1927 and 1930 Schieffelin and the Citizens Union litigated its last two
taxpayers' suits, both ofwhich challenged actions ofmunicipal officials in the administration
of Mayor James J. Walker (1926 - 1932). In Schieffelin v. Walker the Citizens Union
challenged a new municipal policy that the Board of Estimate adopted in 1927 regarding the
method of raising funds for the construction of subways because it increased the taxpayers'
relative share of such costs. Schieffelin and Wallstein prevailed before the trial judge and
in the Appellate Division.224 The New York Court ofAppeals reversed, however, concluding
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that regardless of whether the new policy was "wise or unwise," a matter with which "we
have no concern," the Board of Estimate had the legal authority to implement the policy.225
The Walker case was at least the fifth taxpayers' action in which the Citizens Union litigated
issues relating to rapid transit construction.
Schieffelin v. Goldsmith was the last taxpayers' action filed by Wallstein on behalf
of the Citizens Union. In it, the Citizens Union sought an injunction to restrain the city
comptroller from paying salaries to two temporary municipal court justices who had been
appointed pursuant to a 1929 amendment to the New York City Municipal Court Code that,
the Citizens Union maintained, was unconstitutional. The trial court denied Schieffelin's
request, but the Appellate Division reversed and granted his motion for an injunction.226 The
Court of Appeals in turned reversed the Appellate Division, ruling that the new statute did
not create an unauthorized method of selecting judges.227 Thus, Wallstein was unsuccessful
in his effort to characterize the payment of these judicial salaries as an illegal official act or
a waste of municipal property.

Evaluating the Citizens Union's Taxpayers' Litigation Efforts
By the time the Goldsmith lawsuit was concluded, the Citizens Union taxpayers'
litigation program had spanned almost a generation and the administrations offive New York
City mayors. It had been launched during the Progressive Era and continued on through the
onset of the Great Depression. Its scope and duration demonstrate the central role of the
taxpayers' suit in the Citizens Union's political reform efforts. Furthermore, these taxpayers'
actions illuminate a number of important features of American society during these decades.
At a strategic level, the increased utilization of taxpayers' suits represented a
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fundamental shift in emphasis on the part of the Citizens Union and of other political reform
groups, such as the Civil Service Reform Association, who followed suit. During the first
decade of its existence the Citizens Union had devoted most of its resources to traditional
political activity aimed at electing officials possessing a high degree of integrity and
competence and to research and education intended to promote a business model of
government. The election of one-term Mayor Seth Low in 1901 and the systemic changes
introduced by the Bureau of Municipal Research are representative of these efforts. After
Schieffelin assumed the leadership of the Citizens Union in 1908, however, it increasingly
relied on the law, in the form of both litigation and legislation, to achieve its objectives.
Having experienced only modest success with direct political activity, persuasion, and public
education, after 1908 the Citizens Union sought to enforce and promote change and
improvements in municipal government through the coercive power of the law. It did so in
two ways - by changing laws through the efforts of its Legislative Committee and by
enforcing compliance with the law through the taxpayers' litigation program. The Citizens
Union did not entirely abandon its political and educational activities in these years, but it
did, especially between 1918 and 1930, allocate considerably less time and energy to them
and much more to its legal efforts.
The magnitude and effectiveness of the Citizens Union's taxpayers' litigation
program are also noteworthy. Schieffelin instituted more than twenty taxpayers' suits
between 1908 and 1930, fifteen of which arose out of actions of officials in the Hylan
administration. The Citizens Union ultimately prevailed in twelve ofthose fifteen Hylan-era
lawsuits, thereby preventing a plethora of illegal official acts and expenditures.
The frequency of Citizens Union taxpayers' actions during the Hylan administration
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and the absence of any during the term of Fusion Party Mayor John Purroy Mitchel reflect
another feature of the taxpayers' suits - they provided a means by which political outsiders
could promote reform in government and hold local officials accountable. The need for such
a remedy was greatest when city government was controlled by the Tammany machine and
run by individuals disposed to exceeding the bounds of the law. The watchdog function and
the coercive nature of the taxpayers' action are implicit in Wallstein's recognition that, as
legal counsel for the Citizens Union, "it was my job to keep tabs on the Hylan administration
and to keep them within the law."228 The Citizens Union used the taxpayers' suit with great
effect to combat corruption in municipal government and to force local officials to heed the
law or made to answer if they failed to do so.
The scope and success of the Citizens Union taxpayers' litigation program are
likewise evident in the degree to which it helped to bring about political change, in two
principal ways. First, court decisions in individual cases shaped and affected the course of
public policy in municipal affairs in New York City. In some instances, the Citizens Union
blocked proposed actions by city officials such as funding with taxpayers' dollars the Silver
Jubilee, the subject of the 1923 litigation in Schieffelin v. Hylan. Other taxpayers' suits had
a broader and more systemic impact. The lawsuits that targeted what Wallstein often
referred to as pension schemes served the prophylactic function of making the city's
retirement system more open and honest. Compelling city officials to adhere to the "pay-asyou-go" provision ofthe city charter in cases such as the 1919 taxpayers' action in Schieffelin
v. Hylan was a centerpiece ofthe Citizens Union's political agenda. The injunction that
Schieffelin obtained in the 1925 case of Schieffelin v. Mills was instrumental in preventing
the city from operating municipal bus lines and in checking the Hylan administration's
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efforts to expand the city's powers generally under the Home Rule Law. The legal relief
obtained by the Citizens Union in these cases always had particular consequences, by
altering or precluding specific actions of city officials, and often had more generalized
structural ones.
Second, the taxpayers' suits were a factor in the political demise of John Hylan at the
end of his second term. Hylan had won the 1922 mayoral election by the largest plurality in
New York City's history.229 Only three years later he was defeated in his party's primary.
Admittedly, the Citizens Union could not claim sole credit for Hylan's political defeat. By
1925 Hylan had a host of political liabilities and woes, and the rapid transit issue was an
especially irritating thorn in his side. The cumulative effect of the Citizens Union's many
victories in taxpayers' suits, which received extensive press coverage and laid open the
political workings of Hylan's administration, was not insignificant. Moreover, the Citizens
Union's 1925 taxpayers' litigation on the subject of rapid transit (Schieffelin v. Mills), along
with the related taxpayers' action brought by the United Real Estate Owners Association in
Browne v. City of New York, certainly crystalized public discontent with Hylan's handling
of the mass transit problem. Even a somewhat sympathetic biographer in the National
Municipal Review observed that rapid transit in New York City at that time was "physically,
legally and politically a dreadful mess" and that "[i]n the end it encompassed [Hylan's]
undoing."230 For the Citizens Union, the taxpayers' action proved to be a valuable tool for
change.
Schieffelin's taxpayers' lawsuits also shed light on the issues that dominated
American public life and municipal politics in the early twentieth century. As a consequence
of decades of unparalled and mostly unregulated urban growth, by 1900 "[m]ost municipal
127

governments.. .were strained beyond their capacity to provide urban dwellers with adequate
services and efficient administration."231 Two ofthe thorniest subjects were municipal transit
and municipal personnel. With respect to the first, for nearly twenty years and in five
separate taxpayers' actions, starting with Schieffelin v. McClellan in 1909 and concluding
with Schieffelin v. Walker in 1928, the Citizens Union litigated matters regarding the finance
and operation of rapid transit systems. As to the second, during the 1920s alone Schieffelin
filed at least nine taxpayers' suits involving personnel issues. He challenged pension
payments (in the Enright, Warren and Berry cases) and litigated the legality of judges' raises
(Leary), police captains' salaries (Lahey and Kelliher), a police inspector's reimbursement
for legal fees {Henry), a policeman's unlawful reinstatement (Doolari) and the appointment
of a police building superintendent (O'Brien). Two of the most prominent public policy
issues of this period were at the vanguard of the Citizens Union's legal agenda.
Finally, the taxpayers' litigation program of the Citizens Union tells us much about
Americans' notions of citizenship and their view of the role of law in American society in
this era. The fundamental three-way connection between citizenship, the paying of taxes,
and the right of taxpaying citizens to invoke legal processes in order to hold government
officials accountable was manifested in the goals and operation of the Citizens Union's
taxpayers' litigation program and, indeed, in that very description of the reformers' legal
efforts. It not only embodied the vital relationship between law and political reform
movements but, through its execution over two decades, enhanced that relationship. The fact
that the leaders of the Citizens Union were willing to submit these disputes to the courts for
resolution demonstrates their confidence that the judicial branch of government would, for
the most part, fairly and impartially decide, according to the rule of law, important matters
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of public policy involving both malversation and well-intentioned but nevertheless unlawful
acts of public officials in the executive and legislative branches. The taxpayers' suits
represented, to quote James Willard Hurst, "a demand for positive help from the law" on the
part of the Citizens Union and evinced its expectation that the law would in fact "help
positively to bring things about" in the political and public policy realms.232 Schieffelin and
Wallstein were not so naive as to believe that politics never informed judicial decisions, but
they trusted the courts as an institution that would generally serve as an honest broker of
disputes between citizens and their government.
In the second and third decades of the twentieth century the Citizens Union utilized
the taxpayers' action to a then unprecedented degree to promote its political and public
policy objectives. By the 1920s the taxpayers' suit, if not the tactic of choice, was certainly
a principal tactic chosen by the Citizens Union to further its agenda. This alliance between
law and political reform movements, between legal activism and political activism, was to
intensify and bourgeon dramatically during the next decade, as Americans made widespread
and frequent use of the taxpayers' suit in response to economic and social crisis created by
the Great Depression. The magnitude and relative success ofthe Citizens Union's taxpayers'
litigation program had demonstrated the viability of the taxpayers' suit as instrument of
political reform and good government, and taxpayers and taxpayers' associations made
considerable use of this reform tactic in the 1930s.
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CHAPTER III

"MR TAXPAYER VERSUS MR. TAXSPENDER:"
TAXPAYERS' ASSOCIATIONS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS AND THE LAW
DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
In November 1933, perhaps the bleakest year of the Great Depression, journalist Hal
Steed of Atlanta, Georgia published in the Saturday Evening Post, a popular national
magazine, a two-part article, "Adventures of a Tax Leaguer," in which he related his
experiences in the taxpayers' association movement that was sweeping the United States.
He described the financial squeeze in which middle-class property taxpayers had found
themselves, observing that
[u]ntil January, 1932 when I became a civic uplifter, I was just another
property owner, paying my steadily mounting tax bill without protest. As
early as 1928 I had felt a suspicious calm in the business atmosphere. The
banks began to tighten up; mortgagees refused to renew their loans at the old
figures. In 1929, when I paid my taxes, I found myself with only a small
surplus. In 1930 and 1931, my rentals, thanks to bankrupt tenants, were not
enough to pay my taxes. Meanwhile, my assessments were being raised.
Taxes, for the first time in my life, became a problem.1
Because nearly all other real estate owners were in the same predicament, the local real estate
board decided to call a meeting of property owners to discuss the subject of taxes. When
Steed arrived at the meeting he immediately "sensed a different attitude. I was conscious of
a certain determination born of desperation." Attendees expressed considerable frustration
with the fact that they had reduced expenses in their own business operations during the past
few years in order to remain financially viable but that, in contrast, city and county
governments had expanded their staffs and run deficits. The taxpayers decided to form a
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"Taxpayers League whose members could speak a language at the polls that the politicians
would understand."2
The tax leaguers adopted a platform "calling for efficient government and lower
taxes."3 By April 1932, the organization had more than three thousand members.4 The group
pursued a variety of tactics and programs. It was largely unsuccessful with traditional
political activity at the polls. The members discussed the possibility of a tax strike, in which
property owners would refuse to pay their property taxes, but did not call for one. The
Taxpayers League had its greatest success through what Steed described as a conciliatory
approach, in which the organization examined the operations of city and county governments
and then pressed local officials for operational and fiscal reforms.

Steed expressed

satisfaction that "[t]hrough conferences, agreements and persuasion, we came into 193 3 with
a city tax reduction of $3,000,000 and an additional one from the county of $750,000." In
Steed's view, such reforms and relief were attainable "when good citizens get together."5
The "determination born of desperation" and the resulting concerted political activity
of Atlanta taxpayers were hardly isolated phenomena at the time. On the contrary, they were
representative of a groundswell of populist taxpayer political action that swept the nation in
the early 1930s. The proliferation of local taxpayers' associations during these years was
dramatic and unprecedented. As late as 1927 one study estimated the total number of such
organizations at forty-three.6

Only six years later, Edward M. Barrows, a frequent

contributor to the National Municipal Review, wrote that the
multiplication of these local taxpayers' associations from scores into
thousands in the last few years is a fact well known to most students of
American civic trends.... A study of such sources as are available and
authentic indicates that there are not less than three thousand and probably
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not more than four thousand such local groups now in action, and that there
number is rapidly increasing ... 7
In August 1932, Howard P. Jones, the secretary of the National Municipal League's
Committee on County Government and later editor of the National Municipal Review,
warned that "there has gone sweeping across the country like a prairie fire an irresistible
demand that the cost of local government be reduced, no matter how that reduction be
accomplished." Jones went on to estimate that "county taxpayers' organizations were being
formed this spring at the rate of one a day throughout the nation - a fact all the more
remarkable when it is realized that these were relatively spontaneous."8 Milwaukee Mayor
Daniel W. Hoan, who in a radio program sardonically characterized them as "'cut the cost
of government' leagues," rued the fact that "[taxpayers' leagues have sprung up or grown
strong all across the country during the present depression."9 According to historian David
Beito,"[r]eliable estimates place the number of taxpayers' organizations at well over
1,000."10 In 1938 the Tax Policy League conducted a survey in an effort to create a register
of taxpayers' associations and identified 522 state and local ones.11 Although precise figures
are somewhat elusive, clearly the number oftaxpayers' organizations and their memberships
grew exponentially throughout the nation between 1930 and 1934. Beito has suggested that
"[mjeasured in numbers of organizations, the tax revolt of the 1970s and 1980s looks puny
by comparison."12
This surge in organized taxpayer activity was a direct consequence of, and a response
to, the economic crisis of the Great Depression. As Hal Steed candidly acknowledged, the
fiscal crunch caused him and other American taxpayers to think for the first time about the
burden of taxes and the cost of government. In a similar vein, in 1933 political scientist
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Thomas H. Reed observed that "[i]t has been said that the depression made us tax
conscious."13 Steed also noted that it "was only when business let down" that the average
taxpayer began to question the cost of local government and that "[i]t is only in periods of
stress that reform is born and thrives. It would have been impossible to organize a Taxpayers
League back in 1926."14 The concurrence of a rise in taxpayers' assessments and a decline
in their rental income and real wages impelled them to action. Although the taxpayers'
organization movement may have drawn on a long-standing American tradition of opposition
to big government, it was the economic collapse of the Great Depression that catalyzed and
provoked widespread organized taxpayer opposition.15

Nature and Importance of Taxpayers' Associations
Taxpayers' associations were a principal vehicle by which middle-class Americans
came together to engage in political and legal activism in the 1930s; they were, as historian
Anthony Badger has observed, "[s]ome of the most effective grass-roots ...organizations"
of the depression era.16 Pressure from taxpayers' organizations took a variety of forms and
achieved significant results. Nearly all taxpayers' organizations experimented with the types
of activities in which Steed's Atlanta Taxpayers' League engaged. In a 1933 study, Chicago
attorney Claude R. Tharp examined how local taxpayers' associations promoted efficient
local government. They conducted investigations of government operations and audits of
government finances, made recommendations to public officials, educated the public,
sponsored legislation that promoted good government, and opposed legislation that
threatened the public treasury. Tharp concurred with Dr. T. S. Adams, an academic who
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specialized in government finance, that "voluntary organizations of taxpayers are necessary
in control of government costs," and he concluded that "[taxpayers' associations have
developed beyond the experimental stage and now play an important role in the fiscal affairs
of the majority of states."17

Taxpayers' associations also applied political pressure

throughout the nation by filing scores of taxpayers' actions to restrain unlawful spending or
other illegal acts of local public officials.18 Finally, taxpayers brought fundamental structural
change at the ballot box, securing the passage in twenty states of constitutional amendments
limiting the amount of property taxes.19 The degree to which Americans participated in
taxpayers' organizations in this period was unprecedented and remains unsurpassed, and the
influence of taxpayers' associations was both profound and diffuse.
Despite its importance, tax resistance in the 1930s is a relatively neglected aspect of
American history.20 The politics of the New Deal and of political protest movements such
as those spearheaded by Father Coughlin and Huey Long have garnered the lion's share of
attention in political histories of this era.21 This examination of taxpayers' associations
during the Great Depression will help to rectify this imbalance and demonstrate why
organized taxpayer activity warrants further scholarly attention.
The nature of Depression-era taxpayers' organizations highlights a number of salient
features of American society and of political protest and civic engagement in the United
States. The taxpayers' league was, first, an economic phenomenon. The taxpayers'
association in Depression-era America was a complex, multifaceted organism - part political
action group, part legal advocacy entity, part public education instrument, part social club,
but at its core it was an economic creature because its raison d'etre was economic - to
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reduce taxes. Its diverse political, legal, educational and legislative activities had a common
objective, which was to contain and, where possible, to lighten the burden on tax-paying
members. The astounding proliferation of taxpayers' organizations and the enormous
expansion of their activities in response to the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression
is further evidence of their essentially economic nature.
Second, taxpayers' associations were primarily a middle-class phenomenon.
Although some wealthy taxpayers, including individuals and large business enterprises,
belonged to or otherwise supported taxpayers' leagues, it was mainly those Americans in the
economic middle ground between the wealthy and the propertyless poor who organized, led
and sustained taxpayers' associations. Americans on the rungs in the middle ofthe economic
ladder most acutely felt the pinch of paying taxes during the Great Depression. The middle
class tended to be overlooked by the Roosevelt administration, which focused on revitalizing
industry and creating jobs for the unemployed, yet it was this group from which the most was
asked to pay for the cost of government and its recovery efforts. Taxpayers' associations
multiplied and attained considerable success in these years because they were supported by
such a large swath of middle-class Americans.
A third important feature of the taxpayers' association movement was its
spontaneous, indigenous and local character, which was apparent to contemporary observers.
The populist impulse behind tax resistance during the 1930s was powerful and national in
scope. Early in the decade House Majority Leader Rainey declared that the tax "rebellion
is general.... The sentiment against heavy local taxes and heavy cost of government is the
most conspicuous present manifestation of politics in the United States."22 Although
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organized tax protests emerged throughout the nation, they did not represent a coordinated,
national movement but, rather, a local, grassroots one, in which citizens engaged in what
historian Meg Jacobs has termed "state-building from the bottom up."23 Howard P. Jones
found the speed with which taxpayers' associations proliferated and their nation-wide
distribution especially remarkable in light of their spontaneity, and he noted that "[tjhere
were few paid organizers, traveling the highways and byways, to weld such groups
together."24 Commentators on local government finances, such as Edward M. Barrows and
Murray Seasongood, noted that "[taxpayers' organizations... have sprung up like
mushrooms" throughout the country.25 Barrows characterized taxpayers' organizations as
"amateur" and concluded that "[t]hey are no part of any 'national movement,' though they
represent public opinion in an even truer sense, for they personify the popular thought of
thousands of communities crystallizing into national sentiment." He further observed that
taxpayers' associations were "organizations of voters within a given political area that are
formed to deal primarily with problems of taxation and all its implications within the
boundaries of that political area" and that "the campaign to reduce taxes consists of many
minute, independent local efforts."26
This is not to say that there was no attempt to coordinate the efforts of tax resisters,
but such attempts were few and did not alter the fundamentally local character of the
movement. The only instance of formal interstate taxpayers' association collaboration that
Claude Tharp identified in his 1933 study was the Western Taxpayers' Association,
comprising associations in twelve western states that met annually "to discuss tax problems
of common interests."27 In November 1931, American Taxpayers,' Inc., an organization
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based in New York City, launched the American Taxpayers' Quarterly, a journal that
purported to speak on behalf of the American taxpayer because he "is himself largely
inarticulate."28 This journal did not speak long, however, since this first issue was apparently
also the last. The taxpayers' association movement remained a decentralized, bottom-up one.
As late as 1938 the Tax Policy League observed that "many of these [taxpayers']
organizations are small local groups, many of which spring up overnight and speedily pass
out of existence," and that "no register of such groups had ever been compiled."29 Such
indigenous political and civic movements are typical in the American political system, in
which local government and principles of federalism occupy key places.
Organized taxpayer activity in the 1930s is also important because it reflects the
complex interaction between obligations and rights in Americans' conceptions of citizenship.
Because "a citizen is one who rules and is ruled in turn" in the United States, there exists a
"reciprocal relationship between state and citizen" in which Americans both "exercise the
rights and bear the obligations of citizenship."30 Depression-era Americans recognized that
a principal obligation of citizenship was paying taxes. That obligation, however, was
accompanied by a concomitant right to hold government accountable for how it spent taxes
and to insist on good government. Sometimes this right was characterized as a duty. For
example, Merle Thorpe, the editor of Nation's Business who in 1932 gave sixteen radio
addresses under the general title "In Behalf of the Delinquent Taxpayer - Present and
Prospective," stated that "[i]t is on the books that we must pay taxes. But it is just as much
the obligation of citizenship that we should find out where our money goes and why."
Thorpe went on to commend citizens who participated in taxpayers' associations and other
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organizations committed to fiscally responsible government, "who recognize their duties of
citizenship in its highest sense; if need be, to give some of their time and some of their
energy to the enormously important business of governing themselves well."31 More often,
though, the people's prerogative to ensure that tax dollars were prudently spent was framed
as a right of citizenship. The Teaneck, New Jersey Taxpayers' League, for instance, claimed
that it was created in 1929 when local government finances had "reached a crisis" and, as a
result, "the people of Teaneck awoke to the principles set forth in the Declaration of
Independence that whenever any form of government becomes destructive, it is the right of
the people to alter it and to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such
principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness."32
This dual characterization of the interest that Americans had in the operation of their
government as a privilege or right, on one hand, and as a duty or obligation, on the other,
may well reflect the fact that in the 1930s the culture of citizenship in the United States was
beginning to evolve from one in which obligations were emphasized to one in which rights
were ascribed greater importance. Christopher Capozzola has argued that "throughout
American history, a citizenship of obligation has always coexisted with one of rights" but
that as late as the early 1920s a culture of obligation remained ascendant because the United
States was still "[b]ereft of institutions at the local or national level to create and nourish a
meaningful culture of rights" and that it was only in the last half of the twentieth century that
a "rights-based vision of citizenship" came to play a prominent role.33 The economic crisis
of the Great Depression compelled Americans to think hard about how government was run
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and financed, what good government expert Edward M. Barrows termed "the present
recrudescence of public interest in matters of government," and to emphasize their rights as
citizens regarding these matters and that taxpayers' associations were an important
instrument through which they asserted those rights.34 The sheer magnitude of the taxpayers'
association movement and the extent to which Americans invoked and enforced those rights
through such organizations in turn contributed to and encouraged the transition to a more
rights-based conception of citizenship. In this sense, the taxpayers' association movement
was both derivative, a product of its times, and constitutive, helping to transform Americans'
notions of citizenship.
Americans at the time understood the integral connection between citizenship and
taxpayers' organizations and that the latter were products of and pragmatic exercises in
citizenship. For Hal Steed, the Atlanta Taxpayers' League and its successes were what one
expected to occur "when good citizens get together."35 A 1932 editorial in the National
Municipal Review observed that "[citizens' organizations are springing up in many cities
and demanding material cuts in city budgets," and it praised those "[w]ise political officials
[who] are cooperating with irate citizens."36

Barrows likewise described taxpayers'

associations as "citizens' tax-reduction organizations."37 Citizenship in its broadest sense
encompasses legal status, membership rights and obligations, and civic involvement, and all
of these attributes were represented in the taxpayers' associations of the 1930s.
The taxpayers' association movement ofthe 1930s also deserves further investigation
because the central place of law and litigation in that organized taxpayer activity reveals
important features of American society and American legal history but has largely been
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overlooked by law and society scholars. That decade witnessed an increase in taxpayers'
lawsuits against local government officials which, like the dramatic proliferation of
taxpayers' organizations, was a direct consequence of the economic devastation wrought by
the Great Depression. Taxpayers' associations in the 1930s, as had the Citizens Union in
New York City in the previous two decades, utilized the taxpayers' suit as a tactic of choice
to promote their objectives. Though taxpayers' litigation was not always an unmitigated
success from the taxpayers' perspective, for the most part it furnished an efficacious means,
and courts an effective forum, for controlling government expenditures and alleviating the
tax burden on citizens. Taxpayers' associations also invoked the law to advance their
agendas in a number of ways other than litigation. Organized taxpayers were instrumental
in the enactment ofnumerous constitutional and statutory tax limitation measures during the
1930s. In addition, their legislative programs and research activities convinced state and
local legislative bodies throughout the United States to adopt a plethora of reforms relating
to public administration and finance. As a consequence, during the decade state and local
governments increasingly reflected and practiced the business model of government for
which reformers had advocated for more than a generation.
Finally, the taxpayers' association movement in the Great Depression is significant
because it is representative of the ever-present tension between taxpayers and tax spenders
in American history and sheds light on critical questions that Americans have confronted
from the American Revolution to the present. How should the operation of federal, state and
local governments be funded? What revenue-raising mechanisms are most fair and
equitable? What is the appropriate level of government services? How big or small should
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government be? One consequence of the crisis in taxation in the early 1930s was that the
ensuing "[c]onflicts over taxation brought to light differing conceptions of the state's proper
role in society."38 On one hand were those who favored the expansion of government; on the
other were those who believed that the "price of government should undergo the same
measure of deflation" as the economy and, therefore, advocated for smaller, or at least less
expensive, government.39 Most tax resisters belonged to the second group.40 Taxpayers were
not, however, uniform in their anti-big-government attitudes. In Berlin, New Hampshire, for
example, the members of the Berlin Taxpayers' Association created the Berlin Farmer-Labor
Party, whose platform called for the public ownership of utilities - a story detailed in the next
chapter.41 Moreover, some taxpayers' associations opposed policies that would cripple state
and local governments or unduly cut back the delivery of government services.42
Nevertheless, the conflict between expanded-government sentiment and small-government
sentiment was a central dynamic of the tax resistance movement of the Great Depression.
This tension represents an element of continuity in the political history of the United States,
appearing in contexts rangingfromthe clashes between Federalists and Jeffersonians on the
role of the federal government to the debate about the proper congressional response to the
credit- market crisis in the fall of 2008. This aspect of the Depression-era taxpayers'
association movement, then, has ongoing relevance for students of American political
history.

Taxpayers' Associations as of 1930
On the eve of the Great Depression the taxpayers' association had been on the scene
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in the United States for two or three generations. It was, however, still a relatively incipient
and anemic institution that operated on the periphery of American civic life. A 1927 study
identified only forty-three such organizations in the entire nation.43 In 1932, the National
Association of Real Estate Boards' records indicated that "on January 1,1930, there were
just 33 organized groups of taxpayers in the entire country."44 An on-line search of
newspaper archives in the 1920s reveals that most of the organized taxpayer action that was
reported in the print media occurred in the western United States, including Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, and, especially, California and Utah.45 The Fresno, California Taxpayers'
Association was a particular beehive of activity.46 Organized taxpayer efforts, though, were
the exception, not the rule and can hardly be said to have constituted a movement, much less
a sustained or nation-wide one.
Furthermore, prior to 1930theformationandundertakingsoftaxpayers' associations
were sporadic or episodic, usually responses to immediate local or regional problems and
stresses. The creation of the Taxpayers' League in Lawton, Oklahoma in October 1905, for
instance, was "the outgrowth of the storm sewer contract, which the taxpayers viewed as an
unnecessary burden, and one of the prime objects of the organization is to bring an action...
to enjoin the city from proceeding...."47

In the same year the citizens of Reading,

Pennsylvania came together to form the Reading Taxpayers' League in the context of the
"general distrust of city councilmen which exists among the people" as a consequence of
allegations in open court that a local corporation had won a municipal contract by bribing the
councilors.48 A local fiscal crisis in Adams County, Mississippi in 1921, prompted the
Adams County Taxpayers' League to investigate the administration of county affairs and the
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League's published report "stirjed] up [the local] citizens."49 Four years later taxpayers in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin established the Northwest Taxpayers' Association for the "purpose...
[of] oust[ing] Mayor W. Hoan and several other city officials, who they charge 'played
politics' in the naming of the new fire chief."50 Perhaps the most notable example of regional
dynamics giving rise to organized taxpayer measures was the proliferation of taxpayers'
associations in the states ofthe former Confederacy during Reconstruction.51 The conditions
that encouraged organized taxpayer activity generally were short-lived and localized and,
consequently, such activity in those decades shared those same temporal and geographic
characteristics.

The Crisis of the Great Depression
The onset of the Great Depression completely transformed this economic, political
and civic landscape. The American economy, the incomes of most Americans, and the
revenues of many American businesses shrank far more precipitously than government
expenditures in the early 1930s, producing an increasingly onerous and unbearable tax
burden. This scope and magnitude of the problem was apparent to Americans from all walks
of life and an incessant theme of American public discourse.
In a 1933 article entitled "Taxation Nears a Crisis," William B. Munro painted a
bleak picture of systemic dysfunction in American taxation. Munro, a professor of history
and government at the California Institute of Technology, a former president ofthe American
Political Science Association and the author of several books on public administration,
argued that the "tax situation in the United States has reached a stage of seriousness which
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the average citizen does not appreciate. The burden of national, state and local taxes has
become one of the most formidable obstacles in the path of economic recovery." Munro
endeavored to quantify the manner in which the "incubus" of taxation had grown:
In 1929 the national income of the United States... was estimated to be about
$85,000,000,000. Our total tax bill for that year was estimated at about
$10,000,000,000. In other words, the entire tax levy of 1929, lumping
together all federal, state and local assessments, amounted to about 12
percent of the national income. For the year 1932... this national income has
dropped to about $40,000,000,000, or less than half what it was three years
ago, while the total amount levied in taxes receded only about 10 percent. It
ran to almost $9,000,000,000 for the year, which means that it devoured over
20 percent of the national income.52
He argued that governments "do not begin by determining that public expenditures must be
trimmed into line with the existing revenues" but that, instead, "for the greatest part they
proceeded to bridge the gap by piling on more taxes. Consequently the taxes go up at the
very time that people as a whole can least afford to have them go in that direction."53
Munro accurately identified the crux ofthe taxation dilemma but probably missed the
mark in surmising that average Americans did not comprehend its seriousness. The very real
difficulty that many Americans experienced in paying their taxes and otherwise making ends
meet made them acutely aware of the tax burden and illustrated the aphorism that experience
is often the best teacher. Contemporary sources bear this out. In an address to the Kentucky
General Assembly on March 4,1932, Melvin A. Traylor, president ofthe First National Bank
of Chicago, observed that the cost of government had become "an unbearable burden on the
backs of American citizens" and that the magnitude of the tax burden "has brought disaster
to thousands of taxpayers in every part of the country."54 Various speakers in a series of
radio addresses and roundtable discussions in the Government Series sponsored by the
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National Advisory Council on Radio in Education in 1932 and 1933 emphasized the point.
In one the Honorable Murray Seasongood, the president of the National Municipal League,
observed that the "American taxpayer is bearing an intolerable burden."55 In another,
political scientist Thomas Reed noted that the "taxpayer is groaning under his burden. He
would like to lighten it."56 In a third, Dr. Lent D. Upson declared that the "embattled
taxpayer... is harassed by private worry."57 When he addressed the National Conference on
Government in November 1933, Seasongood reiterated that the "taxpayer is resentful; he
revolts at the heavy needless burden he is made to bear."58
Other business leaders echoed this sentiment. Chicago attorney Claude Tharp
undertook his 1933 examination of methods of controlling the cost of local government
through taxpayers' associations and consolidation of government precisely because public
awareness of the tax crisis had become so pervasive and prominent. He began his study by
noting that "[t]he problem of mounting tax burden of local government and methods of
control have been the occasion of much discussion for the past two years." He went on to
declare that
[a]s the demands for government services increased,titlewaste involved in the
vast number of local governmental units, often duplicating each other,
became more noticeable and burdensome... resulting in unreasonable
demands upon the resources of the Taxpayer... .Taxpayers are now
awakening to the deficits of the present financial systems, and it seems a most
opportune time to analyze and evaluate existing methods of controlling
finance that are in use in the various states.59
In a January 1933 radio address sponsored in part by the American Taxpayers League, F.
Robertson Jones, general manager of the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives,
likewise declared that "[t]he American people have suddenly become aware of the crushing
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tax burden which has been saddled upon them during a decade of spendthrift government.
In October 1931, Edgar C. Rust, chairman of the Massachusetts division ofthe New England
Council, "called upon leading business executives of the state to join in a campaign to
prevent further handicap to business, through augmented tax burdens, by the widespread
creation of local taxpayers' associations." In his letter to the council members, Rust argued
that "[t]he present burden of taxation in Massachusetts is rapidly approaching, if it has not
already passed, the economic limit.... If taxes go beyond this economic limit, that is, the
ability of the community to pay, the result is the depreciation of property values, crippling
of industry, unemployment and the flight of capital in industry."61 The following summer
John C. Percival, while speaking to the local Kiwanis Club in Lowell, Massachusetts about
the objectives of the recently formed Lowell Taxpayers' Association to which he belonged,
claimed that "[t]ax burdens have reached a confiscatory stage to an alarming degree" and that
taxpayers must organize "in a determined effort to relieve the taxpayer of some of his
burdens that he may retain ownership of his property."62 Twenty-two local taxpayers'
associations in Massachusetts came together to form the Middlesex County Taxpayers'
Association in early 1933, during what they described as "these times of stress" for taxpayers
in which "the taxpayer... is already bearing more than he is able in the matter of taxes."63
The tax crisis was omnipresent in the United States in the early 1930s and palpable to almost
every adult.
Although the economic pain of the Great Depression was inflicted on nearly all
Americans, the broad swath of the middle class felt the burden of property taxation most
acutely. The propertyless poor, who did not own real estate subject to property taxation, had
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no compelling reason to participate in organized taxpayer activity, and there is no evidence
that they did so to any meaningful degree. For the most part, property taxes did not consume
a substantial portion of the disposable income of the wealthy, so the "tax burden" was not
that onerous for them. Some members of the business elite, such as Nation's Business editor
Merle Thorpe, supported the efforts of tax resisters because those business leaders were
philosophically opposed to big government.64 Large business property owners were also
involved in some taxpayers' associations, including the Kentucky Tax Reduction
Association.65 The vast majority of organized taxpayers, however, were from the broad
middle class. Typical members of taxpayers' associations included small business owners,
landlords who owned one or perhaps a few commercial or residential properties, farmers,
homeowners, people engaged in trades and in clerical occupations, and realtors. The 3 0,000member Association of Real Estate Taxpayers (ARET) in Chicago, for example, was
comprised mainly of people of modest means, such as the owners of small businesses
(restaurants, drug stores, plumbing outfits, laundries, grocery stores, photography studios,
and so forth), persons engaged in clerical and sales employment, and unskilled, semi-skilled
and skilled workers. ARET's largest single group of members was skilled blue-collar
workers (carpenters, painters, plumbers, electricians, tailors, machinists and mechanics in
particular).66 Hal Steed's Atlanta Taxpayers' League was similarly representative ofmiddleclass tax resistance. Merchants, an automobile dealer, the owner of several office buildings,
other "real estaters and property owners," small, struggling landlords like Steed, and a loan
agent were among its members, although they did enlist a wealthy retired "dry-goods jobber"
to serve as chairman.67

The taxpayers' association movement of the 1930s was
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fundamentally a middle-class undertaking, impelled by the anxieties, concerns and interests
of middle-class Americans.
One consequence of this serious tax crisis was a rapid and substantial increase in
organized taxpayer activity between 1930 and 1933.68 The number oftaxpayers' associations
and the extent of their activities grew astronomically in these years. Edward M. Barrows
wrote in the National Municipal Review in May 1933, that taxpayers' organizations "are
hurrying into action everywhere."69 At almost the same time the Governmental Research
Association, "an organization of individuals professionally engaged in governmental
research" and based in Chicago, found that "taxpayers [are] organizing now in all parts of
the country."70 The National Municipal League's Committee on Citizens' Councils for
Constructive Economy similarly determined that "[e]very local government in the country
today is being subjected to terrific pressure.. .from organized taxpayer groups hit hard by the
depression."71
The widespread proliferation of taxpayers' associations was proceeding full force by
1932. Early in his radio address sponsored by the National Advisory Council on Education
in Radio, Murray Seasongood observed that "[t]here can be no doubt of the strength and
sincerity of taxpayer sentiment for economy. Taxpayers' organizations have sprung up all
over the country to enforce demands for economy."72 Dr. Lent D. Upson stated that "[a]ll
over the country big and little industrialists and bankers, shop-keepers and home-owners, are
being marshaled into regiments of economy leagues, tax reduction associations, and other
agencies for united action."73 In October 1931, the New England Council was advocating
the extensive creation of local taxpayers' leagues because by that time such organizations had
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already "been found the most effective means of dealing with the [tax] situation."
By mid-193 3, taxpayers' associations likely numbered in the thousands. Claude
Tharp identified thirty-nine state taxpayers' associations operating in thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia as of 1933.75

This number did not include organizations at the

municipal and county level, where the real growth was occurring, because, as Tharp
observed, "local governments [were] the largest spenders of public funds."76

Lowell

Taxpayers' Association officer John C. Percival, in his July 1932 speech to the local Kiwanis
Club in Massachusetts, had noted that "[i]n Massachusetts there are now taxpayers'
associations in over 14 cities and towns...with many additional associations now in the
process of formation."77 Indeed, eight months later there were twenty-two taxpayers'
associations in Middlesex County, Massachusetts alone, which collaborated to form the
Middlesex County Taxpayers' Association.78 According to the Governmental Research
Association, whose findings were well researched and generally reliable, there were 140
active taxpayers' associations just in Massachusetts in October 1933, an increase of 60 from
September 1932, and the largest, the Worcester Taxpayers' Association, had more than
10,000 members.79 At the annual meeting of the Minnesota Taxpayers' Association on
February 27, 1934, "[fjifty-seven counties sent delegates to the convention" and the
Association's secretary "reported 70,000 enrolled members in eighty of eighty-seven counties
in the state."80 As of late 1935, New Haven Taxpayers, Inc. in Connecticut, which had been
organized as a municipal research agency in July 1933, had 1,760 dues-paying members,
representing far more than one-third of the city's property owners.81 By December 1936, the
New Jersey Taxpayers' Association had evolved from a "small group of citizens" to a "large
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and powerful organization composed of county and local taxpayers' associations affiliated
with the parent organization from 250 communities."82 In 1932, there had been only 74 local
taxpayers' associations in New Jersey.83 By 1933, the Tennessee Taxpayers' Association had
established county taxpayers' associations in 63 of the state's 95 counties, and New Mexico
had local taxpayers'

organizations in almost every county.84 During the 1930s, the

taxpayers' association movement became one that was nation-wide and of enormous
magnitude.
One rough indicator of the extent and intensity of taxpayers' association activity is
the extent to which it was covered in the print media. Such news coverage in the Lowell Sun
in Lowell, Massachusetts is illustrative. Between 1909 and 1911, that newspaper mentioned
taxpayers' associations 114 times in articles covering the activities of taxpayers'
organizations throughout the nation. From 1912 to 1926, there is not one reference to
taxpayers' associations. Between 1930 and 1936 they are mentioned over 1,200 times.85

Purposes and Objectives of Taxpayers' Associations
The overarching purpose for which taxpayers organized was, obviously, to reduce
their tax burden. A letter from an Iowa farmer, quoted in the January 1933 issue of the
National Municipal Review, expressed the taxpayer's mindset at its most basic level:
My taxes are more than twice what they were a few years ago. My products
sell for about a third of what they used to bring.... We buy fewer clothes,
make fewer improvements (or none), buy fewer groceries, use our car less
and longer - and so on with every item under my personal control. I would
also like to buy less government.... At least I would like to pay less for
whatever government I have to have.86
Wheeler McMillan, in whose article the Iowa farmer was quoted, declared that "[fjarmers
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are not very particular as to what devices are adopted for reducing taxes, just so taxes are
reduced."87 One means to this end was the enactment of constitutional or statutory tax
limits.88 Another was, according to the Massachusetts division of the New England Council,
for taxpayers "to exert a measure of control over public expenditures."89
To accomplish this second objective taxpayers' associations sought to make local,
county and state government both cheaper and better, or, as the Fitchburg Massachusetts
Taxpayers' Association put it, they had "the double object of reducing the cost and increasing
the efficiency of... government."90 Taxpayers' organizations consistently espoused these
dual objectives. The Lowell Taxpayers' Association, for instance, was formed "for the
purpose of fostering, encouraging and promoting a non-partisan interest and a study of the
activities of federal, state, county and municipal agencies, as such activities may affect the
taxpayers of Lowell. Furthermore, by cooperating with such agencies strive to assist in
effecting economy and efficiency."91 The twenty-two taxpayers' associations of Middlesex
County, Massachusetts declared that it is "the purpose ofthese associations to cooperate with
the Local Taxpayers' Associations of Massachusetts to reduce state and county governmental
costs without impairing necessary and efficient public service."92 The Arizona Taxpayers'
Association organized to "cooperate with and assist private citizens, and public officials in
eliminating waste and extravagance from the conduct of public affairs, and to bring about the
practice of genuine economy consistent with efficiency throughout every department of
government."93 The theme of "genuine economy consistent with efficiency" manifested itself
repeatedly in the statements of goals and principles of taxpayers' organizations.
Taxpayers' leagues sought to attain these general aims through a variety of specific
163

objectives. Claude Tharp argued that "[o]ne of the first objectives of a taxpayers' association
should be the directing of its efforts toward securing a sound budgetary and accounting
system for the state and localities."94 When the New Jersey Taxpayers' Association was
urged to endorse a tax strike in 1933, it refused to do so and instead "reiteratefd] our
determination to work unceasingly... for the relief ofthe overburdened taxpayer, by searching
for new ways to reduce public expenditures.... To accomplish the objectives of the
Association" it called for the passage of legislation to provide "absolute control" of
government expenditures, to require budgeting for all state expenses, to improve
management of the state highway department, to reform public debt processes, and to limit
public debt. It also urged the state legislature to adopt a "pay-as-you-go" policy in
government, consolidate municipalities where possible, reduce public education costs and
regulate local government finances, among other things.95 Some or all of these same specific
goals appeared in the platforms and statements of principles of taxpayers' organizations
throughout the nation.96

The Moderate/Collaborative Activities of Taxpayers' Associations
The policies, programs and activities of taxpayers' associations were diverse and
extensive. Claude Tharp examined organized taxpayer activity at the state level as of 1932.
He found that the main functions of taxpayers' associations were (1) research and
investigation, (2) use of the information thus obtained to educate the public and government
officials and to shape public policy regarding government administration, (3) active
engagement in the budget processes of state and local governments, and (4) a vigorous
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legislative program to promote good and affordable government.97 In these efforts, organized
taxpayers sought to cooperate and collaborate with local government officials and engage
them constructively to promote economy and efficiency in government and thereby lighten
the tax burden.
The research activities of taxpayers' associations were foundational in that they
formed the basis for many of their other efforts. The larger organizations maintained paid
staffs of accountants, lawyers and other professionals to investigate subjects relevant to
controlling government finance. The Arizona Taxpayers' Association had auditing and legal
departments that analyzed state, county and municipal budgets in order to cut costs.
Moreover, "[p]roposed bond issues are investigated and the influence of the Association is
used to defeat those which appear unnecessary or excessive." The California Taxpayers'
Association had more than thirty studies in progress concerning, for example, budgeting,
bonding and accounting processes, and it had recently been appointed to the State Advisory
Council ofthe Tax Research Bureau "to enable taxpayers to participate actively in an official
study being made for the guidance of the legislature."98 In 1932, many tax levies in Montana
were reduced as a result of the Montana Taxpayers' Association's examination of levies
across the state and its subsequent recommendations. The same year the Tennessee
Taxpayers' Association completed three surveys ong local government finance, and its work
product was apparently sufficiently impressive that the governor selected the Association's
staff to act as a fact-finding body for the state legislature. Tharp noted that since 1915, the
New Mexico Taxpayers' Association had been "the only agency for assembling the material
for the budget submitted to the legislature by the Governor" and that it was also involved in
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the formation of local government budgets. Many of the state taxpayers' organizations
shared their professional staffs with local associations, especially at budget time, including
those in California, Indiana, New Jersey, Louisiana and Utah."
Local taxpayers' associations likewise participated in the preparation of county and
municipal budgets. A "carefully planned program of economy" prepared by the Washington
County Taxpayers' Association in Tennessee led to a substantial budget reduction.100 A. C.
Rees, secretary of the Utah Taxpayers' Association, boasted that the Association had
"succeeded in having all local budgets analyzed by the local taxpayers and, in the case of all
larger units, to have definite demands made upon public officials for reduced expenditures.
Despite the unprecedented shrinkage in assessed valuations, the old levies have been
maintained, or reduced."101 Harry Miesse declared that in Indiana it had been "possible
through the operation of county associations of taxpayers for members to watch the
preparation of budgets, attend local hearings which are required by law - and advise with
their own local officials as to what expenditures are proper and what are not."102 Cooperation
with and confrontation of public officials during the budget process was an important
component of taxpayers' associations' agendas.
The legislative program was a core activity of taxpayers' associations for two
reasons. First, many of the specific aims of taxpayers' associations, such as instituting sound
accounting and budgeting systems for state and local governments or improving processes
related to incurring public debt and issuing bonds, could be achieved only by enacting new
laws or changing old ones. Second, often the unnecessary or excessive expenditure of public
funds, such as imprudent public works programs or public contracts awarded without
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competitive bidding, could be prevented only by promulgating or stopping new legislation.
The necessity of an effective legislative program was self evident to the leaders of
taxpayers' associations. In a 1928 address to the National Tax Association, A. C. Rees had
emphasized that
[g]ood legislation promotes economy and efficiency in government. In this
field, the taxpayers' association can wield a tremendous influence... by
contacting with the legislators during the entire course of the session,
assisting them to analyze proposed legislation, preparing digests, supplying
data and in general serving as an official advisory council to the legislature.I03
Speaking to the same body three years later, Harry Miesse, the Indiana Taxpayers'
Association secretary, placed greater stress on the importance of organized taxpayers
sponsoring and opposing legislation. A taxpayers' association, he insisted, should not "sit
meekly and watch the introduction of bills in the legislature to make it easier for the public
to be plundered." It must "watch every bill introduced, study its possibilities, and then
oppose it with all the vigor possible if it threatens a raid on the public treasury. Watching
pending legislation, supporting good bills and fighting bad ones has been part of the program
ofthe Indiana Taxpayers' Association."104 Tharp also highlighted the significant legislationshaping activities of the other state taxpayers' associations, including those in Arizona,
California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee and New Mexico.105
Finally, taxpayers' organizations performed a vital educational function by
disseminating relevant information to the public and to public officials. Their officers spoke
to civic clubs and chambers of commerce, gave radio addresses and issued press releases.
Many taxpayers' associations had their own publications. The California Taxpayers'
Association published a monthly magazine entitled Tax Digest. The New Jersey Taxpayers'
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Association issued a monthly "Taxegram" as well as weekly bulletins. In Wisconsin the
Wisconsin Taxpayers' Alliance prepared a semi-monthly magazine named The Wisconsin
Taxpayer.106 These publications were generally regarded as reliable sources of information
regarding public finance. m In 1934, for example, the Governmental Research Association
described The Wisconsin Taxpayer as a "wealth of information and valuable data with
reference to Wisconsin's state and local government... as well as many interesting
governmental facts and developments in other states."108
Taxpayers' associations after 1932 expanded the scope and intensity of the activities
that Tharp had identified. In the mid-1930s there were manymore taxpayers' organizations,
and those established before 1930 did much more of the same things because the exigencies
of the economic crisis required it. Research and investigation continued to be a central, and
perhaps the most common, activity of organized taxpayers. In 1933, the Lake County
Taxpayers' Association in Gary, Indiana conducted a study of county employee salaries to
serve as the basis for proposing a general reduction in those salaries if necessary. The New
Mexico Taxpayers' Association undertook a survey of property assessments in Santa Fe
County "as a demonstration of a method which might be applied by taxing authorities in
establishing a scientific basis for assessing property;" the survey claimed that the absence of
a scientific system had produced significant disparities in property assessments. The
Kentucky Tax Reduction Association, established in December 1932, examined local
government in six counties, one of which was to be used as the basis for proposing a new
county budget law.109 Partly as a result of that Association's efforts, in early 1934 the
Kentucky legislature passed a county budget statute that required uniform budgets for all
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counties and established budget commissions in every county.no In Tennessee the Hamilton
County Taxpayers' League studied certain city departments and prepared reports of its
findings, which "contained many specific suggestions for achieving greater efficiency and
economy."111

The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association's survey of Campbell County

produced detailed recommendations for improving budgetary, purchasing and accounting
systems.112 The California Taxpayers' Association completed a survey of all departments
in Alameda County government, a budget study "at the request of the Santa Anna city
council, to effect a 20% reduction in the city's 1933-34 budget," studies regarding the
administration of the juvenile home and welfare department in Santa Barbara County,
population estimates to aid in projecting government expenditures and revenues, and an
extensive examination of administration and finances of Los Angeles County.113 Other
research and investigation projects of taxpayers' organizations in 1933 reported by the
Governmental Research Association in the National Municipal Review included those of the
Taxpayers' Research League of Delaware, the Taxpayers' League of St. Louis County in
Minnesota, the Utah Taxpayers' Association, the New Bedford (Massachusetts) Taxpayers'
Association, the Wisconsin Taxpayers' Alliance, and the Pierce County Taxation Bureau in
Tacoma, Washington.114
The research activities of taxpayers' associations accelerated in subsequent years.
The Taxpayers' Research League of Delaware embarked on an ambitious research program
to assess the public highway system, administrative procedures in county offices, methods
of financing bonds for construction projects, state government costs, municipal financial
data, and the state tax system.115 In Connecticut the New Haven Taxpayers' Association
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formulated and began "a comprehensive program of research" concerning all city
departments and functions with a view toward making recommendations designed to
promote efficiency and economy in government.116 The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association
and the Hamilton County Taxpayers' Association engaged in a joint survey of the county's
finances and administration and produced a 151-page report whose recommendations for
"improving the administrative machinery" and for "effecting economies and retrenchment,"
if implemented, would reduce county expenses by ten percent117 The Tennessee Taxpayers'
Association increased its research activities significantly in 1934, and a summary of its
projects for that year is published in the January 1935 edition of the National Municipal
Review.116 There was also a spike in the investigative efforts of the Lake County (Indiana)
Taxpayers' Association, which examined the finances and budgets of the county and four
cities and planned "much more thorough investigations of the proposed budgets for local
units" in 1935.119 In New Bedford, Massachusetts the local taxpayer's association made a
thorough study of tax abatements, with the goal of making abatement procedures more
equitable, and it also published a report on the city's financial condition that "pointed out
how impossible it was to restore any pay cuts this year and was effective in forestalling such
action."120

The Stark County Tax League in Canton, Ohio made recommendations to the

governor on county reorganization based on its research of county governments, and it
analyzed the impact of a tax-limitation amendment that reduced the maximum property tax
rate by one-third.121 The state taxpayers' association in New Jersey "expanded its work in
the field of local activities and its program of analytical research on public administration
problems" and published reports, many of which were distributed to more than 300 civic
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organizations, on a plethora of subjects, including the city manager form of government,
highway policy, tax exemptions, the operation of the civil service, public welfare, public
employee pensions, property tax delinquencies, consolidation of municipalities, tax limits,
and proposed new taxes.122 Taxpayers' organizations in Louisiana, Woonsocket, Rhode
Island, Wisconsin and New Mexico also carried out considerable research activities in
1934.123
In 1935, the California Taxpayers' Association commenced a study, after just
completing one that advocated the establishment of a state-wide police force, to "determine
what constitutional and statutory changes are necessary in order to establish an appropriate
state police system."124 The Taxpayers' League of St. Louis County published a report
highlighting excessive per-pupil costs in Duluth, Minnesota schools and the fact that the
school board's operating budget had exceeded the 20-mill statutory tax limit. It also studied
the "problem ofpublic debt and the decreasing proportion of local revenues that are available
for operating expenses after debt payments have been made." It used the information
generated by the first study to litigate a declaratory judgment action that established the tax
limit as binding on the school district, and it marshaled the evidence produced by the second
one in a lawsuit in which it was "successful in preventing the city from adding additional
bonds to the outstanding debt by attempting to issue bonds under emergency powers when
in fact no 'emergency' existed."125 The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association continued to
expand its research programs. After the state legislature asked the governor to have all state
government departments audited, the governor requested the Association to supervise this
project. It selected a public administration and financing consulting firm to head the study
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and it furnished its research services at no charge. The final report "revealed many
opportunities for securing greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of the state's
business." In 1935, the Association also developed a comprehensive financial plan for the
governor to present to the legislature, completed its fourth annual survey of state government
finances, and undertook an investigation of public finances in each of Tennessee's 95
counties and in 145 municipalities.126 Research projects were also carried out by state
taxpayers' associations in Kentucky, New Jersey and Wisconsin and by local organizations
in Worcester, Massachusetts, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Utica, New York, Santa Clara, California,
and Woonsocket, Rhode Island.127
The research, investigation and public education activities oftaxpayers' organizations
proceeded full throttle in the ensuing years of the decade, all with the same overall objective.
The director of the New Bedford Taxpayers' Association reported in May 1936, that the
"Association has continued its work of fact-finding and fact presentation, to the end that
efficiency in government may be obtained."128 Between legislative sessions the Wisconsin
Taxpayers' Alliance "devoted most of its efforts to supplying taxpayers and citizens with
information about ways and means by which their governments may be improved."129 In
June 1937, the Fitchburg, Massachusetts Taxpayers' Association declared that in its "five
years of service to taxpayers and public officials alike, the association has endeavored to
promote efficiency in governmental administration by presenting scientific solutions to
public problems."130
Good government research remained high on the agendas oftaxpayers' organizations
because, in their view, experience had proven its efficacy.
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In 1936, M. W. Madden, the

research director of the Lake County Taxpayers' Association in Gary, Indiana, opined that
"[t]he need for unbiased governmental research organizations has been satisfactorily
demonstrated in many parts of the country. Sporadic individual appeals and protests are
seldom heeded, and only by organized efforts can taxpayers hope to hold governmental costs
at sane levels." The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association contended that the improvements in
state government administration resultingfromits research activities had enabled Tennessee
to close the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, "with a continuation of about the same
$5,000,000 annual reduction in expenditures that has occurred for three successive years."
The same year the Taxpayers' Research Association of Fort Wayne, Indiana reminded
taxpayers that local taxes had been reduced 40% from 1931 to 1936 and asserted that "a
major factor in this reduction of local governmental expenditures has been the work of the
Taxpayers' Research Association, which was organized... to fight waste and extravagance
with an array of facts and analyses by which adequate budgets for good local government at
the lowest possible cost could be scientifically determined."131 In 1937, the Fitchburg,
Massachusetts Taxpayers' Association maintained that its research efforts during its five-year
existence had "been a major factor in the improvement of governmental administration" in
the city.132
The other most prominent activity of Depression-era taxpayers' associations was
their legislative programs. Through these programs organized taxpayers exercised both hard,
or direct, legislative power and soft, or indirect, legislative power. "Hard" legislative efforts
refer to those activities directed at improving the laws affecting state and local government
finance and administration by changing them and opposing laws on those subjects that
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taxpayers' associations deemed imprudent, ill-advised or otherwise contrary to the interests
of taxpayers. Those laws were embodied in state constitutions, state statutes, local laws and
ordinances, and municipal charters. Taxpayers' associations often worked closely with
legislative bodies (state legislatures, county commissions, city councils, boards of selectmen,
and so forth) in crafting new laws and revising existing laws, and they also were instrumental
in obtaining public and legislative support for the approval or enactment of such laws. On
other occasions they worked to defeat proposed legislation. Such "hard" legislative efforts
were aimed at the law itself, as it related to the management and finance of government.
"Soft," or indirect, legislative efforts were aimed not at the law itself, but at
influencing, independently of the law, those policies, processes, procedures and operations
of government units, and actions of public officials, that could be influenced apart from the
law. Taxpayers' associations endeavored to do so through a combination of cooperation,
collaboration, negotiation, advocacy and confrontation with public officials. The ends to
which these means were directed were the perennial twin goals of economy and efficiency
in government. Perhaps the area in which taxpayers' associations exercised "soft" legislative
power with the greatest effect was in the budget processes of municipalities, counties and
states.

They also achieved considerable success in implementing improvements in

government administration and operations.
The larger taxpayers' organizations, by virtue oftheir greater resources, generally had
the most extensive and effective legislative programs. The Kentucky Tax Reduction
Association, organized in December 1932, drafted and sponsored nine bills dealing with
county and local government in the 1934 state legislative session, five of which were
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"enacted into law and afforded the means of saving the taxpayers of Kentucky an estimated
$5,000,000 a year." One of these measures was a new county budget law that established a
uniform budget process for all counties. After this law was passed, the Association's staff
worked with state officials in preparing the budget reforms to be used by the counties
pursuant to the legislation. Another statute abolished the office of county jailer and
transferred the jailer's functions to the county sheriff, resulting in an estimated savings of
more than $600,000 annually. In the 1936 legislative session the Kentucky Tax Reduction
Association defeated an attempt of the jailers' association to have this measure repealed .m
A third measure, requiring annual audits of county finance records, had resulted in
"substantial sums... being returned to local treasuries" by 1935. During the 1934 legislative
session the Association also helped prevent the passage of a number of bills which, "if
passed, would have done serious damage to the cause of good county government,"
according to John W. Manning of the University of Kentucky, who failed to identify these
supposedly nefarious bills.134 The Kentucky Tax Reduction Association exerted hard
legislative power to get important measures enacted into law and to prevent the passage of
other bills as well as soft legislative power to assist in implementing the county budget law.
The state taxpayers' association in neighboring Tennessee worked closely with the
state legislature, especially in connection with budgetary matters and appropriations bills.
The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association assisted the legislature in drafting the appropriations
bills enacted in 1933, which reduced state government expenditures by 35% from the prior
year, and the 1935 biennial appropriations act, "assure[d] a continuation of most of the large
reductions in the cost of government originally provided through the 1933 appropriations
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act." The Association was also involved in the installation of the state's new central
accounting system in the fall of 1935. In the 1937 legislative session it expanded its
legislative efforts to the subject of county government administration.135
Taxpayers' organizations played an important part in securing the adoption of the
manager form of government in many localities. In Nebraska, for instance, the Association
of Omaha Taxpayers, formed in February 1932, was "instrumental in securing the adoption
of several important reform measures" in 1934, including a manager form of government for
Douglas County. City and county manager plans for government were a critical component
of the business model of government, one premise of which was that government units
would be better and more professionally run or managed by individuals with professional
training and expertise in public administration and than by non-professional elected officials.
Reformers who advocated for a business model of government argued that government
administration had become an increasingly complex and demanding business requiring the
application of "practical business methods" and "techniques of business management in
government" by skilled professionals.136 Consequently, manager plans for local government
were a centerpiece of the agenda of good government organizations. In January 1935, the
National Municipal Review touted Douglas County's adoption of a county manager plan of
government as a model for other places.137 The National Municipal League believed the
manager form of local government to be essential to "the solution" of "the problem of
curtailing budgets without abandoning services." It would be a great improvement over what
it called, in 1933, "inefficient, archaic forms of government" typical of most municipalities
and counties.138

176

In 1936, the California Taxpayers' Association, established in 1926, "played an
important role in the enactment of the 5% expenditure limitation law." It was also actively
involved in efforts to streamline local government in Los Angeles County and was
represented on the Committee on Governmental Simplification.139 That same year the
Taxpayers' League of St. Louis County in Duluth, Minnesota sponsored and secured voter
approval of an amendment to the city charter establishing a tax rate limit, and it also
persuaded county officials to implement many of its recommendations for improving
purchasing and accounting procedures.140 The Minnesota Taxpayers' Association, the
Montana Taxpayers' Association and the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers'
Association also had active legislative programs.141
The New Jersey Taxpayers' Association had a vigorous and comprehensive hard
legislative program, scrutinizing all bills introduced in the state legislature and preparing
proposed legislation. It was particularly effective in bringing public pressure to bear on
legislators. In 1934, it "led the opposition to a sales tax, and on this occasion organized the
largest meeting of citizens ever assembled at Trenton to attend a public hearing conducted
by a committee of the legislature. The legislation was defeated." Two years later it
advocated revisions to the state's proposed local budget act and "was able to convince the
legislators of the wisdom of its arguments and was successful in having the bill held in
committee until the objectionable features," which would have substantially increased local
tax rates, were stricken. It also succeeded in continuing a freeze on the salaries of municipal
and county employees through its ability "to convince the legislators, at the public hearing
on the question, of the insurmountable financial burden which would result... if such
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suspensions were not continued."
The indirect legislative efforts of the Worcester Taxpayers' Association in
Massachusetts are representative of such activities by large local taxpayers' associations.
Organized in 1931, by 1935 it had nearly 12,000 members. It organized and directed "a
strong popular demand for continued economy toward city hall," successfully opposing the
restoration of public employee salary reductions, persuading local officials to install modern
inventory and cost accounting systems, and obtaining larger shares of federal funds for the
city. It also "made the most militant campaign in the history of the city to compel the city
council to reduce the budget" in 1935. According to the Association's executive director,
it prevented "fourteen unnecessary police department appointments made by the outgoing
mayor," saving the taxpayers $30,000 annually, and put a halt to a number of proposed
Public Works Administration (PWA) projects because, it maintained, they would have
required the city to incur substantial debt and the "maintenance of these new buildings and
other projects would impose a large permanent cost on the local taxpayers." The Worcester
Taxpayers' Association also endeavor to shape state legislation, but the exercise of such hard
legislative power took a back seat to its soft legislative activities.143
The legislative program of the Taxpayers' Association of New Mexico included
significant hard and soft efforts. The Association's director worked with state legislative
commissions to recommend needed legislation. The Association also participated in drafting
a variety of new legislative measures and facilitated their passage. Among these was a
statute allowing taxpayers to pay delinquent taxes in installments, and the Association
"conducted an intensive campaign to acquaint taxpayers with this provision and it is believed
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that this effort was responsible for the collection of a large amount of delinquent levies."
The Taxpayers' Association ofNew Mexico promoted good government legislation and then
worked hard to make it effective. In 1935, the state legislature passed an act consolidating
state revenue collection agencies, a measure that it had advocated for several years. Another
principal activity of the Association was assisting in the preparation of local government
budgets and representing taxpayers at public hearings on budgets.144
Numerous other local taxpayers' associations had vital legislative programs during
the mid-1930s. Local organizations drafted and facilitated the passage of state legislation
affecting state and local government and of municipal ordinances in their own communities.
Through the legislative process, collaborative efforts, and public pressure, they exerted a
powerful influence on the content and amount of state and local government budgets and of
contracts entered into by local and county government units. In a host of ways, organized
taxpayers at the local level in Fitchburg, Springfield and New Bedford, Massachusetts,
Chattanooga, Tennessee, San Jose, California, Utica, New York, New Haven, Connecticut,
Gary, Indiana, and elsewhere promoted efficiency and economy in government, lowered their
tax burdens and shaped their communities.145

The Aggressive Activities of Taxpayers' Associations
The research, education and legislative activities were the traditional functions of
taxpayers' associations in the United States, and they remained at the center of organized
taxpayer action in the 1930s. The crisis of the Great Depression, however, made the
programs of taxpayers' associations more multidimensional and gave them a sharper edge.

179

The taxpayers' associations examined by Tharp in 1932 had emphasized a non-partisan,
cooperative approach. Although contention between taxpayers and tax spenders on these
subjects was to some extent inevitable, pre-1930 taxpayers' associations were likely to
highlight collaboration rather than confrontation. In the early 1930s, though, confrontation
assumed a more prominent role in the taxpayers' association movement. This sharper edge
took a number of forms - traditional, and sometimes more overtly partisan, political activity;
a greater push by taxpayers for tax limits; a new receptivity to tax strikes (which were the
nuclear bombs in the organized taxpayers' arsenal of tactics); and an increased reliance on
litigation as a means to control government expenditures and to restrain unlawful acts of
public officials. Organized taxpayers had employed these tactics, especially traditional
political activity and taxpayers' lawsuits, in the past, but after 1930 they did so more
commonly and extensively. In a sense, in these years the taxpayers' association movement
had something of a contrapuntal tenor to it, with cooperative efforts and energies comprising
the major key and conflictive ones being the minor, but still important, key.
Prior to 1931, taxpayers' associations largely eschewed traditional political activity,
especially of a partisan nature. Leaders oftaxpayers' organizations and those who examined
them maintained that taxpayers' associations should encourage good people to run for office
and work collaboratively with elected officials to promote economy and efficiency in
government but that they should not participate in electoral politics. In Claude Tharp's
estimation it was imperative that "[a] taxpayers' association... declare its intention to remain
non-political" and that "no one group representing a certain... political party dominates."146
A.C. Reese, while secretary of the Western Taxpayers' Association, declared in 1928 that
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the duty of promoting good legislation regarding state and local government "must now be
assumed by some representative, non-political organization, such as a taxpayers'
association."147 Three years later Harry Miesse, the Indiana Taxpayers' Association's
secretary, insisted that a taxpayers' association
must be non-partisan in theory and in fact. Its greatest strength will come
through enlisting the membership and active participation of representatives
of all political parties to the end that they may sit down together as citizens
and as taxpayers rather than as partisans, and consider what is wisest and best
as a whole. Because of its non-partisan character, a taxpayers' association
must remain aloof from political campaigns.148
These sentiments represented the dominant world view among organized taxpayers through
1930 or so. Taxpayers' associations participated in political campaigns only infrequently and
when they did so they tended to emphasize the non-partisan nature of their efforts. When all
five candidates favored by the Teaneck Taxpayers' League were elected to the city council
in the 1930 election, for instance, the League later stressed that all five were "non-partisan
candidates" and that the "League did not have among its members a single person then active
in partisan politics."149
In the early 1930s there was a moderate, though not seismic, shift in the attitudes of
organized taxpayers toward traditional political activity. Some actions took the form of
indirect educational efforts with respect to elections. The Minnesota Taxpayers' Association,
for example, prepared and distributed to candidates for state and local office a questionnaire
on taxation and then published the candidates' responses in newspapers and furnished them
to local taxpayers' organizations. It also prepared and published tax platforms for state
legislature candidates.150 Officials and candidates for elective office solicited support from
taxpayers' associations at election time. The Worcester Taxpayers' Association proclaimed
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that in the 1935 city election "the candidates of both parties strove to outdo each other in
stressing their interest in the taxpayer..., and it was impressed upon the political aspirants
that the path to success at the polls was along the idea of pledging economy during the
campaign."151 Likewise, the three gubernatorial candidates in New Jersey felt compelled to
address the New Jersey Taxpayers' Association at its annual meeting during the 1934
campaign.152
Taxpayers' leagues also actively promoted their own candidates and tickets for state
and local office. New Jersey was a relative hotbed of such political activity. The Newark
Taxpayers' Association contributed to the ouster of four of the five incumbent city
commissioners in the 1933 election. Two of the victorious candidates, Reginald Parnell and
Austin Waldron, had accused four of the incumbent commissioners of "graft and corruption
in the government, and pledg[ed] a $2.50 tax rate," and they had "received their unusual
independent vote from supporters in the Newark Taxpayers' Association, of which they were
among the principal organizers." In the same election cycle the Audubon Taxpayers'
Association conducted but lost "a spirited fight" against the Republican organization in the
Audubon borough election.153 In the fall of 1933, the Citizens and Taxpayers' Association
of Asbury Park, New Jersey, put forth a slate of candidates for five vacancies on the city
council, and all five won.154
The rough-and-tumble politics of the New York City metropolitan area were even
rougher than usual for the Taxpayers and Rentpayers Association of West New York, New
Jersey during the 1935 city election campaign. The Association had initiated a fusion
movement against the local Democratic machine to unseat the five Democratic city
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commissioners in the May 14 municipal election. On the night of April 17 there was an
attempt to murder Irwin Rubinstein, the leader of the fusion movement and legal counsel to
the Association. As Rubinstein drove home on dimly lit Broadway Street a sedan with four
men in it forced his vehicle to the curb. One man got out of the car, put a pistol through the
driver's window of Rubinstein's vehicle and fired two shots, but as he did so Rubinstein
struck the assailant's arm and the shots went wild. Rubinstein drove away and narrowly
escaped. He carried on the political battle, and the anti-Democratic fusion movement
"carried all its five candidates to victory."155
Hal Steed's Atlanta Taxpayers' League expressed some ambivalence about the extent
to which it should engage in political activity. Steed favored a cooperative approach- "[m]y
idea was to conciliate them, not fight them." Others "insisted that we go into politics,"
declaring that "[t]he elections will be coming on soon.. ..[W]e must pick our candidates."
For a time the tax leaguers adopted something of a compromise stance, seeking to have input
in the election of state legislators who had the power to enact "our proposed reforms, notably
consolidation of local governments," but not taking sides in local elections. When an effort
to recall the public works superintendent whom the League supported was made, however,
the League went into high gear politically, elicited the largest voter registration ever at the
time, and "[w]e taxpayers won." Steed and other moderates headed off a tax strike by
convincing taxpayers that the "remedy is not in striking, but in orderly cure at the polls."
Although the League's experiments with vote control were not all that successful, it engaged
in traditional political activity when appropriate.156
The Berlin Farmer-Labor Party is one ofthe best examples of the connection between
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organized taxpayer political activity and political party formation. Citizens in Berlin, New
Hampshire organized the Berlin Taxpayers' Association in 1933, when they learned that the
city tax collector had misappropriated tax monies and the mayor and city council were not
prepared to do anything about it. The Association then instituted a taxpayers' action and
prevailed in the trial court. These events provided the critical mass for the Association and
other civic organizations to come together and create the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party. Its
candidates for mayor and three city council seats were elected in 1934, and in the 1935
election the Farmer-Labor Party gained control of city government. In this case organized
taxpayer protest had developed into organized political protest and resulted in the creation
of a third political party.157
Intense and widespread advocacy of tax limits was another facet of the more
adversarial relationship between taxpayers and tax spenders in the early and mid-1930s.
Most such measures aimed to limit the property tax rate. Some, though, limited the amount
of the property tax levy.l58 Michigan, for example, amended its constitution in 1934 to limit
the total amount of property taxes to 1.5% of the assessed valuation.159 The imposition of
tax limits through state constitutions represents what journalist James Ring Adams termed
the "third wave" of the tax revolt.160
Taxpayers' associations themselves were not, however, in the vanguard of this tax
limitation movement. Rather, its principal impetus came from organized real estate interests,
in particular the National Association of Real Estate Boards and its affiliated divisions at the
state and local level, whose members had a direct and significant interest in capping taxes
on their real estate.161 Agitation for tax limits was not an explicit element of the programs
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and activities of most taxpayers' associations. Indeed, at least one, the Stark County Tax
League in Ohio, complained that the adoption in November 1934, by Ohio voters of a further
reduction in the tax limit would shrink revenues faster than a commensurate reduction in the
cost of government could be achieved.162 Such opposition to tax limits suggests that
taxpayers' organizations were not simply anti-tax entities. Rather, they sought to balance the
level of necessary government services against the taxpayers' ability to pay for those
services. Still, many of the members of the real estate organizations that backed the tax limit
movement also belonged to state and local taxpayers' associations, so there was considerable
support for tax limitation measures in taxpayers' associations even if there is little evidence
that most openly promoted them. In any event, the taxpayers themselves, whom the
taxpayers' associations represented, clearly and overwhelmingly supported constitutional and
statutory tax limits, as is demonstrated by the fact that voters approved such revisions in at
least twenty states during the 1930s, including those in Washington, Michigan, Ohio,
Nevada, West Virginia, Indiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Minnesota and
Nebraska.163
As one might expect, tax spenders were vehemently opposed to tax limitation
measures. Many political scientists, other public administration experts, and tax officials
harshly criticized tax limitation laws as unduly rigid, throttling the delivery of services by
state and local government, and ineffective in reducing the overall tax burden, which was
merely shifted from owners of real estate to other taxpayers.164 Indeed, the National
Municipal League, a nation-wide citizens organization committed to good government,
devoted almost the entire November 1935 issue of the National Municipal Review to the
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negative consequences of real estate tax limitation.165 Nevertheless, taxpayers, while
rejecting some tax limitation measures, endorsed many others during the Great Depression.
The most militant weapon in the taxpayers' association's arsenal was the tax strike,
in which taxpayers refused to pay their property taxes unless and until certain demands,
usually relating to budget cuts or other government cost reduction measures, were met. Tax
strikes ranged from brief, isolated episodes to extensive and extended ones. The following
incident described in the National Municipal Review is typical of spontaneous, short-lived
efforts of tax strikers:
The primitive urge of the tax striker has not yet been completely dissipated,
if the recent disturbance in Pottsville, Pa., is any indication. Upwards of a
thousand taxpayers... stormed the Schuylkill County court house, dragged
out two of the county commissioners, and read the riot act on tax reduction.
Unequal assessments were the cause. The county commissioners promised
to hear a taxpayers' grievance committee, and the strikers were appeased.166
At the other end of the continuum was the Chicago tax strike, which extended from 1930 to
1933 and was, according to David Beito, "the largest tax strike in the country if not in
American history." The strike was organized by the Association of Real Estate Taxpayers
(ARET) in Chicago. A large majority of its 30,000 members in late 1932 hailed from
"relatively modest backgrounds" and were small shopkeepers and other small business
owners, skilled blue-collar workers, and persons employed in clerical and sales occupations.
At the height of the strike in 1932, a majority of real property taxes in Chicago were unpaid,
and the city narrowly averted bankruptcy. The tax strike fizzled out in 1933 only after ARET
lost several state court lawsuits that weakened it and it dissolved into two warring factions.167
Although there were no other Depression-era tax strikes of the magnitude of the
Chicago strike, they were seriously considered in many cities and implemented on occasion.
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Leaders of the Taxpayers' Advisory Council in Milwaukee suggested a tax strike in 1932,
but backed off after voters approved a tax-limitation measure in the November election. That
same year in New York City, the West Side Taxpayers' Association passed a resolution
encouraging taxpayers to withhold their taxes and the Greater Brooklyn Property Owners
Association (GBPOA) initiated a tax-strike campaign. The momentum for a tax strike
dissipated, however, in the face of stiff opposition from another taxpayers' organization, the
New York Real Estate Board, dissension among the tax strike advocates, and the adoption
by Mayor James Walker of a more conciliatory approach on taxation matters.168 In Atlanta
the taxpayers' plight was sufficiently desperate that Hal Steed believed that "[a]n insurrection
is brewing" and "that a tax strike was by no means improbable." The moderate wing of the
Taxpayers' League of Atlanta and Fulton County succeeded in defusing the situation with
a plea for moderation, agreeing that the public officials who were responsible for high taxes
and high government debt "should be starved out. But if you try to starve them by refusing
to pay your taxes, you will also starve innocent and deserving persons. You will starve
policeman, firemen and teachers who are serving us, and, for the most part, had nothing to
do with our plight."169 Tax strikes, like tax resistance generally, were not targeted at core
government functions or essential levels of government services. Rather, they were aimed
at spending that was wasteful or not truly necessary, such as that occasioned by redundancy
in government services, inefficiency in government operations, and non-essential programs.
The specter of tax strikes continued to loom over local governments through 1933.
At a conference of the American Bankers Association in January speakers warned that
"[fjaxpayers' strikes may result from failure to reduce the cost of government and
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taxation...." Professor H. W. Dodd of Princeton University declared that "[tjaxpayers are
in an angry mood," and Massachusetts state senator Samuel H. Wragg insisted that "unless
the tax burden is lightened 'there are possibilities of taxpayers' strikes.'"170 On January 19,
1933, the North Bergen (New Jersey) Taxpayers' and Civic Association threatened a
taxpayers' strike unless $180,000 was slashed from the 1933 city budget. Two weeks later
the city commission reduced the budget by $119,000.171 That budgetary concession
apparently was not sufficient, because the Association still declared a property owners tax
strike in effect on February 24, 1933. Rudolph J. Welti, the Association's president,
announced that "all of the 1,000 members of the organization would support the tax-paying
holiday and that 5,000 other property owners of the city [of the 8,000 taxpayers] would join
the movement." He further explained that the association "was advising the property owners
to deposit the amount of their taxes" in an escrow account "pending the outcome of the
strike"... [and] that the strike would continue until the taxpayers' demands for budget
reductions were met."172
At the annual meeting of the New Jersey Taxpayers' Association in June 1933, there
were calls for a tax strike unless the state legislature acceded to the Association's demands
for reductions in the state budget. Irwin Rubenstein, the attorney for the West New York
Taxpayers' Association who was to foil the attempt on his life two years later, proposed a
tax strike resolution, but the measure "failed after a sharp debate." The Association's
president warned that "[t]his is a very controversial question containing a considerable
amount of dynamite.... I feel it would be a great mistake to adopt so radical a measure." A
director of the Association warned that "[w]hen respected citizens countenance a tax strike
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they are undermining the essential services of government.... [F]or this organization to
resolve we will stop paying taxes is too radical."173 These comments belie the stereotype of
the taxpayers' organization as a conservative, anti-government entity. They do not reflect
a libertarian mindset but a measured and responsible view of the taxpayers' relationship to
government and of their responsibility to pay for essential government services. They also
acknowledge the taxpayer's duty to pay taxes, the obligation side of the citizenship coin.
Most state taxpayers' associations espoused similar values and adopted a similarly cautious
approach to the subject of tax strikes.
In Jersey City, New Jersey, what began as a tax strike in early March 1933, had
evolved into a third-party political movement by April. On March 1, the Jersey City
Taxpayers' Association declared its intention to call a tax strike unless the Democratic
administration of Mayor Frank Hague cut the city budget by almost fifty-five percent. The
Association did not specify the programs or services that it proposed to cut but only the
overall level of the budget reduction. Two other taxpayers' organizations were formed
almost immediately to oppose this draconian demand. The Association stated that it "has a
potential strength of 20,000. We are about to enter upon a tax strike after every effort to
come to harmonious and sensible understandings with a headstrong city government has
failed." The threat apparently carried little weight, for the city commission adopted the
proposed budget without any reduction on March 10. On March 21, the Association adopted
a resolution urging a tax strike by its members. At about the same time "[r]esentment over
the passage of the Jersey City budget last week without the sharp reductions advocated by
the Jersey City Taxpayers' Association led yesterday to the formation of a fusion movement
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of Republicans and independent Democrats... to run against Mayor Frank Hague and the
Hague candidates at the city election in May." One of the fusion candidates was Daniel E.
C. Somers, an official of the Association. Hague was the vice chairman of the Democratic
National Committee and had been involved in Jersey City government for seventeen years.
Despite winning a position at the top of the ballot, all five fusion candidates were trounced
by the Hague administration incumbents. The New York Times observed that "[i]t was
evident that the defeated Fusion candidates in Jersey City were at a loss to account for the
size ofthe vote rolled up by Mayor Frank Hague and the other incumbent commissioners."174
This political drubbing stood in stark contrast to the success of the candidates backed by the
Newark Taxpayers' Association in the Newark city elections on the same day.175
Not surprisingly, both the act and the threat of a tax strike elicited strong opposition
on a number of fronts. Such radical action was antithetical to the conservative mindset of
business leaders. Businessmen, bankers, municipal bond dealers, and investors in municipal
bonds found the notion of tax strikes unsettling and feared that they would cause irrevocable
damage to the municipal credit market. Melvin A. Traylor, the president ofthe First National
Bank of Chicago and a leader of the forces that sought to break the Chicago tax strike,
maintained in 1932 that the "tax dodger who declines to assume his fair proportion of the
cost of government, and the tax striker who refuses to pay taxes levied and assessed against
him, constitute the great menace to American governments today." They threatened, he
claimed, to cause "the general collapse of municipal credit, which rests solely upon the
confidence of the investor in the willingness of the citizen to pay, and the ability of the
Government to enforce the collection of revenue sufficient for its needs."176 The following
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year Frank H. Morris of Lehman Brothers echoed Traylor, declaring that "[i]f tax strikes
become general, we would have in the municipal bond market the equivalent of what
happened in 1929 in the stock market."177
To the public officials who depended on a regular and predictable stream of tax
revenues, tax strikes were anathema. Daniel Hoan, the Socialist mayor of Milwaukee and
philosophically a proponent of big government, considered such organized tax resistance a
threat to the Republic itself. In a one-act radio play sponsored by the National Municipal
League entitled "Mr. Taxpayer versus Mr. Taxspender," Hoan and Luther Gullick, a
professor of municipal government at Columbia University, engaged in a spirited discussion
about the "problem of high taxes and tax reduction." Hoan strongly defended the need for
active government intervention in the devastated Depression-era economy. "Much as we
dislike to pay our tax bills," Hoan declared,
[t]he fact is that government... has stood like the Rock of Gibraltar during
this frightful depression to save us the agonies of complete chaos. While
banks bailed, factories closed, shops went bankrupt, pyramided utilities
collapsed, the government was expected to function with more vigor and
energy than ever.... Is it not high time to call the attention of the citizens of
this country to the fact that they are playing with dynamite when they so
recklessly undermine and destroy faith in this Republic and all its agencies....
The operation of government is as necessary as it is to have a home to live in
unless we are to concede that we should slip back the to the level of savages.
...If then, it is true that to have progress we must have efficient public
service, it behooves every good citizen to take part in civic and governmental
affairs and improve that government and when the time comes to pay the bill,
to do so with a sense of civic duty.178
Hoan's insistence on the necessity for forceful government action to reduce unemployment,
stimulate consumer demand and provide a bulwark against a deflating economy anticipated
the arguments made by British economist John Maynard Keynes three years later in his
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seminal work, The General Theory Of Employment, Interest and Money, and that underpin
much of the discussion about the economic stimulus legislation enacted in February 2009.179
In a 1933 radio forum on the "Secrets of Municipal Credit," New York State Comptroller
Morris S. Tremaine warned that "[a] taxpayer strike would double the cost of borrowing" by
state government.180 Tax strikes were a threat to the operation and to the very legitimacy of
government. Consequently, government officials opposed them vigorously and often
reminded taxpayers that a principal obligation of citizenship was paying taxes.
Political scientists and other good government experts and reformers also decried tax
strikes.

Luther Gullick, the director of Columbia University's Institute of Public

Administration, played the role of the taxpayer in the simulated radio debate with Hoan but
nevertheless regarded tax strikers as a threat to the body politic. In a 1932 radio roundtable
discussion he opined that taxpayers' associations could promote economy and efficiency in
government in a number of constructive ways but warned that "a taxpayers' strike, or the
threat of a strike, is dangerous business. Its first effect is to wreck the credit of the
community, jack up the interest rates that must be paid for borrowed money, and perhaps
bring on payless pay days for schoolteachers, policemen and firemen."181 Gullick elaborated
on this theme in his discussion with Hoan, questioning the loyalty and patriotism of the tax
slacker, "who can, but doesn't pay his taxes cheerfully and promptly [and] is just a plain
traitor to his city and town." He argued "that a tax strike costs twenty cents on the dollar on
taxes, as over against the normal and legitimate methods open to the citizen of expressing
his demands for tax reduction."182 Public administration professionals frequently emphasized
the dire practical consequences and the radical nature oftax strikes and encouraged taxpayers
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to engage in more moderate and, in the professionals' view, more effective efforts to alleviate
their tax burden.
The threat posed by tax strikes and tax delinquencies was of sufficient concern to
good government experts that in September 1933, the National Municipal League launched
"a nation-wide 'Pay Your Taxes' campaign to educate the average citizen throughout the
country to the importance of paying his taxes in this critical period if municipal credit is to
be preserved and essential local government services continued."183 The League was a
voluntary association of citizens organized in 1894 to promote reform in municipal
government.184 Consequently, it had a direct and vital interest in the extent to which tax
delinquencies threatened the financial viability of state and local governments. Thomas
Reed, a professor of government at the University of Michigan who shared Gullick's dim
view of tax strikes and tax limits promoted by organized taxpayers, was selected as the
chairman of the National Pay Your Taxes Campaign (NPYTC).185 The NPYTC was
essentially an intensive, large-scale public relations campaign designed to make "the taxpayer
understand his responsibility for the tone of government" and his civic duty to pay for
government.

It was backed not only by public employees and good government

organizations but also by many in the private sector, to which the financial health of state and
local government mattered greatly. An editorial comment in the October 1933 National
Municipal Review described campaign's methods in glowing terms:
The idea of a nation-wide drive against tax delinquency is penetrating
businesses and industry clear to the man on the street. In various newspapers,
arresting "Pay Your Taxes" advertisements are appearing, sponsored not by
the tax gathering powers but by banks and leading industrial institutions.
They recall the days of Liberty Loan drives. Telephone, radio, screen appeals
in motion picture houses, volunteer house to house campaigns by the
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unemployed - and by civic employees anxious to avoid this status - all are
parts of the unique public movement. More than that, the New York Bureau
of Municipal Information reports "sermons given in churches about the
Restoration of Faith in Local Government."186
The movement gained momentum quickly and produced results in short order. In
February 1934, Wade S. Smith, the National Municipal Review's contributing editor for
taxation and government, reported that'" Pay Your Taxes' campaigns continued to provide
an effective weapon against tax delinquencies in cities with pressing financial difficulties,"
including Columbus, Ohio, Houston, Texas and Tacoma, Washington.187 The National
Municipal League published a campaign manual for use by local Pay Your Taxes campaign
committees.188 Some taxpayers' associations, such as the state taxpayers' organization in
New Mexico, supported the campaign.189 In August 1934, the National Municipal Review
declared that the "[r]esults secured by the campaign during the past year," including the
reduction ofdelinquencies and restoration ofmunicipal credit, "had been highly successful,"
and it vowed to continue the campaign.190
By late 1934 tax strikes had waned for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most
important, the tax strike was a radical approach with destructive potential that most
Americans were not prepared to embrace. Moreover, actual tax strikes had not proven all
that effective and often resulted in considerable public backlash. Finally, the National
Municipal League's Pay Your Taxes Campaign succeeded to a large extent in diverting the
energies oftax resisters into more constructive and more cooperative channels for advancing
their agendas. By September 1934, the National Municipal Review was reporting that tax
protesters throughout the nation "seem definitely to have lost their old tax strike
enthusiasm."191
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In addition to lobbying, political campaigns, and tax strikes, the fourth and final sharp
weapon in the Depression-era taxpayers' association's arsenal was the taxpayers' lawsuit.
Taxpayers turned to this remedy when they deemed it necessary to invoke the coercive power
of the law to enforce economy and efficiency in local government. Taxpayers brought such
lawsuits most often to restrain the unauthorized expenditure of public funds, to require the
return of taxpayer dollars already improperly paid out and to enjoin other unlawful municipal
acts such as the illegal issuance of municipal bonds. When taxpayers believed that town, city
and county governments were not adhering to constitutional and statutory provisions
regarding local government finance and operation, they turned to the courts to force
compliance.
Because the reported information regarding taxpayers' actions is so diffuse, it is
impossible to measure with precision the number of such suits brought annually in the 193 Os,
compared to the 1920s.192 For several reasons, though, we can be sure the number of
taxpayers' suits instituted during the 1930s increased sharply. First, such litigation was
expensive, so it was most often undertaken or sponsored by organized groups, which
multiplied exponentially between 1931 and 193 5. Second, the information gleaned from the
Decennial Digests, rough and imprecise though it is, suggests that there was a surge in
taxpayers' actions in the 1930s. For example, in the five-year period between 1923 and 1927
there were 105 reported taxpayers' suits, whereas in the five-year period between 1933 and
193 7 there were 146, a 39% increase. m Third, a revived interest in taxpayers' actions among
legal commentators during the Great Depression suggests an increase in the frequency of
such suits. The June 1937 Harvard Law Review took a positive view of taxpayers' actions.
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It observed that "[r]ecent attempts to enjoin governmental expenditures have brought into
renewed prominence the problem of defining the scope of suits by taxpayers against officials
mismanaging public property or funds." It concluded that
[t]he taxpayers' suit must then be understood as not only a means of
vindicating individual rights but as a governmental device to safeguard the
legal restrictions on state and local governments, which, if not subjected to
the careful scrutiny of the individual taxpayer, might well become dead
letters.... The overwhelming acceptance of such suits is in keeping with the
distrust of the executive and administrative self-restraint in the use of the
spending power and with the readiness to allow the courts to assume the role
of arbiter in the governmental scheme.194
In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court's 1933 decision in Wertz v. Shane, holding that a
taxpayer was authorized to prosecute suits "to recover for the state funds wrongfully
expended if the proper officials refuse to act," elicited criticism from the Illinois Law Review
because "such suits might be employed merely to discredit honest officials. Individuals or
factions could contest the execution of an administrative policy which appeared odious to
them, and unduly hamper officials whom a majority had elected."195 The commentators'
differing perspectives of taxpayers' actions show the spectrum of opinion about the
desirability of such suits. The first commentator also reflects the view of consensus legal
historians that courts acted as honest brokers or arbiters of citizens' disputes with their
governments.
Bell County, Kentucky provides an interesting case study of the litigation programs
of taxpayers' associations during the Great Depression. Established by the state legislature
in 1867, Bell County is in southern Kentucky in the region of the Cumberland Gap and the
Cumberland River.196 It abuts the far southwestern corner of Virginia and Tennessee's
northern border. In the 1930s the principal cities of Bell County were Middlesboro and
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Pineville.197
The Taxpayers' League of Bell County was formed in 1930 "by a number of
businessmen to correct the abuses attending in the administration of Bell County's financial
affairs and the illegal expenditures of the taxpayers' monies, and wants every taxpayer in the
county to become a member."198 Those abuses included the misappropriation ofpublic funds
by officials, the refusal by public officials to allow regular audits of government financial
records, and what taxpayers considered wasteful or excessive expenditures of tax dollars for
employee salaries and other things.199 In an "Open Letter To Taxpayers" in the Middlesboro
Daily News, the League urged all county taxpayers to join because "it will show that you still
have the interest of the county and its citizens and good government at heart."200 It "built up
an extensive membership of taxpayers" in the county. The League's stated objectives were
[t]o curb unlawful and injudicious expenditures of public funds and to take
such legal steps as in its judgment appeared necessary to protect the monies
raised by taxation for public purposes; to audit or have audited public records
of Bell County, and to publish reports of the same; to employ such agencies,
including the engagement of legal talent, as might be necessary to promote
the end sought; and generally to do all things leading to the ultimate purpose
of the organization, such as would tend to elevate the government to a higher
plane.201
It promised "to see that when money is collected from the taxpayers it will be spent for the
purposes for which it was levied."202
Taxpayers' litigation was the centerpiece of the League's agenda and the taxpayers'
action its principal weapon. In its March 1931 "Open Letter To Taxpayers" the League
boasted that it had "been instrumental in having some suits brought against former officials
to recover" public funds and that "[e]ight suits are now pending to recover about $60,000.00,
and every citizen should be interested in these matters."203 At its May 25,1931 meeting, the
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League adopted a resolution declaring that one of the League's main objectives was to insure
that public officials "honestly and faithfully perform[ed] their duties, regardless of politics
and political pressure" and that investigations by the League had revealed "that many of the
officers are not complying with their legal duties." The resolution went on to "unhesitatingly
condemn these practices" and instructed the League's attorneys "to prepare and file such
actions as may be necessary to compel the proper performance by the public officials of Bell
County ofthe duties imposed upon them by law."204 Some taxpayers' actions were thereafter
brought by the League itself, while others were instituted by officers of the League on its
behalf, much as William Jay Schieffelin had done in carrying out the Citizens Union's
taxpayers' litigation program in New York City.205 In both cases, the plaintiffs were
represented by attorney Martin T. Kelly, a central figure in the League's taxpayers' litigation
program, much as Leonard Wallstein had been in the Citizens Union's legal efforts.206
One of the League's earliest taxpayer cases was initiated by James Hoskins and other
members of the League's executive committee in December 1930, against James Helton, the
former Bell County Sheriff, to recover monies wrongfully withheld by Helton. The taxpayers
claimed that Helton had refused to remit to the county and the board of education
approximately $42,000 in taxes he had collected as sheriff, that the taxpayers had demanded
that county and school officials institute suit to recover the funds, and that these public
officials had not only refused but "had been hostile to the efforts of the taxpayers of Bell
County to compel the sheriff to comply with the law...." The trial court dismissed the
taxpayers' petition on the ground that they lacked the legal capacity to prosecute such an
action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the taxpayers had a right to

198

maintain the action since the petition alleged that "the sheriff is retaining money that he
should have paid over, and that the fiscal court has failed and refused to correct the matter
and is averse to doing so." The court declared that the "taxpayers should not be left without
remedy, for they are the real parties in interest, and they have a right to demand that the
account be settled and judgment entered for the county for the amount due."207 In so ruling
Kentucky's highest court reiterated the settled principle that taxpayers were entitled to
enforce causes of actions belonging to local government where public officials wrongfully
refused to do so.
In 1931, the League, through several of its members, brought a taxpayers' suit against
the city of Middlesboro, its mayor, and commissioners to compel them to allow the plaintiffs
and their accountant to inspect and audit the city's financial records. An audit the previous
year by the city's auditor had revealed that a number of the county officers "were short in
their accounts," and the League had vowed to push for "a thorough investigation to the
end."208 The trial court judge denied the taxpayers' petition on the ground that "inasmuch
as the city had had an audit made... that it should be sufficient."209 The taxpayers appealed,
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, "[s]ubject to... reasonable rules
and regulations,... the taxpayers have the right at any time to inspect the records of the city
with a view of making an audit and discovering the truth as to its financial affairs and the
manner in which the public business is conducted."210 Such lawsuits promoted transparency
in government and accountability of public officials, two principal objectives of proponents
of a business model of government for more than a generation.
The following year representatives of the Taxpayers' League filed a taxpayers' action
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against the Middlesboro board of commissioners to recover for the city treasury excess
salaries paid to the commissioners. In 1922, the voters of Middlesboro had adopted a
commission plan of government. The city charter for which they voted also provided that
each member of the board of commissioners would receive an annual salary of $900. In
1929, the commissioners enacted an ordinance increasing their compensation, which
prompted the taxpayers' suit. The Bell County Circuit Court dismissed the petition, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the electorate had fixed the commissioners'
compensation in the city charter, that therefore "the city commissioners did not have the
power to increase their compensation, however much it may have been deserved," and that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the use and benefit of the city the illegal excess
salaries paid to the officials. The court grounded its decision on "the supremacy of the voice
of the people," declaring that "the will of the electorate...must be given full force and
effect... .Municipal councils... are but the servants of the people and when the people register
their will in respect to things directly submitted to them, that will is controlling."211 As the
court observed, the case presented "a novel and important question with respect to the
limitations on the power of the board of commissioners... by reason of the referendum under
which that method of government was adopted."212
It would appear that nepotism in county government prompted the Taxpayers' League
next lawsuit. In 1930, George Vanbeber, the county judge, had appointed Ed Vanbeber clerk
to the county judge.213 The League brought suit against both Vanbebers and the Bell County
fiscal court to recover monies paid to Ed Vanbeber as clerk and to enjoin further payment of
his salary, alleging that he had not attended to his duties as clerk and had only been present
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a total of fifteen days. In this action the League's efforts were unavailing. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, ruling that a citizen and a
taxpayer could not maintain an equitable action for injunctive relief where, as in Vanbeber's
case, there were specific remedies at law available.214 It is unclear what those other remedies
were or whether the taxpayers thereafter pursued same through litigation.
The Taxpayers' League had better luck the next year, again putting a stop to an
attempt to increase a public official's salary. In February 1931, the Bell County fiscal court
voted to increase the fiscal court clerk's salary from $60 monthly to $ 100 monthly, pursuant
to which order the clerk, J. M. Pursifull, was paid $ 100 per month in 1931,1932, and 1933.
The League filed a taxpayers' suit challenging the fiscal court's order. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order awarding "judgment for the use and benefit of the
county for the excess of $40 a month" because the state constitution prohibited such a change
in the clerk's compensation.215
The Bell County group's taxpayers litigation program was highly effective. It
prosecuted taxpayers' actions in a coordinated and vigorous manner. In the Hoskins case the
League elicited a reminder from Kentucky's highest court that "taxpayers should not be left
without remedy," a premise underlying taxpayers' actions since their inception almost a
century earlier.216 In a libel action brought by the League against Sun Publishing Company,
the publisher of The Pineville Sun, the Court of Appeals called attention to "the very
commendable things which [the League] had undertaken, and to some degree
accomplished."217 The Taxpayers' League's considerable clout is evidenced by the fact that
in 1933 the county attorney of Bell County felt obliged to seek the League's approval of a
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proposal by the county fiscal court to borrow funds to pay county expenses that had accrued
the previous year.218 Organized taxpayers in Bell County, like those throughout the nation,
were ready, willing and able to resort to the courts when they believed that doing so was
necessary to protect taxpayers' rights and to compel public officials to adhere to the law.
Organized taxpayers resorted to all four aggressive activities, whose common
characteristic was their adversarial nature, during the Great Depression. Tax strikes were
infrequent after 1934 for reasons already discussed. The push for tax limitation measures
continued throughout the decade but slowed after 193 5. One explanation for this trend is that
taxpayers came to realize that the criticisms of tax limits as unreasonably rigid and not
particularly efficacious were, to some degree, justified. The most probable one, though, is
that tax limitation had its limits, that is, taxes could be restricted only so much without
causing the engines of state and local governments to seize up completely. Between 1930
and 1935, organized taxpayers succeeded in enacting scores of tax limitation measures
throughout the nation, so by 1936 further limitation was not all that feasible.
Moreover, these tax limitation laws had produced a host of unforseen and undesirable
consequences. Obviously, when enacted "[l]ocal officials were faced with the dilemma of
how to obtain sufficient revenues for operating purposes."219 In the short term they often
were unable to do so, resulting in a dramatic curtailment of local government services, as
occurred in West Virginia and Ohio, among other states. In the longer term public officials
found replacement revenues from other sources, such as taxes on business revenues and
alcoholic beverages, the effect of which was not to reduce the public's overall tax burden,
but merely to shift it from one class of taxpayers, owners of real estate, to others.220 By
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arbitrarily restricting the revenue-raising capacity of government units, tax limits also
undermined municipal credit.221 The National Municipal League was highly critical of tax
limitation laws. In a November 1935 editorial in the National Municipal Review it argued
that "[w]herever tried, such laws have resulted in a practical breakdown of local government
and a chaos in municipal finance.... [T]ax limitation represents probably the most serious
immediate menace with which local self-government and sound public finance is faced at the
present time."222 Simone E. Leland of the Illinois Tax Commission likewise maintained that
the adoption of tax limitation proposals would "have disastrous effects upon governmental
activity in Illinois amounting to chaos and the complete breakdown of many services in
various sections of the state.... [T]hese schemes have so frequently curtailed government
service and produced fiscal chaos that the plan has been permanently discredited."223
While tax strikes and tax limitations lost momentum, traditional political activity and
taxpayers' lawsuits continued unabated throughout the decade. This was likely attributable
to several factors. First, they had often proven effective. Furthermore, the party politics in
which taxpayers engaged were, for the most part, moderate or somewhat left-of-center but
not far left (e.g., Communist) or otherwise radical. The nominees ofthe Teaneck Taxpayers'
League purported to be "non-partisan candidates," and the other political party activity in
New Jersey took the form of fusion or other independent movements.224 In Berlin, New
Hampshire, third-party political activity took the form of the Farmer-Labor Party.225 More
specific information about the political affiliations of taxpayers' association members is not
readily available, but none of the political party activity by organized taxpayers had a radical
tenor to it. Third, taxpayers' suits, for their part, had been among the panoply of remedies
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available to American citizens who relied on the rule of law for almost a century. Although
such party politics and taxpayers' suits were aggressive and adversarial in quality, they were
still part of the American civic and legal mainstream.
The connection between the more confrontational tactics are also noteworthy. In
Jersey City tax strike agitation metamorphosed into a fusion political movement directed at
overthrowing the Democratic machine headed by Mayor Frank Hague. In New Hampshire
the taxpayers' suit brought by the Berlin Taxpayers' Association began a chain of events that
led to the formation of the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party. In each case the energies released by
these aggressive efforts by taxpayers' associations generated the requisite critical political
mass for the creation of a third-party political movement. In Duluth, Minnesota, the
Taxpayers' League of St. Louis County participated in a lawsuit to enforce a statutory tax
limit against a local school district. There was a considerable degree of interaction and
interplay between the various hard tactics of taxpayers' associations, and they reinforced one
another to some degree.
The use by organized taxpayers of different and sharper tactics after 1930 is not to
suggest that taxpayers' associations abandoned their previous, less confrontational meausres.
On the contrary, taxpayers' associations continued to rely primarily on the traditional
activities of research, public education, and constructive engagement with public officials.
Still, after 1930 the taxpayers' association movement expanded into new activities and was
characterized by a greater degree of heterogeneity, complexity and nuance.
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Impact and Importance of Depression-era Taxpayers' Associations
Evaluating the effectiveness of taxpayers' associations during the Great Depression
is an equally complex and nuanced undertaking. To some extent such an evaluation depends
on how, and from whose perspective, one measures and defines effectiveness. If success is
measured by the degree to which organized taxpayers attained their goals of promoting
economy and efficiency in government and lightened tax burdens, then it was relatively
effective. In 1931, the New England Council had already concluded that "local taxpayers'
associations have been found the most effective means in dealing with" the burgeoning tax
burden.226 In late 1933, George L. Leffler, a professor of finance at the University of Toledo,
examined "the burden of taxation" in six northeastern states (New York, Michigan, Illinois,
Wisconsin, Ohio and Indiana), found, among other things, that "the influence of strong, wellorganized taxpayers' associations have forced economy in 92 percent of the taxing units o f
Indiana. He predicted mat, in these states, "the burden of taxation will be much reduced in
1933," and concluded that "the campaign for reduced taxation has made marked progress
during 1933 toward its goal. Reduced budgets and tax limiting laws are the order of the
day."227 That same year Claude Tharp argued that taxpayers' associations had made
important contributions to the cause of efficient and less costly government.228
As one might expect, taxpayers' organizations regularly touted the efficacy of their
policies and programs. The Worcester Taxpayers' Association reported that its third year of
work, 1934, "saw a reduction in property taxes in Worcester for the second successive year,"
from approximately $ 11.4 million in 1932 to $9.7 million in 1934. In 1935, the Association
of Omaha Taxpayers' Inc. asserted that it had "been instrumental in securing the adoption
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of several important reform measures," including a county manager plan ofgovernment. The
Taxpayers' Research League of Delaware likewise claimed that it had a hand in "important
and constructive measures enacted by the legislature." The local taxpayers' association in
New Haven, Connecticut quantified the value of its research activities, claiming that "[e] very
dollar spent in research by this agency resulted in the formulation of definite
recommendations for saving about $30 annually in a normal year in the operation of city
services."229 Although such reports are admittedly self-serving, they appear to be mostly
accurate. Many state taxpayers' associations played an important part in the enactment by
their state legislatures of worthy reform measures concerning government operations and
finance.230
Public officials, bankers and, to a lesser extent, experts on government, took a less
sanguine view of the impact of taxpayers' organizations. Mayor Hoan of Milwaukee rarely
missed an opportunity to deride "tax dodger leagues."231 Based on his experience in
Milwaukee he considered the demands of taxpayers' associations for economy and budget
cuts as unreasonable and unrealistic. He maintained that such reductions in public spending
would impair the ability of government to "furnish ... community services that we can't get
along without," and believed that "[o]ur citizens have thoughtlessly rallied to the cry that if
taxes can be drastically cut somehow their troubles will be solved."232 Frederick L. Bird, the
director of municipal research for Dun & Bradstreet, rued the negative effects that tax
limitation measures had on municipal credit233 Wade S. Smith contended in January 1934,
that although recent legislation enacted in a number of states forgiving interest and penalties
on past-due taxes had been adopted at the urging of taxpayers "to induce the tax defaulter to
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pay up, in nearly every instance they have had just the opposite effect and have encouraged
further tax delinquency."234 Sidney Demers, the manager ofthe Buffalo Municipal Research
Bureau, had "no quarrel with those taxpayers' associations whose work is based on
research..." but condemned any type of "militancy" by organized taxpayers, insisting that
the "claim of any group less than that of the people themselves to dictate to the elected
officials their course of action, under threat or duress of any kind, is outside the constitution
and the laws, and is nothing less man mob rule."235 Thomas Reed likewise approved of those
taxpayers' groups organized "for the purpose of finding the facts and passing reasonable
judgments on them" but feared that the more extreme tax reduction and tax limitation efforts
would wreak havoc on state and local governments.236
Most experts in public administration likewise saw in taxpayers' associations the
potential for both good and evil but concluded that their promise outweighed any peril they
posed. For good government professionals, the question was whether organized taxpayers
would devote their energies to constructive or destructive ends.237 While he was president
of the National Municipal League Murray Seasongood framed the issue as follows:
There can be no doubt of the strength and sincerely of taxpayer sentiment for
economy.... The question is, shall this sentiment be mobilized and directed
toward an intelligent and discriminating economy which preserves the good
while eliminating the bad, separates the essential from the non-essential
service, and actually makes government better, or shall it be left under
uninformed and fanatical leaders in the newly-discovered cause of economy
to pass away in empty vaporings or to disrupt administration, destroy
essential services, and bring government itself into contempt.238
Seasongood and other experts on government generally regarded the collaborative activities
of taxpayers' associations, especially their research and legislative programs, as forms of
constructive economy and maligned tax strikes and tax limits as species of destructive
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economy.
Others also emphasized the importance of intelligent and informed taxpayer action
and found great potential in such efforts directed at working with, not against, government
officials. Luther Gullick of Columbia University opined that "[i]f a taxpayers' or civic
organization is willing to get at the facts painstakingly and think intelligently about their
government, such an association can be oftremendous value."239 National Municipal League
Secretary Howard P. Jones saw in the emerging taxpayers' association movement "an
opportunity before those interested in local government that has never existed before and
may never come again...." There is at present citizen interest, energy and enthusiasm
regarding problems of local government which, directed into intelligent channels, may work
wonders" by generating the public support necessary to modernize and refashion the
structures and operations of state and local governments throughout the nation.240 Edmond
M. Barrows, though, recognizing that taxpayers' associations "provide at once menace and
opportunity," was encouraged by their increasing embrace of intelligent and balanced
legislative and research programs. He urged that such organizations obtain appropriate
information and attention "from their better trained co-workers in thefieldofcivic advance,"
that is, good government experts. Consequently, he concluded that taxpayers' associations
were allies "for the advocates of governmental reconstruction" and that they "are after
simplicity, sound financing, and centralized responsibility in local government. In these
efforts they are on solid ground."241 By and large, good government experts in the 1930s
assessed taxpayers' associations favorably, most likely because the lion's share of organized
taxpayer activity was of the constructive economy type.
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Many tax spenders also concluded that taxpayers' associations were not driven as
much by anti-big-government fervor as they had feared.

Admittedly, there was an

undercurrent of such sentiment in the taxpayers' association movement. Some of its
supporters in the business community, like Nation's Business editor Merle Thorpe, who
Beito described as representing "the dwindling hard-core anti-big-government wing of the
organized business community," were truly of a libertarian ilk.242 At the grass roots level
many shared the desire ofthe Iowa farmer who "would also like to buy less governmenf' and
the belief of the West Virginia Taxpayers' Association that "the price of government should
undergo the same measure ofdeflation as every other branch ofhuman activity."243 Although
these opinions likely reflected some degree of preference for smaller government, they were
fundamentally about the cost, not the size, of government. Most organized taxpayers simply
wanted some relief from their onerous tax burdens. To this end they sought to eliminate
unnecessary services and wasteful spending and to promote economy and efficiency in
government. The activities of taxpayers' organizations like Hal Steed's Atlanta Taxpayers'
League were mainly devoted to constructive economy measures, not destructive ones. For
the most part, taxpayers' associations responsibly balanced theirrightto press for lower taxes
against their obligation to pay their fair share of the cost of a reasonable level of government
services. The National Pay Your Taxes Campaign was so successful because organized
taxpayers were not libertarian ideologues. Anti-big-government sentiment was a minor
component of the taxpayers' association movement, not a major one.
With the benefit of two generations of hindsight, taxpayers' associations during the
Great Depression may properly be seen as largely effective and as having exerted a profound
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influence on both American government and on the fabric ofAmerican civic life. Tax strikes
were admittedly a dangerous and radical gambit, and that is precisely why they were rarely
employed. Tax limitation measures were crude instruments of tax relief policy, but in scores
of states and localities they did in fact achieve the goal of alleviating the citizen's tax burden.
Taxpayers' associations were also successful in promoting better and less costly government
through taxpayers' actions in the courts and through an array oftraditional political activities.
The programs of taxpayers' organizations that had the most significant and enduring
impact, though, were their extensive legislative and research efforts. Through these activities
organized taxpayers in every state and in hundreds of communities across the country
transformed the manner in which state and local governments were organized, operated and
financed. They informed and influenced, often to a very considerable degree, thousands of
decisions and actions by state and local legislative and executive bodies and resulted in the
enactment ofinnumerable measures affecting the administrative structure ofgovernment and
the means and methods ofpublic finance and public administration. Their cumulative impact
was enormous. Many of the features of modern public administration that we now take for
granted at the turn of the 21 st century and for which proponents of the business model of
government had advocated since at least 1900 only gained widespread acceptance and
adoption when concerted pressure for such measures was brought to bear on public officials
by millions of organized taxpayers through their voluntary associations. Such reforms
included, among many others, the county and city manager plan of government, transparent
and scientific systems of budgeting and accounting, consolidation of government
departments and functions, and the increasing professionalization of public administration
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generally.
Prior to the Great Depression, the institutions of state and local government evolved
largely in an ad hoc manner, without much forethought from a public administration
perspective. County governments were formed when population density attained a certain
level. Government departments and bureaucracies were created by elected officials to meet
a particular, usually acute, need or to advance a particular agenda, not on the basis of longterm planning or the application of business management principles to public entities. The
1930s was a watershed decade in this regard. For the first time the influence of the business
model of government extended widely and powerfully beyond the halls of academia, the
National Municipal League and other non-governmental professional associations to state
and local governments across the nation. Henceforth, the structures of state and local
government developed to a lesser degree on an ad hoc basis and to a greater degree as a result
of thoughtful planning informed by professional expertise.
This is not to say that taxpayers' associations are entitled to all the credit for such
reforms. Good government reformers, business leaders, and public officials themselves
made important contributions. Still, it was taxpayers' organizations that played a crucial and,
I argue, an indispensable part in the process of refashioning state and local government
across the United States in these years. In doing so, they fulfilled their promise, envisioned
by Barrows and other good government reformers, of being not only advocates of
government reconstruction but agents of such change.
The programs and activities of Depression-era taxpayers' associations were also
important because they represented various manifestations of, in historian Meg Jacobs'
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formulation, "pocketbook politics." Almost all taxpayers were consumers of government
services, and all helped to pay for those services with their own taxes. The taxpayers'
association movement, at its most fundamental level, was a protest by consumers of
government services against the escalating cost of the services as evidenced by their
escalating tax burdens. Each of the programs of taxpayers' organizations, directly or
indirectly, aimed in some way to lighten that burden. Organized taxpayers brought these
concerns to their legislative bodies, to the polls and to the courts in order to facilitate
economy and efficiency in government and to reduce or at least limit their taxes. Like the
progressives who, according to Jacobs, "transformed their agenda ofmass purchasing power
into a program of national recovery and reform during the Great Depression of the 1930s,
pushing it from the margins to the center of political debate," so too did taxpayers'
associations in the 1930s force their agenda of government reconstruction and tax reduction
from the periphery to the hub of political debate throughout the United States.244
The taxpayers' association movement also had long-term impacts on American civic
life and conceptions of citizenship.

For one thing, Americans became far more

knowledgeable about and involved in their government. Americans had always interacted
with public officials and the institutions of government, but before the Great Depression such
interaction was more sporadic and superficial, usually provoked by and limited to particular
issues and problems. As a result of the crisis of the Great Depression, however, citizens of
the United States engaged (usually constructively, occasionally destructively) their state and
local governments and public officials to a far greater extent. Admittedly, not all Americans
did so, for many had all they could do to put food on the table, much less agitate for better
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and less costly government. There was, though, an increasing level of citizen-government
engagement and, consequently, of citizens' understanding of how their governments did
function and should function.

This process in turn informed Americans' notions of

citizenship, both by further integrating ordinary citizens into the fabric of American public
life and by promoting a more rights-based vision of citizenship in the United States.
The necessity for such constructive engagement with local government on the part
ofthe organized taxpaying citizens was apparent to contemporary observers ofthe taxpayers'
association movement and to taxpayers' organizations. In 1933, Clyde L. King of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration insisted that, among the "prerequisites to that
wholesome and responsive government we call democracy" and to combating political
patronage and corruption in government, was "[a] better informed citizen."245 National
Municipal League secretary Howard P. Jones maintained that citizen organization was
essential to achieving progress in county government, declaring that
[m]ost important of all... is the increased citizen interest in public affairs
resulting generally from the depression and specifically from the desire to
reduce taxes.... In America nothing can be accomplished without citizen
interest. Organization follows interests, action follows organization, and
gradually, slowly, cumbersomely... the bit of leaven leavens the whole
lump....246
A 1935 editorial in the National Municipal Review exhorted citizens to organize to further
good government, arguing that it "is idle to think good government can be protected by the
spontaneous desire of each individual citizen acting alone" and that "the only way... to make
the average citizen feel he has a part in local government is through organization."247 Later
that year Thomas H. Reed seconded that emotion, contending that "[w]ithout citizen
organization, permanent citizen organization, good government is impossible."248
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Taxpayers' organizations expressed similar views about the duty and the right of
citizens to engage constructively public officials in order to promote good government. Paul
Reynolds, the director of the Wisconsin Taxpayers' Alliance, wrote that the motto of the
Alliance could be phrased, "[w]e will never have good government until the people take an
active interest in government affairs."249 The local taxpayers' league in Duluth, Minnesota
maintained that "a democratic form of government requires that every citizen should spend
the maximum time possible in doing his part to ensure that his government does the best job
possible."250 Americans' ideas about citizenship were energized and reshaped by the
taxpayers' association movement of the 1930s.
Finally, one sees in the taxpayers' organizations ofthe 1930s the dynamic interaction
between law and society in America. The vast majority of organized taxpayers' programs
somehow implicated and invoked the law. Taxpayers petitioned, persuaded and otherwise
agitated to procure the passage of dozens of tax limits nation-wide. They instituted scores
of taxpayers' actions in order to bring the coercive power of the law to bear on public
officials and require them to comply with laws relating to state and local government finance
and administration. The research and legislative programs of taxpayers' associations were
instrumental in producing a large body of new legislation that, for the most part, improved
the quality and efficiency of government Time and again taxpaying citizens successfully
resorted to the law to refashion state and local governments and thereby appreciatively shape
their environment to their ends. Conversely, the law substantially framed and shaped the
interactions between taxpayers and public officials. The formative and constitutive power
of the law is evidenced by the very fact that citizens were required to rely on it so often to
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achieve their objectives.

The Depression-era taxpayers' association movement thus

demonstrates the reciprocal flow of influence between law and society, between legal
institutions and ideas and civic institutions and ideas.
These forces and dynamics vigorously percolated up through the American social
fabric in hundreds of communities across the nation during the Great Depression. The next
chapter focuses on how their confluence in one small city in northern New Hampshire forged
a viable third-parry political movement. It tells one particular story ofthe intersection of law,
notions of citizenship, pocketbook politics and political reform, in which legal activism and
political activism, the prerogatives of United States citizens, came together and led to the
formation of the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party.
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CHAPTER IV

CITIZENS WITH A "JUST CAUSE:"
THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FARMER-LABOR PARTY IN DEPRESSION-ERA
BERLIN

On a cold day in February 1934, while sitting in his basement law office in Berlin,
New Hampshire, attorney Arthur J. Bergeron held in his hand an envelope from the New
Hampshire Superior Court containing its decision regarding the first prominent legal case of
his career. The court's ruling in this matter would either reshape the political landscape in
New Hampshire's northernmost city or condemn the city to continued oppression by a
corrupt political machine.1
Bergeron, forced to return to his home town for economic reasons after graduating
from Harvard Law School in 1933, had been desperate for work. Earlier that year a group
of residents, outraged by the city tax collector's misappropriation of tax revenues and the
corruption of city leaders who had declined to hold the tax collector accountable, had sought
legal redress. Organized as the Berlin Taxpayers' Association, they approached several
prominent local attorneys for legal counsel but were politely rebuffed. Desperate and
frustrated, the Taxpayers' Association brought these concerns to Bergeron who, with few
demands on his nascent law practice and persuaded of the egregious injustice presented by
the case, enthusiastically agreed to serve as its attorney.
To Bergeron's relief that February day, the Coos County Superior Court had
sustained his petition on behalf of the Taxpayers' Association, holding "that any taxpayer or
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body of taxpayers might take up the prosecution of the case."2 The court's decision provided
Bergeron with a victory and forced the city tax collector to resign from office and face
criminal proceedings instituted by the State of New Hampshire for embezzlement of public
funds.3 This litigation proved the catalyst for the formation of the Berlin Farmer-Labor
Party, which was swept to power in a populist tide in the 1934 city elections.
The story of the taxpayers' association and Farmer-Labor Party in Berlin is a
multifaceted tale, reflecting both the particular history and circumstances of the city and the
broader contours and context of America during the Great Depression.4 It illustrates how
law, pocketbook politics and citizenship coalesced around organized taxpayer activity and
metamorphosed into a third political party. When Berlin citizens thought that city officials
were indifferent to the tax collector's thievery, they formed a taxpayers' association and, in
October 1933, filed a taxpayers' action against city officials. Before the end of the year they
had also organized the Coos County Workers Club and, in February 1934, in the immediate
aftermath of the superior court ruling in the taxpayers' suit, launched the Berlin Labor Party,
which changed its name to the Farmer-Labor Party four months later.5 The causal link
between taxpayer organization and litigation, on the one hand, and the creation of this third
political party, on the other, was direct and tangible. The lawsuit showed Berlin taxpayers
that, as some scholars have argued, "[l]itigation provides one way for marginalized social
actors to insist on the legitimacy of their demands for inclusion, equal treatment, and respect"
and that "[l]aw facilitat[es]... political change."6 Bergeron and his cohorts, having "used
[the law] whenever it looked as if it would be useful," would likely have agreed with James
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Willard Hurst's assertion that "the central principle of our legal order... [is] that law exists
for the benefit of people and not people the benefit of the law."7
If litigation was the vehicle used by the people of Berlin to achieve their political
reform objectives, then pocketbook politics was the engine of that vehicle. The economic
dimension of citizenship infused the political reform impulses in Berlin. The core issue for
the reformers was the consumer's purchasing power. In an editorial in the first issue of the
Coos Guardian, a weekly newspaper that purported to speak on behalf of all citizens "who
have a just cause and to whom it can be of assistance" and whose motto was "vox populi,
vox Dei" ("the voice of the people is the voice of God"), Bergeron declared that the
publication's "raison d 'etre " was to address "the real issues affecting our bread and butter,"
"such as matters affecting commodity prices, wages, taxation, etc."8 The Coos Guardian
lamented the fact "that wages are lagging behind the cost of living" and was "so bold as to
doubt the success that is claimed for the NRA [National Recovery Administration]," whose
"whole policy," the Guardian maintained, "was to go easy on profits and pay out in wages
so that the country's purchasing power might be restored."9 By July 1934, Bergeron had
concluded that the NRA's '"wage before profit' policy to effectuate an increase in the general
purchasing power has been discarded."10 Just prior to the March 1934 city election the
Farmer-Labor Party declared its belief "that wages have gone as low as can be and yet permit
a working man's family to live.... Hence labor should be protected from any further deflation
of wages."11 The Guardian attributed the Farmer-Labor Party's success in that election to
such wage and price concerns, observing that because "[t]he standard of living of the people
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has gone down continually with the prolongation of the depression," they had "registered a
vote of 'protest' against the ones in authority locally much in the same manner that they
voted' against' Hoover."12 The connection between citizenship and participation in the mass
consumer economy was explicit in the party platform, which included demands on behalf of
"the consumer, who is every citizen...."13
Berlin's Farmer-Labor Party also practiced pocketbook politics when it came to the
consumption and cost of local government services. In its March 1934 platform it noted
"[t]hat the city must practice economy in this depression is no news any more than the fact
that real estate under our taxation system is overburdened. Taxes must be lowered and the
sooner the better...." Accordingly, it pledged that "[sjtrict economy .. .be practiced in all
City expenditures in view of reducing taxes to within the real estate values and revenue" and
that "[a]ll necessary payroll economies... be practiced on the higher paid employees and not
inflicted on the rank and file of the departments... ."14 The latter plank of the platform was
a response to the fact that, under the Democratic city administration that the Farmer-Labor
Party was hoping to oust, "when employment is to be curtailed and wages reduced, they
begin at the foot of the ladder. The man who is getting only enough to buy the necessities
of life is slashed; those at the top overlooked or cut slightly.... We believe that economy at
the top is in order as being more just and also more of a saving."15 In this respect the Berlin
Farmer-Labor Party reflected both its populist "vox populi, vox Dei" motto and the bottomup political reform efforts typical of taxpayers' organizations.
Finally, the organized taxpayer activity and political reform activity in Berlin reflect
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the rights-based vision of citizenship that was becoming increasingly ascendent. Both the
taxpayers' association and the Farmer-Labor Party were fundamentally about advocating for
the rights of the citizenry. The taxpayers' action was brought to establish the right of
taxpayers "to enforce the rights of the City" where the city refused to do so, and the
Guardian vowed that "[t]he proceedings of the Taxpayers are going ahead and that will
either get the City the money or the public the truth."16 Bergeron argued that the taxpayers'
association "was formed with the idea of providing concerted action of the taxpaying
members in safeguarding their interest" and for "the purpose" ofpromoting those interests.17
Likewise, the overarching object of the party was to advance and enforce the rights of the
people including, among others, "the right of workers to organize" and the rights of all
citizens to "economic justice" and to "justice and opportunity."18 Although Bergeron
acknowledged that "it is the duty of the good citizen to vote," he maintained that citizens
should fulfill that civic obligation with a view to facilitating political change, that is, to
"overthrow the present administration and install one of their own."19 Edward Legassie,
President of the Coos County Workers Club and a prominent member of the Farmer-Labor
Party, also "thought it a necessity to form a party made up of working men primarily because
it alone could best look after its interests."20 Even the party's 193 6 campaign songs exhibited
rights consciousness. One song, adapted to the tune "When Johnny Comes Marching
Home," declared
Oh, we are the workers of the state, Hurrah, Hurrah
We've worked from early until late, Yes sir, Yes sir.
And now we're standing for our rights
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And if we must we'll surely fight...21
Berlin taxpayers and Farmer-Labor adherents mainly conceived of citizenship with reference
to rights, not obligations.

Midwestern Antecedents
By the time the Farmer-Labor Party gained traction in Berlin it had been a feature of
American political life for almost a generation. It had its deepest roots in Minnesota. In the
late 1910s Minnesota farmers in the Red River Valley had faced an economic crisis brought
on by falling crop yields, massive overhead and lagging prices. Farmers there, following the
example of their neighbors in North Dakota, had formed the Farmers Non-Partisan League.
The League, however, focused only on the agricultural needs of the predominantly
Scandinavian farmers and did not bring about much-needed economic change. By 1918, the
League endeavored to broaden its political base and win the support of urban workers in the
Twin Cities. The workers felt that they had nothing to lose by supporting agrarian legislation
in exchange for the farmers' support of the labor platform. This coalition was originally a
marriage of convenience, but it solidified rapidly and attained political power in 1930 with
the election of Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party head Floyd Olson as governor.22
Under the tutelage of Governor Olson, the state's powerful Farmer-Labor Party
attracted the attention of "radicals" who were seeking to form a third national party. These
intellectuals were Marxist thinkers "with carefully guarded images of respectability" who
sought to gather together widely dispersed populist elements and to form a balanced political
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reform movement. Olson was the glue that kept the several factions of his party united. He
was at home in any situation, able to relate comfortably with workers, intellectuals, and an
array of ethnic groups from Jews to Germans.23
During his first years in office Olson had successfully implemented several radical
yet effective reforms, including the "establishment of'co-operative' business enterprises in
a variety of fields, new environmental legislation [and] increased public ownership of
utilities." He also ardently supported farmer and labor union activities, as exemplified in
1934, when he declared martial law to protect striking truckers from strikebreakers.24
The 1934 Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party platform declared that the party was
"opposed to state ownership and operation of small business" and proclaimed "the party
guardian and protector of small business 'from destructive competition and monopolistic
institutions.'" The platform also called for "(1) operation of idle factories, (2) extension of
the mortgage moratorium law, (3) exemption of homestead taxation, (4) additional taxes on
large incomes and inheritances, (5) unemployment, sickness and accident insurance, and (6)
extension of municipal authorities to sell power outside city limits." The platform attracted
"radicals" who saw themselves as "thinking people" rather than "blind followers" of
"irresponsible demagogues."25 It was Olson's approach to reform, combining both caution
with radicalism and calling for a restoration ofthose fundamental American ideals embodied
in the Constitution, that earned Olson the respectability that made him admired among
reform leaders.26
The Farmer-Labor movement enjoyed its greatest political strength in the Midwest.
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In the eastern United States, only in Berlin, New Hampshire, did the Farmer-Labor program
attract widespread popular support and experience victory at the ballot box. The particular
economic, cultural and political circumstances present in Berlin at the onset of the Great
Depression allowed the Farmer-Labor ideology to take root and ultimately thrive there for
a brief period in the mid-1930s. Only by understanding the development of Berlin during
the seventy-five years prior to the Depression can one truly appreciate the nova-like
phenomenon of the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party.

The Berlin. New Hampshire Context
The city of Berlin, New Hampshire is located in the heart of the White Mountains in
the Northern Appalachian Mountain range. The mountains form a natural barrier, dividing
the northern third of the State of New Hampshire from the southern portion. The high
altitude of the mountains in this region affects temperature, the amount of precipitation and
thus ground water, and the average number of sunny and overcast days. These climatic
conditions in turn helped shape the character of the region. In addition, passenger travel
through the mountain notches was often difficult, if not impossible, thereby isolating the
region's population from the rest of the state and the nation.
Situated on the pitch of the Androscoggin River, Berlin became the center of the pulp
and papermaking industry in New England. For several decades after its chartering in 1829,
Berlin saw little economic activity apart from a few small farms. By 1850, however, three
developments had changed the economic landscape of the Androscoggin Valley. The first
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was the introduction of the turbine engine that, when integrated into dams in the river, could
generate power for mills. The second was the coming of the railroad in 1852. The third was
the availability of a new immigrant population in the United States, ready and willing to
relocate for the promise of work.
A group of Portland, Maine businessmen, including John B. Brown, Josiah S. Little,
Nathan Winslow and Hezekiah Winslow, recognized that the construction of a railroad line
through Berlin, coupled with the availability of the new turbine technology, made the
Androscoggin River Valley an ideal place in which to locate a highly-productive sawmill
with the means to get its product to market. In 1852, they formed a partnership under the
name H. Winslow and Company which, in 1868, changed its name to Berlin Mills Company.
That same year John Brown sold his stock to William Wentworth Brown (no relation) of
Portland, Maine. In the 1880s W. W. Brown, along with other family members, purchased
the remaining stock and acquired complete control of the Berlin Mills Company.
W. W. Brown rapidly expanded and diversified the production facilities over the next
twenty years, building chemical, pulp, and papermaking mills. During this period a second
group of investors, owners of the Boston Globe and the New York Tribune, built Glen
Manufacturing Company, a pulp and paper mill designed to produce newsprint. In 1898,
International Paper Company purchased Glen Manufacturing Company.27
By the early twentieth century, Berlin Mills Company, which during World War I
changed its name to Brown Company because of domestic hostility towards anything
German, had become the most prominent pulp and papermaking operation in Berlin and a
236

leader in the pulp and papermaking industry nationally. In 1915, Brown Company built a
separate research and development facility, the first in the industry. During the 1920s the the
company's research and development department employed more than one hundred scientists
and technicians, who produced hundreds of patents. By 1929, Brown Company owned
mills from Canada to Florida, employed more than nine thousand people and had assets
exceeding seventy-five million dollars. Just to provide the mills with wood, over 4,000 men
were employed each winter.28
The arrival of the railroad in 1853 had dramatically and permanently transformed the
cultural landscape of the region. Over the next seventy-five years the population increased
precipitously, peaking in 1930 at 20,018. According to the census that year 80 percent of
Berlin's inhabitants were immigrants or children of immigrants, 57 percent of FrenchCanadian heritage.29 The people who arrived to work in the mills and the ancillary
businesses brought with them their particular ethnic identity. Initially this divided the
various immigrant groups, who chose to live in neighborhoods with others of like
background, creating ethnic ghetto communities. Over time, however, the remoteness of the
Northern Forest, combined with its long, harsh winters, resulted in a partial coalescing and
blending of these immigrant groups, forging a new cultural identity unique to the region.30
In 1929, Berlin reached it social, economic and cultural apogee. In his January 1929
inaugural address Mayor Edward R. B. McGee proclaimed his optimistic vision of Berlin's
future, stating that "the finances of the city are in excellent shape, and there is no need for
us to enter a retrenchment program, for we are happily in a position to make further progress
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for the betterment of our city and its citizens." He also reminded the residents that the
centennial celebration planned for July "is a proud event in the history of Berlin" and called
on every person participating in the event to make it "something that will attract the
attention of the whole country to our wonderful city and the success which it has achieved
in the past one hundred years."31 The centennial "Grand Historical Pageant" documented
Berlin's history and culture and its social and economic achievements, painting a picture of
ethnic harmony and economic promise.32 Even labor unions, once very active in Berlin
earlier in the decade, had all but disappeared by 1929 as the booming economy and resultant
prosperity diminished workers' grievances and rendered labor unions increasingly
irrelevant.33
When Berlin celebrated its centennial in the summer of 1929 it was a city with a
robust economy and a vibrant culture, New Hampshire's fourth largest city and the largest
in the northern two-thirds of the state.34 It was the first in the state to have electric lights, the
power for which was generated by the hydroelectric power station from the Furbish Forest
Fiber Mill. The city boasted seven banks, numerous profitable businesses, three 'state-ofthe-art' theaters with a combined seating capacity of more than 3,500, a symphony orchestra,
and a band. A street railway system connected Berlin to the town of Gorham, eight miles to
the south. Berlin was home to numerous fraternal, civic, athletic and service organizations
representing its multicultural heritage. The city boasted that "Berlin in her schools as in her
mills is a leader and all over the North American Continent the Berlin school system is
known, named and imitated."35 Finally, the city's largest employer, Brown Company, had
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acquired an international reputation through its research facility and its innovative products.
As Berlin embarked on its second century, its residents had every reason be proud of its
accomplishments and to anticipate continued prosperity and a bright future.36

The Onset of the Great Depression
By early 1930, however, the city of Berlin had begun to experience some of the
aftershocks of the stock market crash in October 1929. On February 1,1930, J. E. Parent,
the overseer of the poor, reported that:
This has been a very expensive year for this department due to
several causes:
1st -Our increase in population.
2nd -Slackness of work.
3 rd -Difficult for men past middle age to secure employment in the
mills of our City.
4th -Our present Liquor Laws, for violation of which heads of
families are sent to the House of Correction.37
He concluded by explaining that despite his efforts to be economical, "he could not let the
poor suffer" and thus had spent more than twice what was budgeted. He also requested a
"larger appropriation for this department and a substantial increase in salary" (his current
salary was $350 for the year).38
The city's recently reelected mayor, in his 1930 inaugural address, confirmed the
desperate unemployment situation. Mayor McGee maintained that Berlin was now "faced
with a serious problem, perhaps the most serious that any City Government of Berlin has
been confronted with for many years, ...the problem of the unemployed....With a large
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number of men out of work, there is no real prosperity, and surely no good feeling." He went
on to suggest that there "lives not the man or woman who would accept aid.. .if work of any
kind could be obtained. The average citizen does not seek assistance...unless absolutely
compelled to so do." Alluding to President Herbert Hoover's proposed solutions to the
Depression, McGee called for the city to "enter upon a program of public improvements,
with a view of relieving the unemployment situation." Because the finances of Berlin were
still "in excellent condition" and the cash on hand was "the largest in the history of the City,"
it appeared to be in a "position to carry out needed improvements." In conclusion McGee
commended members of the council and departments for giving "freely of their time for the
benefit of the City, without regard to political affiliation," a situation he hoped would
continue.39
In 1931 Berlin's second largest employer, International Paper Company, closed its
local mill, leaving many men unemployed and with little hope of obtaining other work. The
city elected William E. Corbin, superintendent of Brown Company's Cascade Paper Mill,
to the office of mayor. In his inaugural address Mayor Corbin painted a bleak economic
picture for Berlin. He noted "the over-drafts in our Public Works and City Poor Department,
which was caused largely by the business depression which has [ajffected us and made it
impossible for many men to secure employment," as a result of which there could "be no real
prosperity in our City." The mayor further observed that "Real Estate has suffered a severe
loss" in the form of dramatically reduced values and that, therefore, taxpayers needed "some
relief, either by lower valuation or lower tax rate." *°
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Unlike International Paper Company, Brown Company appeared to have avoided
disaster in the early 1930s.

Residents of Berlin perhaps believed that the city's

unemployment and financial crisis would be assuaged by electing a nationally respected
Brown Company superintendent and bank president as mayor. Corbin's business acumen,
however, could not prevent the 1931 international monetary crisis from undermining Brown
Company's bonds and sending the company into a deadly financial tailspin. In January 1932,
the city' s Public Works Department reported that "the unemployment situation had been very
critical. Brown Company found it necessary to curtail expenses and production, which
resulted in many men being without work. There being no other industry to employ them,
they looked to this Department for work." Having the capacity to put to work only a small
percentage of the unemployed, the Public Works Department was "able to place about two
hundred men in jobs outside of the City." The January 1932 report of the overseer of the poor
stated that the number of families collecting aid had almost tripled, producing a 266 percent
increase in welfare expenditures compared to 1930.41
In two short years Berlin had gone from a prosperous, full-employment city to one
with massive unemployment and underemployment. The experience of Philip Glasson, a
long-term Brown Company employee whose career with the company spanned six decades,
exemplified the wrenching changes and economic dislocation that most of Berlin's
inhabitants underwent during the Great Depression. Because he was a college graduate with
technical skills still in demand, even in the employment market of the Depression, Glasson's
story is not as forlorn as those of many unskilled or less educated persons. Nevertheless, his
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correspondence, records and papers, generated and maintained in connection with both bis
professional and political lives, provide an authentic view of life in Berlin during the dark
decade following the stock market crash.
Glasson, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in chemistry, came
to work for the Brown Company Research and Development Department in the late 1920s.
By 1931, Glasson had become the research librarian for Brown Company at a salary of fifty
dollars per week.42 That same year the company discontinued payment of dividends on its
preferred stock and substantially increased its borrowings from banks.43 In March 1931, the
company cut Glasson's wages by 10 percent and laid off all the unmarried men. The
following autumn Brown Company cut wages by another 10 percent and terminated all of
the married men without children.44 The forests were silent during the winter of 1931 to
1932 because the Woods Department could not finance its winter logging operations.45
By spring of 1932, still unable to halt its downward spiral, Brown Company was
forced to institute a third 10 percent wage decrease. This time Glasson was given a sixmonth leave of absence. Financially strapped, he and his young family were forced to move
in with his parents in Vermont. At the end of his leave of absence Glasson returned to Berlin
to find that there was still no work. He applied for and obtained a job as a technician with
Brown Company at $ 18 a week, which was less than the wages paid to high school graduates
in 1930. Relieved to have secured any employment, Glasson moved his family into an
unheated tenement.46 Four months later the Research and Development Department made
additional cutbacks and implemented a four-day work week, forcing Glasson and his family
242

to subsist on twelve dollars per week. To help make ends meet, Glasson's wife tilled a plot
at the community "supply" gardens where she grew vegetables for the family.47 That same
year, forced to segregate assets as security for bank loans and to reduce its common stock
account from twenty million to ten million dollars without changing the number of shares,
Brown Company started down a road from which there would be no return.48
Simultaneously, the city of Berlin confronted its first budgetary crisis. Brown
Company, financially unsound as a result of imprudent business decisions, was able to pay
the city only 49 percent of its real estate taxes in 1932.49 The fiscal crunch was further
compounded by the December 1931 collapse of the Guaranty Trust Bank, in which Tax
Collector John Labrie had deposited city funds in the amount of seventy-five thousand
dollars into his own account for personal gain. Mayor Corbin and the city council requested
that the city solicitor bring suit against Labrie and the bonding company, Fidelity and Deposit
Company of Maryland, to enforce the city's claim to the thirty-five thousand dollar tax
collector bond. 50 Mayor Corbin, cognizant of the need to turn his attention to the faltering
Brown Company, did not seek reelection.

The Taxpayers' Association and the Taxpayers' Suit
The public realization that this once proud city had been brought to its knees was
humiliating and emotionally devastating. Forced to borrow from local banks to pay for the
increasing needs of the unemployed, Berlin had become New Hampshire's neediest city.51
As a consequence, the citizens began searching for scapegoats. Newly elected Mayor Ovide
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J. Coulombe was a prominent lawyer and a member of Berlin's elite. In his 1932 inaugural
address Coulombe insinuated that the city's financial troubles had occurred because of the
substantial amount spent annually on "men who are loafing," thereby depleting the city
coffers. "Let them build a sidewalk in front of my house" in exchange for public relief, the
mayor declared.52 A month later Coulombe and the city council, retreating into executive
(non-public) session, voted to dismiss the suit against the bonding company and to release
Labrie from liability. Almost as ifto agitate purposely Berlin's working-class citizens, Mayor
Coulombe then reappointed Labrie as city tax collector.53 Infuriated by this course of events,
a group of citizens organized the Berlin Taxpayers Association and resorted to the legal
system to obtain justice.
The association's leaders sought to retain several well-established Berlin attorneys,
all of whom declined to represent the organization. Fortunately for the taxpayers, however,
a young lawyer, Arthur Bergeron, had just returned to Berlin. Bergeron hailed from a
French-Canadian neighborhood and had been educated in its parochial schools. A gifted
student, he had been encouraged to pursue a college education and graduated with honors
from Dartmouth College, in 1929, and from Harvard Law School, in 1932. His combination
of legal and bilingual skills appealed to many New York City law firms, but they too were
severely affected by the Depression and could offer to pay new associates only fifteen dollars
per week. Unable to subsist on this income in New York City, Bergeron returned to Berlin.
With few other clients and intrigued by the legal complexities involved in the Taxpayers
Association's request, he agreed to take the case.
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In October 1933, Bergeron filed on behalf of the Taxpayers' Association a petition
in the Coos County Superior Court requesting:
leave to prosecute an action at law, originally begun by the City of Berlin
against the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, to recover upon its
bond given as surety for John A. Labrie, tax collector of Berlin, which the
petitioners allege the City of Berlin illegally, unlawfully, and fraudulently,
without right, by vote duly recorded, voted to drop and so instructed the City
Solicitor, and that thereupon the City Solicitor entered on the docket
"Voluntary nonsuit; no costs."54
In the city government's response to the taxpayers' petition, Mayor Coulombe identified
himself as "a lawyer of many years practice," implying that he had more experience and
knowledge than Bergeron. Coulombe also alleged that those involved with bringing the
petition were:
organized by an agile, poll-taxpaying political agitator [presumably referring
to Bergeron] and . . .were recruited by him from the ranks of political
enemies of the present administration, who are opponents because of
personal, fancied grievances; and that said petition brought by them was not
brought in good faith but for political purposes to try to discredit the
administration.55
On February 6,1934, the superior court ruled in favor of the Berlin Taxpayers Association,
resulting in a settlement agreement with Fidelity and Deposit Company in June. Labrie,
represented by former Mayor Coulombe, resigned, and the State of New Hampshire
prosecuted him for misappropriation of public funds.56
The criminal prosecution of Labrie highlights the remedial function that the
taxpayers' lawsuit served. In October 1934, the State indicted him on twelve counts of
embezzlement by a public official. As part of a negotiated plea, Labrie pleaded guilty to all
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twelve indictments and was sentenced to four years in the state prison.57 The taxpayers'
litigation had brought Labrie's embezzlements to the public's attention and had resulted in
his prosecution. The suit had proved an effective tool in combating corruption in local
government and in holding public officials accountable.
During this same period the mayor and city council met with Governor Winant, a
close friend of the Browns, to discuss Brown Company's situation. In an unprecedented
move the Governor traveled to Washington, D. C , to confer with the board of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). It was agreed that the RFC and the city would
enter into a self-liquidating contract with Brown Company to finance the cutting of wood
necessary for the company's operation for one year by utilizing the city's unemployed men.
Under the plan the RFC loaned money to the city, which used the funds to finance the
company's logging operations. In turn, Brown Company repaid the "loan" by purchasing
wood from the city in increments, based on the Company's market demands for wood and
its ability to pay for it.58

Creation of the Farmer-Labor Party
The taxpayers' association litigation and the implementation of the RFC/city timber
purchase arrangement occurred contemporaneously with the organization ofthe Coos County
Workers Club. In late 1933, one hundred and fifty workers in Berlin, agitated by corruption,
business bankruptcy and continued unemployment, united under the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) guidelines and formed the Coos County Workers Club. By January
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1934, the club had four thousand members.59 Attorney Bergeron processed the necessary
legal work for the organization Bergeron's family members had been Republicans for three
generations, but in 1933 the city government was controlled by a Democratic Party machine
that shamelessly dispensed, or withheld, favors based on political considerations. As
Bergeron later observed in 1942:
When I started to practice law in 1933...[i]t was difficult to get genuine
consideration unless one was a pretty good Democrat... The "right" people
got all the jobs, the contracts, the work and the favors but the Republicans did
not seem to be the right people... An attitude of defeatism prevailed and the
Democrats became accepted as "unbeatable."60
Bergeron had observed, through the Labrie case, the corruption in the present city
administration and in the local media. Consequently, he joined with the Workers Club and
others to "launch an independent political party in the coining city elections."61 To
accomplish this goal, in February 1934, the Workers Club began publishing a newspaper, the
Coos Guardian, with Bergeron as editor. His editorial in the first edition, entitled "Raison
D'etre," declared that the purpose of the Guardian was to "advocate and further enlighten
the public" on "topics of true social value, interest and significance." The Guardian
distinguished itself from other contemporary newspapers that merely told mothers "how to
rear babies that their fathers cannot support or instruct farmers as to the proper soil in which
to sow seeds... although they cannot sell their crops." Bergeron identified the Guardian as
the "official mouthpiece of the Coos County Workers Club, the veterans, the farmers, the
taxpayers and all other individuals or groups who have ajust cause. "^ Clearly he was laying
a foundation for a future political movement.
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Dissatisfied with the "conditions, systems and practices" at city hall, the Coos County
Workers Club and others formed the Labor Party (later renamed the Farmer-Labor Party) and
entered the political arena in February 1934. Inspired by third-party political movements in
New York City, the Labor Party maintained that it would conduct a "moneyless election,"
allowing voters to vote according to their consciences and giving them the opportunity to
"clean house."63 An editorial in the Guardian claimed that "perhaps the reason why Labor
should enter and stay in politics is best explained in a little poem we have in our scrapbook:"
Have you ever been to Crazy Land
Down on the Loony Pike?
There are the Queerest People thereYou never saw the like.
The ones that do the useful work
Are poor as poor can be,
And those who do no useful work
live in luxury.
They raise so much in Crazy Land
Of food and clothes and such.
That those who work don't have enough
Because they raise too much.
They're wrong side to in Crazy Land,
They're upside down with care,
They walk around upon their heads
With feet up in the air.

(Author unknown)64
The Guardian urged the men and women of Berlin to vote, arguing that "the class of people
who had the least to do with bringing about the depression nevertheless has to suffer the
most, simply because they are not in control of the government."65
The Labor Party advanced a program of political reform and pocketbook politics. It
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promised to put before the public a platform to reform city government and to elect an
administration that would not allow self-advancement or profit through political or official
connections. The Berlin Labor Party platform pledged, among other things, the following:
I. All deliberations, debates and discussions of the City Council to take place
publicly in the Councilroom and not in the back room in secret or executive
sessions.
2. A full itemized statement of all salaries and wages paid by the City of Berlin to be
published....
3. A two-platoon [shift] system be installed in the Berlin Fire Department.
4. All business of the City to be conducted without favoritism [or] fear ....
5. Strict economy to be practiced in all City expenditures in view of reducing
taxes....
7. To strive for adequate and substantial relief from the state....
I I . Full cooperation to be extended to the Brown Company in negotiating necessary
State loans but with a wage saving provision providing for an adequate minimum
wage for all labor involved in or to result from such loans.66
This last item, cooperation with Brown Company, was a consistent theme in Farmer-Labor
Party policy. The March 1, 1934 issue of the Coos Guardian, in which the Farmer-Labor
Party platform was introduced to the people of Berlin, observed that "we all understand that
should the local mills change hands even, let alone closing, that we would all be the losers"
and, consequently, maintained that the "City Government should cooperate in weathering the
present difficulties as much as possible."67
In response to the formation of the Labor Party, Democratic Governor Winant
requested that the Republican candidate for mayor withdraw because of an alleged conflict
of interest, intimating that this conflict would interfere with and jeopardize the financial
arrangement that the state had established with the city to assist Brown Company. Many
believed that this would force Republicans to support the reelection of Democratic Mayor
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Coulombe. The attempt backfired, however. Despite Winant's attempt to influence the
election in Berlin, the Labor Party candidate, Daniel Feindel, won the March 1934 mayoral
election, and three Labor Party candidates were elected to the City Council. The success of
the Berlin Labor Party attracted the attention of the Boston Sunday Globe, which observed
that if the Party should "begin missionary work in other industrial centers of the State, the
old party leaders would have something to think about."68
Nevertheless, the profound changes for which the Labor Party had hoped did not
materialize because Feindel failed to implement, or even support, the party platform. Why
this happened is unclear, but for whatever reason the new mayor appears to have betrayed
his party's confidence.69 Undaunted by FeindePs anemic leadership, however, the Labor
Party gathered further momentum.
Around this time employees of the Parker-Young Company paper mills in nearby
Lincoln, New Hampshire - also a devastated pulp and paper mill community- requested
Berlin Labor Party President Edward Legassie and attorney Bergeron to address a gathering
of workers. Legassie was from Lincoln and his family worked in the Parker-Young mills.
Lincoln was a one-industry company town, and in 1934 that industry, as in Berlin, was
facing receivership. The men voted to form the Lincoln Workers Club and to comply with
the NRA codes. Although the Berlin Labor Party was encouraged by the reform movement's
success at the polls, it did not have the human or financial resources to become actively
involved in the propagation of the "labor gospel" in other communities. The Guardian
observed that it was entirely up to the Lincoln Workers Club members to make something
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out of their organization and that "it is not up to outsiders to dictate their course of action."70
During the next few months the Coos County Workers Club petitioned Brown
Company for a pay increase. By 1934, the pulp and paper industry appeared to be recovering
throughout the nation. Paper had become a necessity in modern America, and, with
increased literacy, newspapers, books and other published materials abounded. Nevertheless,
Berlin's local story was still one of economic stagnation, and, unbeknownst to the Workers
Club and the city, Brown Company would soon be in receivership. Legassie and Bergeron
attended a NRA code hearing in Washington hoping to persuade the NRA to raise the pulp
and paper industry wages to sixty cents per hour, but it approved only a forty-five cent per
hour rate. 71 Bergeron, frustrated with the system, remarked that "[t]he original theory behind
the codes was to arrive at a restoration of prosperity or normalcy by increasing public
purchasing power.... A partial redistribution of wealth is the only solution and on this was
based the NRA.... [Even so i]t appears that price fixing has worked in favor of the big
concerns as against the little ones . . .and the 'wage before profit' policy to effectuate an
increase in the general purchasing power has been discarded."72
Disappointed by the failure of national Democratic Party policies, in particular the
NRA, to achieve meaningful results, members of both the Coos County Workers Club and
the Berlin Labor Party paid heightened attention to third-party activities nation-wide. The
Coos Guardian cited the success that the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party had enjoyed in
putting "the two old political parties [Republican and Democratic] out of commission." In
1932, the Guardian observed, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party had supported Franklin
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Roosevelt, but with the recent deterioration of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
"that party is now outstripping Roosevelt." The Guardian also reported on the recently
adopted platform of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, which called for "government
ownership of factories, mines, banks, insurance, transportation and utilities." It further noted
that in "opposition to this the two old parties are now fusing, so the result of the next
Minnesota elections should be interesting."73 Later in the year the Guardian again called
attention to the battle taking shape in Minnesota and to the united political efforts among
farmers, workers and intellectuals.74
On July 10,1934, the Coos County Workers Club, evidently persuaded by events in
Minnesota, "voted enthusiastically" in favor "of presenting a full ticket to the voters of Coos
County" in the next election.75 Since a large segment of the population outside of Berlin
consisted of farmers who had also been affected by the financial crisis in Berlin, it was voted
that the Labor Party, which the Workers Club backed, change its name to the Farmer-Labor
Party and affiliate with that party nationally.76 Bergeron, disillusioned with the NRA, called
the recent code hearings a "plain farce and bluff," and added that "God helps those who help
themselves. So labor must help itself as no one else will." He concluded by unequivocally
supporting the Farmer-Labor Party ticket and "a platform that means something."77
That fall the Coos County Farmer-Labor Party proposed a platform that "realized that
fundamental changes are necessary in our society, that the burden of making a living may be
equalized and made more uniform in order that every one may be provided with the
necessaries of life now denied to a great many of our fellow citizens."78 By and large, the
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Coos County Farmer-Labor Party was not comprised of strident ideologues. Nevertheless,
the party platform certainly was radical for its time, at least to the extent that it proclaimed
that fundamental social change was imperative.
Both Glasson and Bergeron later acknowledged that many people viewed the FarmerLabor Party in Berlin as socialist, although its progressive policies were later co-opted by
President Roosevelt and embodied in post-193 5 New Deal measures. Glasson, who played
a key role as the Farmer-Labor Party's secretary, claimed that he was attracted to this party
because he was "searching for answers.... How could this happen? What were the
remedies?" Glasson saw the Depression as "a sociological upheaval.... [S]uddenly I was
sharing the workers' problems....

[T]hese men had no protection.

There was no

employment insurance.... [T]hey were just let out.... [S]uddenly you realize they had
nothing."79 Both Bergeron and Glasson recognized that the body politic was ill and
desperately in need of a cure.

The Farmer-Labor Party in Power
The Coos County Farmer-Labor Party was organized and ready with a slate of
candidates for the next Berlin municipal election in March 1935. It nominated the reserved
but articulate Bergeron to run for mayor. As a lawyer, Bergeron normally "talked a very
deliberate language." Glasson remembered Bergeron's passion, however, when he addressed
his neighbors in the French Canadian 'ghetto' in their native language. "My gosh!"
exclaimed Glasson, "he was rapid fire.... [Y]ou had a whole different impression ofthe man,
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his [exuberance] emotionally charged the people!" 80 The predominantly French-Canadian
city voted overwhelmingly in favor of the entire Farmer-Labor Party slate of candidates,
giving the party control of the city government.
The euphoria of a successful campaign proved short-lived as the realities of an
escalating fiscal crisis gripped the city. Bergeron and the council immediately implemented
much ofthe Farmer-Labor platform. Following Bergeron's inauguration all council meetings
were conducted publically, as evidenced by the increased length and depth of the city reports,
and the salaries paid to city employees were published. The city council also reduced
departmental expenditures significantly, which generated a property tax rate reduction of
eight dollars per thousand.81 The city again entered into a timber harvesting contract with
the State ofNew Hampshire and Brown Company, although the city included a specific wage
and board schedule in the new contract.
In the fall the city faced its foremost financial challenge when it was notified of
Brown Company's intent to file bankruptcy. The council passed a resolution granting
Mayor Bergeron authority to act on behalf of the city in the reorganization proceedings. To
assist the ailing firm, the city allowed Brown Company to pay its 1935 property taxes at a
reduced rate. At the close of 1935, Governor Styles Bridges declared a state of emergency
in the city of Berlin. The state loaned $850,000 to the city as emergency financial assistance,
some of which was applied to offset the tax revenues abated for Brown Company and some
of which was funneled into Brown Company to keep it operating.82
During Bergeron's first administration all of the 1934 Labor Party platform pledges
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on which Bergeron had run had been fulfilled and Berlin taxpayers had realized significant
property tax relief. In the March 1936 elections, the Farmer-Labor Party candidates were reelected. They continued to safeguard the interests of Berlin's workers and to cooperate with
the state, the bankruptcy court and Brown Company to achieve as favorable a resolution as
possible in the reorganization proceedings.

The city renewed the Cooperative

Unemployment Wood Cutting Contact with the state and Brown Company in May 1936.
Their dedication to the ideals embodied in the local Farmer-Labor platform brought Bergeron
and the party attention across the state and the nation. By the summer of 1936 liberal groups
throughout New Hampshire were looking to Berlin for political leadership.83
In response to the apparently growing interest, the Farmer-Labor Party in Berlin
organized a series of conferences across the state in 1936 to determine the level of interest
in a third-party movement. Party leaders invited labor union representatives, Granges,
farmers, educators, Communist and Socialist Party members, and intellectuals to a meeting
to be held in Laconia. Conference delegates "represented possibly 15,000 [union] members;
one man alone [Edward Holden] representing a textile union [the United Textile Workers of
America in Manchester] with 7,000 members."84

The conference concluded with a

unanimous agreement by the delegates to launch a state-wide party. A committee was
elected to develop a platform to be presented at the next conference.
Herbert Rudd, professor of philosophy at the University of New Hampshire, was
elected chairman of the platform committee. Rudd, "anxious to have the very best platform
possible for presentation" at the July conference, gathered the thoughts and concerns ofparty
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members from across the state.85 In a pamphlet promoting the Farmer-Labor Party, Rudd
underscored the need for "fundamental changes," and contended that the party's role was to
"carry on the democratic struggle of our Revolutionary forefathers, seeking not bloody
revolution but peaceful, intelligent change through the ballot."86

Rudd also "spent

considerable time trying to write a preamble and approach" that would clearly reflect the
political and economic landscape of New Hampshire and articulate the party's ideology.87
In the final version of the preface Rudd declared:
At a time when science and invention have made possible an economy of
abundance beyond all past dreams, the great mass of American citizens are
subjected to lives of extreme frustration and helplessness. Such a condition
makes imperative a new political party dedicated to the achievement of
economic justice and ever higher standards of human welfare.
The dangers of our time have been long foreseen.
JAMES MADISON said:
"The day will come when our republic will be an impossibility
because wealth will be concentrated in the hands of the few."
DANIEL WEBSTER said:
"The freest government can not long endure when the
TENDENCY OF THE LAW is to create a rapid accumulation of
property in the hands of a few and to render the masses poor and
dependent."
. . .[T]he Farmer-Labor Party arises to demand a new era—fighting, not
against individual millionaires or particular corporations, but against those
elements in the economic and legal system and in popular psychology, which
encourage monopoly and parasitic control of the nation's resources.88
Bergeron, speaking at political rallies in Newmarket and Dover, echoed these
sentiments, declaring that "the principles under which this government was founded have
been abandoned by those interests that have had the control of the making of our laws. The
Constitution has been grossly distorted by its interpreters who have been under the control
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of these same groups. Property has been placed above humanity."89 The state-wide platform
demanded a graduated income tax, opposed a sales tax, and called for the reduction of
property taxes. Like all the Farmer-Labor platforms, the New Hampshire platform called for
"justice and opportunity for all classes of citizens [and] . . . decent minimum-wage
standards," advocated the right of workers to organize, to engage in collective bargaining
without intimidation and to strike without fear, and demanded old age pensions and public
ownership of utilities.90 The Farmer-Labor Party platform proposed by Rudd and his
committee was embraced by the state party. According to letters from several delegates, it
was "quite a hit outside of the state as well."91 Party secretary Philip Glasson received letters
of support from each New England state, New York, and even from a Minnesota party
member with roots in New Hampshire.92
Encouraged by this evidence of widespread support, the New Hampshire FarmerLabor Party chose a slate of candidates to place on the ballot for the general elections in
November. Although party leaders did not expect political victory, they hoped to garner 3
percent of the vote state-wide. Stearns Morse, a professor of economics at Dartmouth
College, was nominated to run for the United States Senate. Dr. Anna Rudd, a physician and
the wife of party chairman Herbert Rudd, was nominated for representative of the first
congressional district, but she was reluctant to accept the nomination because she felt that
the time was not right for a woman to enter politics. Professor Rudd and others from the
University ofNew Hampshire feared they would lose their jobs ifthey ran for political office,
however, "so Anna had no other option but to run."93
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Additional problems soon emerged from within the party. The party had nominated
Bergeron as its gubernatorial candidate, but he balked at running because he was concerned
that it would "interfere with his getting the [needed] aid for Berlin projects."94 Under
pressure from Rudd, Glasson, and other party members, Bergeron agreed to campaign,
although probably not with as much enthusiasm as he had demonstrated in the earlier Berlin
elections.
By August the party was besieged with controversy. In Manchester Edward Holden
was forced to resign as his union's delegate to the Farmer-Labor Party because the union did
not approve of the Communist Party's involvement with the Farmer-Labor Party (the
Communist Party had sent representatives to Farmer-Labor political conferences and
gatherings and engaged in some degree of dialogue with Farmer-Labor leaders).95 The
United Textile Workers of America was the largest union in the state and, therefore,
Holden's withdrawal was a major setback. Holden remained active in the Farmer-Labor
Party but later was accused of embezzlement for borrowing large sums of money and
"claiming that he was receiving money from the [Farmer-Labor] party as security.
Manchester might as well be forgotten in this campaign," wrote Socialist Party representative
Charles Hill.96
In 193 6, the party's overall effectiveness in New Hampshire was hindered further by
national events. In anticipation of the failure of Roosevelt's reforms to secure full economic
recovery, liberals across the nation had foreseen the "gradual disintegration of the
Democratic party and the emergence of a robust socialist movement capable of taking
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power" in the form of the Farmer-Labor Party.97 By the summer of 1936, however, the
momentum of third-party activity in the United States had decelerated significantly. In
Minnesota, Floyd Olson, the Farmer-Labor Party's charismatic leader, succumbed to cancer.
His last act was to call upon all liberals to "unite in 1936 to re-elect Franklin Roosevelt and
to prevent the election of reactionary Alf Landon."98 Roosevelt appreciably swung to the left
in 1935 with the "Second New Deal" reforms. Initially, this shift was not enough to win over
the Left, but with their support Roosevelt launched a crusade in 1936 against "economic
royalists" and on behalf of the "forgotten man" who was "ill-housed, ill-clothed and illfed."99
In the November elections in New Hampshire, the fledgling Farmer-Labor Party won
just 1 percent of the state's vote. The people elected as governor the popular Manchester
community leader and Republican candidate, Francis P. Murphy. Rudd wrote that, while he
was overjoyed at the "defeat administered to the reactionary forces of the country... it is a
little difficult to know just how to make any aggressive attack for our own program while
attention is focused on the Roosevelt landslide."100 The state party's overwhelming defeat at
the ballot box and the eventual defection of union supporters left many Farmer-Labor leaders
bewildered. Despite the disappointing state-wide electoral results, the Farmer-Labor Party
in Berlin remained in power until 1938. Brown Company, having benefitted from the
cooperation of Bergeron and other local leaders, experienced the beginnings of a financial
recovery that would continue through the next decade.
As the economic recovery gained momentum, the Farmer-Labor Party's political base
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was increasingly undermined. In the 1938 city elections the Farmer-Labor candidate for
mayor, Edward Legassie, one of the more left-leaning socialist members of the party, lost to
the Democratic nominee, Matthew Ryan. The following year the Berlin electorate returned
to office a more moderate Farmer-Labor Party mayoral nominee, Amie Tondreau, who
served as mayor until 1943. Nevertheless, after 1938 the Farmer-Labor Party ceased to be
a dynamic force for political change as its "raison d'etre" became more and more irrelevant
in a burgeoning economy.

The Legacy of the Taxpayers' Association and the Farmer-Labor Party
The Farmer-Laborites of Berlin were radical in their espousal of a partial
redistribution of wealth as necessary to rectify the prevailing economic inequities and in their
firm opposition to existing political power structures. In this respect they reflected a
longstanding American tradition of hostility toward large accumulations of wealth that may
be traced at least as far back as Jacksonian populism and that manifested itself politically
from time to time. Fundamentally, though, the Farmer-Laborites were practical individuals,
not die-hard ideologues, who were motivated primarily by a desire to mitigate the harsh
economic circumstances facing their community. They sought to reform capitalism, not
uproot it, and to moderate its operation and effect. Indeed, although Bergeron railed against
concentrations of wealth and promoted workers rights, the Farmer-Labor Party under his
stewardship never sought to undermine Brown Company but, rather, worked collaboratively
with it and endeavored to put the company on a firmer foundation.
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In March 193 7, the party reminded taxpayers "ofthe pleasant and mutually profitable
relations that existed between Brown Company and the City" and called on them to vote
"straight Farmer-Labor" and reelect the present mayor so as to "assure full cooperation with
the Brown Company in a fair and equitable manner to all concerned and protection to both
wage earners and taxpayers."101 Far from viewing it as the culprit for the city's woes, the
party appreciated that Brown Company's "future is the future of the whole city" and
recognized that the company represented the community's first, best and only hope for
economic recovery and stability.102 There is no evidence that even the party's Socialist
members, such as Legassie, ever cast Brown Company as a corporate villain or promoted
policies that would have undermined the company.
The Berlin "radicals'" desired to embrace a movement that could effect change
locally yet possess credibility by being affiliated with a national movement. Similar
aspirations took root in communities across America in the mid-1930s. In the East, however,
only the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party achieved electoral victory. In the state of New
Hampshire, Berlin was the only city confronting the bankruptcy of both its municipal
government and its largest employer. Without a massive injection of state and federal aid,
more than twenty thousand people would have been deprived of life's basic necessities. In
the midst of economic despair and rampant political corruption, the Berlin Farmer-Labor
Party with Bergeron at the helm was able to lead the city through the Depression's most
challenging times.
The Berlin Farmer-Labor Party gave voice to taxpayers and other citizens, established
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an honest and open municipal government, and became the conduit through which the state
and Brown Company could implement the latter's reorganization plan. Once this plan was
up and running, the storm subsided, Berlin entered a period of economic stability and the
need for "radical" change dissipated. Glasson noted that "by 1937 Brown Company got
profitable again" and workers got their j obs back.l °3 The radicalism ofthe mid- 1930s became
increasingly irrelevant and the party itself was marginalized as a consequence of this partial
economic recovery and the introduction ofNew Deal reforms that conferred additional rights
upon workers.
By the 1940s the most vocal leaders of the third-party movement had returned to the
"old parties." Indeed, in 1942 Arthur Bergeron returned to his Republican roots and ran on
the Republican ticket for Coos County Solicitor "at the suggestion and invitation of several
Republican leaders."104 He was elected for two consecutive terms and served as county
solicitor from 1943 to 1946.105 As Bergeron observed in a different context, "this is another
illustration that the radical ideals of today become the conservative principles of
tomorrow."106
Organized taxpayer activity and political reform efforts in Berlin highlight the
significance of local political institutions and actors in politics in the United States.107
Berlin's Farmer-Labor Party movement was unique in that the party was able to accomplish
a great deal locally within a few months oftaking office. Moreover, although associated with
the national Farmer-Labor Party, the Berlin party's focus was on resolving the specific
problems of the city. Many party members were life-long residents of this closely-knit
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community and could not relate readily to the needs or problems of those in distant regions.
Admittedly, the party platform was based on the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party's platform,
and its goals were echoed by many throughout the nation. Indeed, it was the coalescing of
Berlin's Farmer-Labor success with the national party platform that appealed to so many in
New Hampshire and the northeast. Unlike the party in Berlin, however, the state FarmerLabor Party was divided in its interests, goals and priorities from the beginning.
In the Depression's earlier years, the Berlin Farmer-Labor Party had resembled
Olson's Farmer-Labor Party. Although much of the nation was beginning to experience the
first hints of economic recovery by 1936, the city of Berlin was still in a downward spiral
that appeared to be accelerating. The citizens desperately needed protection from destructive
economic forces, much like the farmers and truckers in Minnesota. The taxpayers also
needed protection from unscrupulous public officials, like the city tax collector who had
misappropriated $75,000 of the taxpayers' money. The former Democratic administration's
lackluster response to this illegal official act had precipitated the taxpayers' suit and had
galvanized the political reform movement. Intellectuals, such as Glasson and Bergeron,
witnessed the government corruption and the elites' egregious disrespect for the taxpayers,
and they sought to rectify the situation.
Bergeron successfully led the local movement in part because of bis educational
background, but also because of his strong ethnic ties to the city's French-Canadian
community, representing 57 percent of Berlin's population and composed predominantly of
mill workers. Moreover, Bergeron was a student of the New Hampshire Constitution and
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would have been familiar with the provisions of part I, article 10:
Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or
emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the
ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered,
and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right
ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of
nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.108
This articulation of the peoples' right of resistance, their right to engage in popular protest
in order to reform incompetent or corrupt forms of government, was manifested 150 years
later in the platforms of all the political protest movements of the Great Depression.
Although Bergeron may not have referred explicitly to this constitutional provision, its
content flavors much of his political speech.
The Berlin party was also representative of the populist protest movements springing
up in response to the Depression. Roosevelt's New Deal measures helped unions gain a
foothold in industry, but they did not result in immediate, tangible benefits to labor such as
guaranteed wage increases and job security. Frustrated at being ignored by both industry and
government, the predominantly ethnic workers pursued political redress and, consequently,
populist fronts were spawned across the nation. These reform movements all opposed
existing power structures.
The Berlin Farmer-Labor Party, like the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the other
populist alliances of the era, promoted political alternatives to the "capitalist economic
system they considered obsolete and cruel."109 These groups pursued economic reforms
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intended to improve the lot of the "have nots" and sought to ameliorate the harsh economic
realities facing the American people. Their demands, programs and policies attracted
widespread popular support and thereby influenced national policy by forcing Roosevelt and
the Democratic Party to the left and by rendering it politically expedient for the Democrats
to adopt or co-opt much ofthe reformers' platforms. The reformers all found their inspiration
in a centuries-old tradition of political resistance rooted in pocketbook politics in the United
States. Berlin's Farmer-Labor Party may have evolved as a response to a particular local
situation, but it was part of a larger political dynamic.
The Farmer-Labor Party in Berlin never dominated city government after 1938. As
in the rest of the nation and in the case of the other reform movements, it had gathered
strength and momentum from the economic crisis and attendant social upheaval afflicting
the nation after the 1929 crash. As the Democratic Party selectively adopted the reformers'
principles and programs and incorporated them in modified form into the New Deal, and as
these measures to some extent mitigated the harshest symptoms of the Depression, the thirdparty protest movements atrophied and their popular support weakened. Nevertheless, the
Farmer-Labor Party in Berlin and elsewhere and the other political protest movements of the
1930s were significant in that they influenced and informed Democratic Party domestic
policy and thereby served as catalysts of political and economic change. Consequently, the
reformers' legacy was more extensive and durable than their brief "moment in the political
sun" might otherwise suggest.
The endeavors of the Berlin Taxpayers' Association represent a powerful, and
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somewhat unique, fusion of political reform as both ends and means. Most of the time
political reform was either the objective of taxpayers' organizations, as was the case with the
Citizens Union, or the strategy they employed in furtherance of economic objectives, as was
typical of nearly all organized taxpayer activity during the Great Depression. In Berlin
political reform was both an objective and an instrument. The taxpayers organized to combat
political corruption in city hall when the mayor and council turned a blind eye to the tax
collector's malfeasance. In this regard, the political reformation of city hall was the
objective, and taxpayers' litigation and third-party political activity were the strategies. At
the same time, the overarching concern of the taxpayers was how to address the economic
crisis of the Great Depression at the local level and obtain some measure of economic relief
and stability.
objectives.

They chose third-party politics as the tool to achieve these economic

The events in Depression-era Berlin demonstrate that, depending on the

circumstances, political reform can be either or both a strategy and an objective of organized
taxpayer activity.
Pocketbook politics, the law, and evolving notions of citizenship combined in the
crucible of organized taxpayer activity in Berlin to produce a viable third-party political
movement. The taxpayers' lawsuit and the ensuing political reform activities of the
taxpayers were galvanized by the economic dimension of citizenship and by the rights-based
conception of citizenship that was becoming ascendant in the 1930s. Taxpayers locked horns
with tax spenders over how the latter were spending and, in the case of the tax collector,
stealing public funds. The taxpayers' suit played a crucial part in generating the necessary
266

political critical mass for the creation of the Fanner-Labor Party in Berlin. In turn, the party
engaged in pocketbook politics in order to increase the citizens' purchasing power and to
reduce their tax burden.
The populist reformers were heirs to a heritage of political resistance in general and
of organized tax resistance in particular that harked back to the nation's very origins. The
protestors' freedom to bring a taxpayers' lawsuit, to practice pocketbook politics, and to
engage in moderate, liberal, and even "radical" political expression during a time of
economic and social upheaval without undermining the country's social fabric evinced the
essential strength and beauty of the American constitutional system. Indeed, the reform
movements "gave evidence, in short, that the long tradition of opposition to large,
inaccessible power centers, a tradition that stretched from the American Revolution to the
populist revolt and beyond, would continue to survive."110
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CONCLUSION
THE LEGACY AND ENDURING RELEVANCE OF ORGANIZED TAXPAYER
ACTIVITY
One ofthe recurring themes of American political history is the engagement and often
conflict, between taxpayers and tax spenders. Historically, tax spenders have been mainly
concerned with maintaining what they regard as a reasonable and necessary level of
government activity, and taxpayers have been more concerned with the cost of doing so. The
tension between taxpayers and tax spenders was never more palpable than during the Great
Depression. In 1933, the National Municipal League attempted to convey the essence ofthis
political-civic dynamic in the "Mr. Taxpayer versus Mr. Taxspender" radio play, in which
Columbia University professor Luther Gullick spoke for the taxpayer and Milwaukee Mayor
Daniel Hoan spoke on behalf of public officials entrusted with responsibility for spending
tax dollars. Interestingly, and in a way that still resonates with the twenty-first-century
observer, Hoan synthesized the problem as follows:
There is ...a universal demand, past and present, for greater and greater
governmental functioning and activity. There is, on the other hand, a
widespread insistence that government shall reduce its expenses. The
average citizen will furnish a list of activities a yard long of what he believes
the government should undertake and the same person will bewail the fact
that government should raise and spend the money necessary to meet his
demands.1
Hoan castigated "this illogical reasoning."2 Hoan had a point, but, to be fair to taxpayers,
most citizens did not insist on having their cake and eating it, too, but merely sought to
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balance the reasonably necessary level of government services with their ability to pay for
them. Still, conflict over whether and how to spend tax dollars has been a primary feature
of taxpayer-tax spender engagement.
This same taxpayer-tax spender tension has been manifested in the recent debates
over the federal economic stimulus package, in which some favor government spending as
a way to stimulate the economy and create jobs, and others prefer tax cuts as a means to those
ends. Hoan likely would have endorsed the former approach as a pocketbook politics
measure, inasmuch as he contended that the role of government was to "provide wages and
increased purchasing power."3 The legislation that President Obama signed into law in
February 2009, arguably represents the product of this collision of taxpayer and tax spender
interests, since it includes both substantial government spending and significant tax
reductions for most Americans. It also embodies somewhat the cognitive dissonance about
which Hoan complained, because it both expands government and reduces taxes. At least
for the present, Americans will fund the expansion of government activity not with taxes, but
with debt, not with a "pay-as-you-go" policy of the type advocated by the Citizens Union and
other reform organizations, but with a "borrow-as-you-go" one.
Organized taxpayer activity highlights the role of the taxpayer as reformer. The
reform and refashioning of state and local governments was a principal purpose oftaxpayers'
associations. Taxpayers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought taxpayers' suits
to restrain unlawful or corrupt acts by public officials and to compel them to comply with
the law in performing their duties.

For the Citizens Union, the Berlin Taxpayers'

Association and others, taxpayers' litigation was also a device that political outsiders
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employed to bring about political change. Taxpayers' associations during the 1930s engaged
in a wide array of reform activities that had a profound and lasting impact on American
society. For 150 years, such organizations have enabled taxpayers to realize their status as
political and legal actors. Organized taxpayer efforts embody a vital fusion of political
activism and legal activism.
Taxpayers' associations also demonstrate the importance of local institutions in
American public life and what historian Thomas Sugrue has identified as the "persistence
of localism" in American politics. Taxpayer's leagues were fundamentally local civicpolitical organizations directed at local taxes and local problems. Even the taxpayers
association movement of the Great Depression, although national in scope, was nevertheless
local in its impetus and its character. For a century and a half, taxpayers' associations and
taxpayers have been among "the subnational political institutions and actors" which have
shaped public policy at the state and local levels.4
Americans' evolving notions of citizenship have actuated and shaped much organized
taxpayer activity. Taxpayers have invoked the citizens' freedom of association to organize
taxpayers' associations through which they might advance their interests. They used their
obligation to pay taxes as a rationale to assert and construct a corresponding right to hold
government officials accountable for how they expended public funds and operated
government. When Daniel Hoan declared that "it behooves every good citizen to take part
in civic and governmental affairs and improve that government and when the time comes to
pay the [tax] bill...," he hit upon the essential connection between being a citizen, paying
taxes and promoting political reform.5
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Taxpaying citizens sought to enforce theirrightto good government through political,
legislative, and research efforts, and through litigation. The growth of organized taxpayer
activity in the twentieth century paralleled and was fueled by the evolution of a rights-based
conception of citizenship and of a legal culture emphasizing individual rights. The
emergence of a citizenship of rights and of a legal culture of rights after 1930 are
complementary and mutually reinforcing developments.
Collective action by taxpayers also illuminates the intimate connection between law
and citizenship. Being subject to, and able to derive the benefit and protection of, the rule
of law is a defining, arguably the defining, characteristic of citizenship. Simone Weil, citing
Montesquieu and Rousseau, has argued that "[t]he difference between a slave and a citizen
is that a slave is subject to his master and a citizen to the laws. It may happen that the master
is very gentle and the laws very harsh: that changes nothing. Everything lies in the distance
between caprice and rule."6 The relationship between citizenship and the law is fundamental;
law is inextricably bound to citizenship, and citizenship to the law. As Weil observes, the
very concept of citizenship is defined with reference to the rule of law, which is the
distinguishing feature of citizenship. Hence, it is not surprising that law and litigation have
played such a crucial part in organized taxpayer political activism.
Litigation, specifically the taxpayers' action, was a principal tactic used by organized
taxpayers to promote political reform and to engage in pocketbook politics. In the last half
of the nineteenth century taxpayers convinced courts and legislatures to develop a body of
jurisprudence that defined the nature and scope of the taxpayer's right to sue public officials
and restrain official actions. The Citizens Union and the Berlin Taxpayers' Association
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relied heavily on taxpayers' litigation to accomplish their political reform objectives. Other
taxpayers' associations during the Great Depression similarly used the taxpayers' suit to
facilitate economy and efficiency and to combat corruption in local government.
The extent to which taxpayers resorted to the courts was an essentially positive
development. The notion of litigiousness admittedly has a negative connotation, and people
can and do bring frivolous lawsuits. Notwithstanding such abuses, most litigation (and
certainly most taxpayers' litigation) has not been frivolous. The ability and the willingness
of citizens to call upon the coercive power of the law to enforce their rights and upon the
courts to serve as arbiters of their disputes is a measure of the influence of law in a society
and of the confidence of its citizens in the rule of law and in the courts as honest brokers.
Thus the degree of litigiousness in a society is a barometer of an energized and vital legal
culture.
Organized taxpayer activity has embodied the civic, economic and legal dimensions
of citizenship. Taxpayers expressed the economic element of citizenship by engaging in
pocketbook politics. They exhibited its civic component by organizing in voluntary
associations to further their interests and to influence government.

They reflected

citizenship's legal aspect by relying on the rule of law and by invoking law and legal
institutions in their reform and tax resistance efforts.
Finally, taxpayers' associations provide a rich setting in which the historian may, in
legal historian James Willard Hurst's words, seek better "to understand the law.. .as it had
meaning for workaday people and was shaped by them to their wants and visions."7
Through their research, legislative, litigation, and political programs, taxpayers'
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organizations exercised significant influence on the law and, in doing so, on the structures
of government and on American public life. As Hurst would doubtless have recognized,
organized taxpayers regularly made "affirmative use of the law" in an effort to "materially
control their environment" and their destinies. 8
Political reform has been one of the prominent features of organized tax resistance
throughout the history of the United States. The Founders declared independence pursuant
to "the right of the people," articulated in the Declaration of Independence, "to alter
or... abolish... any form of government" when that government "becomes destructive" of the
ends for which governments are established. A little more than 150 years later, the National
Municipal Review concluded that an urgent desire to reform and refashion the institutions
of government was the impetus behind Depression-era taxpayer activity. It commended the
"widespread citizen interest in ways and means of achieving governmental economy" and
made the following observation:
Disillusioned and cynical taxpayers are being beaten by economic necessity
into the realization that waste and extravagance and inefficiency and
corruption are not necessary attributes of government and that if they
themselves will give to public affairs some of the time and thought - not to
say money - they have wasted on the stock market, the returns will be
proportionately greater, individually and socially. For government, which
seems to follow on inevitably like a river, is too readily dammed by those
who would irrigate their own pastures at the expense of their fellows
downstream.9
Nearly all the other efforts of organized taxpayers examined evince a similar motivation.
Taxpayers' organizations have served as important instruments through which taxpaying
citizens in the United States have fulfilled the function and realized the status of reformer.
Although the number oftaxpayer's associations decreased somewhat after the 193 0s,
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they have remained numerous and a significant presence in American public life. One study
identified forty taxpayers' organizations in Massachusetts alone in the mid-1960s, almost as
many as there were in the entire nation forty years earlier.10 In the ensuing decades,
taxpayers have continued to resist taxes and to press for reformation of state and local
governments through taxpayers associations.
A tradition of tax resistance harks back to the nation's founding. The intensity and
scope of tax resistance and organized taxpayer activity in the twenty-first century reflect the
continuing vitality of a powerful antitax sentiment in the United States.11 News reports of
taxpayers' opposition to taxes in March 2009, sound very much like those one reads in the
newspapers of the 1930s, perhaps because the nation is arguably confronting its most serious
economic crisis since the Great Depression. On March 9,2009, the day before state-wide
town meetings in New Hampshire, the Associated Press reported that "keeping property
taxes in check is taking precedence" over all other matters with New Hampshire voters.12
Three days later the New Hampshire Union Leader declared that "[t]own meeting voters this
year have turned a skeptical eye toward anything that looks like unnecessary spending" and
that, like the Iowa farmer quoted in the National Municipal Review in 1933, they were
looking to buy less government.13 In Polk County, Iowa, officials are currently "bracing for
an onslaught of [property tax] protests" because "[e] verybody wants a reductionrightnow."14
Organized taxpayers in Chapel Hill, North Carolina and Hoboken, New Jersey have recently
participated in large-scale property tax protests.15 In West New York, the site of considerable
organized taxpayer activity during the 1930s, hundreds of taxpayers rallied on two occasions
to protest "soaring property taxes" and to demand a spending freeze.15 Clearly, taxes remain
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at or near the center of American politics in 2009, and the taxpayers' association will
continue to be a principal institution through which taxpayers and tax spenders contest the
citizens' tax burden, the fiscal constraints on the state, and the size and role of government
in the United States.
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